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Sofia A. Perez has written a historically 
informed account of the politics of do-
mestic financial liberalization in Spain in 
the past twenty-five years. She chal-
lenges the widespread assumption that 
international market forces alone explain 
domestic reforms in a formerly interven-
tionist state. In Spain, she suggests, do-
mestic elites seized on liberal economic 
arguments to promote agendas that had 
less to do with international pressures 
than with domestic politics. 
Reform was also driven, Perez con-
tends, by the specific political agenda of 
a small group of reformers within the 
central bank. This group's ascendance 
in Spanish policy-making circles began 
well before the death of Franco and the 
transition to democracy. A pattern of 
accommodation between state elites and 
private banking, which had character-
ized Spanish financial regulation from 
the beginning of this century, persisted 
through the process of liberalization. 
Spain is not the only activist state to opt 
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Preface 
T he regulation of banking and finance is often perceived as an abstruse if not arcane subject. Because of the technical issues that it involves, financial regulation seems less amenable to the 
tools of political or sociological analysis than other realms of the politi-
cal economy, such as labor relations and trade policy, where the lines of 
conflict appear to be more clearly defined and where the identities of 
the relevant actors reflect better understood cleavages. When the sub-
ject of fin~ncial regulation is taken up by political economists, it tends 
to be addressed almost solely in terms of structural economic forces, 
such as the inht!rent power of finance capital or the inexorable force of 
international financial market integration. The presumption is that the 
technical nature of financial regulation makes political variables, such 
as the identities of policymaking elites and their ideological agendas, 
irrelevant. This is especially the case wheIJ,fit comes to the way political 
economists think about the phenomenon of financial "liberalization" 
in a country such as Spain, where market-oriented reform coincided 
with political democratization, lending support to the idea that it was 
simply the natural, ahistorical corollary of the interplay of economic 
and political market forces in a new democracy. 
In this book I take issue with many of these common assumptions 
about the political underpinnings of financial regulation and in particu-
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lar those of financial liberalization. My analysis grew out of an effort to 
understand-why the liberalization of the domestic financial system in-
stituted in Spain during the late 1970s and early 1980s did not !?ear ;the 
• • · t . . 
fruits that neoliberal reform is expected to produce: a truly competitive 
financial system. My effort to understand this outcome led first to die 
observation of an underlying reality: that the highly oligopolistic pri-
vate banking sector in Spain was afforded almost as much protection 
during the reform process as it had enjoyed for nearly a century under a 
succession of political and regulatory regimes of very different ideologi-
cal hues. The explanation, I discovered, was not to be found simply in 
the structural economic "power" that the financial sector held within 
Spanish capital, as Spanish reformers had tools at their disposal to 
break that power during the 1980s. It was to be found, rather, in the 
historical origins of the reform agenda in Spain and in the political 
dynamic to which this agenda gave rise in the course of the reform 
process. Financial liberalization in Spain was brought about neither by 
international market forces nor by democratization, even if these fac-
tors played into it in important ways. It represents rather the culmina-
tion of a long historical process of competition within the state and of 
accommodation between succeeding groups of state elites with 
different political and ideological agendas and the private banking sec-
tor, a process that goes back to the early days of Spanish industrializa-
tion at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Like all books, this one benefited greatly from the input, critique, and 
assistance of people to whom I am very grateful. Foremost among them 
is Harvey B. Feigenbaum, whose keen and unapologetic expositions of 
the political economy perspective served to focus my mind on _the sub-
tleties of economic power and its relation to political processes in con-
temporary market economies. Thus I became interested in an aspect of 
Spain's contemporary political economy that has been all but ignored 
by scholars, though it is critical to an understanding of that country's 
contemporary economic problems. Throughout the course of my work, 
Harvey has been a steady source of encouragement, a helpful critic, and 
a good friend. 
Others who have contributed generously with their comments and 
whose input has helped to shape my ideas are Christopher S. Allen, 
Tom Cusack, Douglas Forsyth, Jeffry Frieden, John Griffin, Mauro 
Guillen, John Ikenberry, Richard Locke, Michael Loriaux, Brian 
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Loynd, Sylvia Maxfield, Cynthia McClintock, Eusebio Mujal-Leon, 
H~nry Jl. Nau, Ton Notermans, Juan Carlos R~driguez, Susan Sell, 
Stephen S. Smith, David S.9_skice, SigurtVitols, and John Zysman. All 
offered valuable advice and critique on various versions of the argu-
ment that I develop in this book. Special thanks are due to Gabriel 
Tortella, to Michael Loriaux, and to an anonymous reviewer for Cor-
nell University Press, all of whom offered important suggestions that 
helped in the final revision of the manuscript. I am also especially 
grateful to Roger Haydon of Cornell University Press for his early and 
persistent interest in the project and for his steady hand in guiding to 
fruition. 
The list of persons who assisted in my field research in Madrid in-
cludes a large qumber of government and private bank officials who 
were intimately involved in the reform process, all of whom were ex-
tremely generous with their time and their interest. I am convinced that 
the strategic choices of this group of reformers were guided by strong 
personal convictions and intellectual sincerity, and that they can be 
properly understood only in the light of history. 
Members of the academic community in Madrid offered their own 
insight and helped in a variety of ways. I am particularly grateful to 
Ramon Tamames for an early interview and for his encouragement; to 
Victor Perez Diaz for his support of the project and for giving me a 
home base at the Fundacion Juan March's Centro de Estudios Avan-
zados en Ciencias Sociales (cEAcs); to Ricardo Cortes and Jose Pedro 
Perez-Llorca for their time and help in facilitating critical interviews; to 
Professor Enrique Fuentes Quintana for making time for an extensive 
intfrview in his extremely busy schedule; to Martha Peach, Jesus Cuel-
lar;'Almudena Knecht, and the rest of the staff at the CEACS library for 
their assistance; to Paloma Gomez of the Bank of Spain's library for 
last-minute bibliographical assistance; and to Juan Carlos Rodriguez, 
who helped me develop the historical analysis through endless 
conversations. f 
I am indebted as well to institutions · that provided financial and 
technical support. A fellowship from the Western Europe Program of 
the Social Science Research Council in New York and another from the 
Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., financed two stays in 
Madrid for field research. The Fundacion Juan March afforded a col-
legial work environment, along with its extensive computer and library 
resources. After leaving Madrid, I found another excellent setting for 
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work at the Wissenschaftszentrum-Berlin for Sozialforschung in Berlin. 
I extend special t~anks to David Soskice for inviting me there and for 
his always brilliant contributions to my thinking, p~st and,.J':1':e.seqt. I 
also thank my colleagues in the Political Science Department at Boston 
University for providing a cordial and receptive work environment. 
On a more personal note, I thank David Bositis and James Lebovic, 
who helped me to think clearly about social science; my parents, who 
always made it clear that not thinking about politics was not an option; 
and Brian Loynd, for making life fun along the way. The two people to 
whom I dedicate this book are responsible for pulling two families 
through the upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s, and hence played no 
small role in allowing me to complete it. 
SOFIA A. PEREZ 
Boston, Massachusetts 
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Introduction I visible Hand 
and Political Legacy 
• 
T he. abandonment of state interventionism and the embrace of m~ket-oriented reform are two of the dominant themes of the late twentieth century. The two concepts are often seen as sides 
of the same coin and as developmer;its driven principally by the relent-
less pressure of international market integration. The assumption that 
it is markets that drive change in domestic regulatory institutions is 
reflected directly in political scientists' explanations of how the regula-
tory shift away from interventionism comes about. Market integration, 
so goes the conventional argument, is. compelling liberalization by un-
der~ining tlreqpacity of governments to insulate their economies and 
by increasing pressure from economic actors in favor of institutions 
that lead to greater allocative efficiency. 
This debasement of politics in our understanding of contemporary 
regulatory trends has a variety of consequences. One is the widespread 
belief that the same economic pressures that lead governments to aban-
don interventionism will also lead them to reform domestic market 
structures, thereby strengthening the capacity for adjustment of na-
tional economies. Another is the tendency to assume that the specific 
characteristics and motivations of state elites, deemed critical to an 
understanding of interventionism, are far less relevant to our under-
standing of market-oriented reform. If anything, the historical develop-
I 
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ment of the state may be seen to explain resistance or residual variation 
in a systemic process of market-driven regulatory convergence. All 
these conceptions are particularly prevalent in disc.us~ion&,,p.~ pational 
financial systems, where market pressures are believed to be imposing a 
"depoliticization" of financial flows on formerly activist states, 'be-
cause of the exit options that offshore markets and technological inno-
vations offer to investors. 
This book challenges the relegation of politics in our understanding 
of contemporary regulatory trends through a historical analysis of the 
politics of financial regulation in Spain-a country where the decision 
to abandon the postwar framework of state-directed credit allocation 
was taken relatively early and coincided with a transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a parliamentary democracy. Spain, I argue, 
offers a telling contrast to France, the country on which the interven-
tionist framework of financial regulation adopted under the Franco 
regime was modeled and whose experience serves as a point of refer-
ence for my analysis. Like post-Franco governments in Spain, the So-
cialist government in France chose to abandon selective forms of credit 
regulation in the mid-1980s. Yet this decision was accompanied by a 
deliberate and aggressive effort to expand the role of the capital market 
as a source of financing for French firms at the same time that tradi-
tional sources of state-directed bank credit to industry were being 
phased out. This overhaul of the domestic financial market was impor-
tant to the success of the French government's policy of "competitive 
disinflation" in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Spain, by contrast, 
where the commitment to abandon interventionism was made almost a 
decade earlier than in France, the reform process was characterized by a 
protracted failure to accompany credit deregulation with. .assertive 
measures to alter the oligopolistic structure of the domestic financial 
system. As a consequence, financial liberalization exacerbated the bur-
den of adjustment for nonfinancial firms, creating an underlying bias in 
the economy that ultimately undermined the neoliberally inspired pol-
icy strategy of the Socialist government that came to power in 1982. 
This contrast in the outcome and consequences of domestic financial 
liberalization, I suggest, reflects the fact that the abandonment of inter-
ventionism in these two European countries was driven in a first order 
not by changing sectoral pressures or allocative efficiency concerns 
(although those concerns featured prominently in the arguments of 
reformers) but by the problematic of macroeconomic, and in particular 
INTRODUCTION 
mol}etary, control. The common trend away from interventionism in 
, these countries, often adduced , as evidence that current regulatory 
changes are being determi!U!d by systemic market pressures, is best 
understood as a choice by political or·dected authorities to extricate the 
state from the allocation of credit in order to reduce the political costs 
of macroeconomic adjustment or austerity. Yet because this decision is 
a negative one, the abandonment of interventionism does not neces-
sarily result in adequate reform of market structures. Indeed, the 
domestic political dynamic behind the abandonment of intervention-
ism may even milita.te against such "market" reform. The result of 
liberalization will in any case depend heavily on the character of the 
domestic policymaking community and on the way financial reform 
feeds into the configuration of conflict and identities among state elites. 
Such an understanding of the trend away from interventionism chal-
lenges liberal l<convergence" arguments. And it suggests that variation 
in the outcomes of liberalization may be not just residual but in fact the 
consequences of the very same political dynamic that fosters the aban-
donment of interventionism. 
To say that the politics of market-oriented reform is tied to the 
character -0f the domestic policymaking community and to the con-
figuration of conflict and identities among state elites also is to say that 
it is historically rooted. The chapte£s covering the anti -interventionist 
reform process in this book are therefore preceded by a close look at the 
origins of the contemRorary Spanish financial system and the interven-
tionist regulatory framework instituted under the Franco regime. The 
politics of both interventionism and liberalization in Spain were condi-
tion~d by the way in which the development of the domestic banking 
sector and its rbie in Spanish industrialization were linked to the infla-
tionary finances of a waning, and later defeated, colonial state. This 
linkage among public finance, the banks, and industrialization in Span-
ish history had two kinds of consequences. First, it turned a private 
banking cartel into the dominant element oi national capital, and at the 
same time imbued the relationship between these banks and Spanish 
industry with a very tenuous character. Second, it played a central role 
in configuring the conflicts and battles within the state elite that would 
drive both of the major regulatory shifts of this century-toward inter-
ventionism in the early 1960s and against it in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The early relationship between the state and the banks thus gave rise to 
a latent conflict in the Spanish political economy between the interests 
3 
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of finance and those of producers, and at the same time set in motion a 
pattern of political accommodation between public officials and the 
banks that persisted through major regulatory ovei;haµls, a.J14 through 
the political transition. 
Although this book focuses on the politics of financial interventi~n-
ism and liberalization and on the way in which the Spanish experience 
challenges our understanding of these questions, it also offers a specific 
hi~torical perspective on Spain's present-day economic problems. Polit-
ical scientists tend to focus on the experience of post-Franco Spain as an 
instance of success. The literature on political regime transitions reg-
ularly highlights the reformist character of the Spanish transition in the 
1970s and its successful consolidation during the 1980s. Since the 
principal aim of this literature is to establish the conditions under 
which democratic institutions consolidate, it also tends to pair Spain 
exclusively with other recent democracies. This, however, may not be 
the best light in which to view other aspects of the recent Spanish 
experience. 
Without contesting the importance of the political transformation 
that has taken place in Spain since the mid-1970s, this book presents a 
somewhat less sanguine view of the outcomes of the Spanish transition. 
It starts with the economic situation in Spain a decade and a half after 
the end of the Franco regime, revealing a record that includes impor-
tant economic performance failures: a stagnating rate of technological 
innovation and productivity growth, "inflation-proneness" in the face 
of high interest rates, and a dismal record in the creation of employ-
ment. Though these economic problems do not negate the successful 
transformation of Spanish political institutions, they nonetheless raise 
important questions about just how the legacy of the Franco regime 
and the character of the regime transition h~ve impinged on the politi-
cal economy of democratic Spain. My analysis suggests that the Franco 
regime's legacy was not just one of failed policies or obsolete economic 
structures. It also involved the emergence of specific cleavages and 
agendas within the Spanish economic policymaking elite that proved 
critical in determining the choices of reformers during and after the 
transition. 
The story of Spanish financial reform represents a crucial yet com-
monly overlooked explanation for Spain's economic problems. It 
points to the cost of investment finance faced by firms to explain why 
the costs of adjustment have been so much higher in Spain than else-
INTRODUCTION 
whe.re in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
•ment (OnCD). It also suggests that analyses that f•cus exclusively on 
the creation of participatory institutions exclude an important aspect of 
the Spanish regime transition. Much of the eco~omic policy course 
pursued by democratic governments in Spain since 1977, I suggest, has 
been determined not by participatory institutions but by a contest 
within the state's policymaking elite that began well before 1977, and 
by a pattern of accommodations between state elites and the domestic 
financial sector th~t has roots even farther back in Spanish history. 
The argument advanced in this book develops in the form of a histor-
ical analysis. This approach allows us to explore not only the origins of 
Spain's contemporary problems .but also the antecedents and timing of 
major regulatory decisions, both of which are critical to the questions 
that I seek to ~onfront. The first chapter lays out the present-day em-
pirical puzzle and places the outcomes of the Spanish reform process in 
the context of prevalent explanations of financial liberalization. 
In chapter 2 I analyze the evolution of Spanish financial regulation 
before the introduction of an interventionist framework. This chapter 
explains the basic institutional characteristics of the financial system 
that emerged in Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
reveals the origins of the pattern of accommodations between state 
elites and the domestic banking cartel that persisted through subse-
quent regulatory overhauls. I place particular emphasis in both cases on 
the role of inflationary public finance in the early stages of Spanish 
industrialization. In chapter 3 I turn to the construction of an interven-
tionist framework of selective credit regulation in the early 1960s 
focu~i'ng both ·6n the continuing pattern of accommodation and on the 
similarities between the Spanish and French postwar experiences. In 
spite of differences in the existing institutional frameworks, the politi-
cal goals of ascendant state elites and their economic policy choices in 
the two countries produced a remarkable, degree of regulatory con-
vergence during this period. 
I then describe the beginnings of the regulatory turn away from 
interventionism in Spain, linking it to a subtle shift within the state in 
favor of central-bank reformers that began in the late 1960s. As in an 
earlier shift within the Francoist elite, which led to the introduction of 
French-styled indicative planning and an interventionist regulatory 
framework, changes in the economic context (both domestic and inter-
6 BANKING ON PRIVILEGE 
national) played an important role in abetting the shift at the end of the 
1960s. Yet thefdid so because they impinged upon a particular politi-
cal configuration within the Spanish policymaking .elite. Alth<lugh the 
shift away from interventionism in Spain thus can easily be constrqed 
to support a market-driven view of liberalization, I seek to demonst;ate 
that such an exercise obscures the domestic political dynamics behind 
the initiation of reform. 
Jn chapters 5 and 6 I follow the evolution of financial reform through 
the Spanish regime transition and the Socialist victory of 1982. The 
transition created a window of opportunity that the reformers were 
able to use to advance both their agenda for institutional reform and 
the central bank's position of influence within the state. However, be-
cause they saw themselves as advancing a neoliberal agenda that might 
be jeopardized by the new political process, they also sought to estab-
lish a relationship of reciprocal consent with the private banks to 
strengthen their influence within the transition governments. The out-
come was a highly biased course of reform. The Socialist electoral 
victory of 1982 served to consolidate the shift within the policymaking 
elite, producing continued accommodation with the banking sector in 
the process of regulatory reform, and a distinctly nationalist stance 
toward that sector following Spanish entry into the European Com-
munity (EC) in 1986. In chapter 7, I explore the links between financial 
reform and the macroeconomic policy strategy pursued under the Par-
tido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) up until the crisis of the Euro-
pean Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93, returning in the 
Conclusion to the insights that the Spanish experience and its contrast 
to France hold for our understanding of the domestic politics of finan-
cial liberalization. 
I 
The Spanish E~onomy 
and Financial Reform 
When, with the death of Francisco Franco in November 1975, Spain emerged from almost forty years of authoritarian rule, the country faced not only its most important political 
challenge since the Civil War but, simultaneously, its worst economic 
crisis in over two decades. The nadir of that crisis still lay ahead, in the 
second oil shock of 1979. But there already was a widespread aware-
ness among the political elites who undertook the political transforma-
tion in 1976 that its success would depend on the country's ability to 
adju~~ to new economic realities. The two issues, economic adjustment 
and political change, thus came to be strongly related in the transition 
process. Almost from the outset, economic policy was placed in the 
hands of reformist economists within the public administration and the 
academic community who sought a sharp break with the intervention-
ist orientation of the Franco regime, and fpr this purpose, set out to 
ground the process of political change ill' a commitment to market-
oriented economic reforms. Defying widespread expectations, this 
commitment not only persisted, but was indeed bolstered with the 
Socialist victory of 1982. 
The steady neoliberal orientation in Spanish economic policy since 
the transition is often credited with bringing the country firmly into the 
league of advanced industrialized countries. Many observers have 
7 
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sought lessons in the Spanish case for other countries moving away 
from autli.oritarian rule. In the literature on political transitions, Spain 
often appears -as the model of a successful "dual trapsi!ion/; p~ a coun-
try that successfully (or even "miraculously") combined democrat(za-
tion and economic adjustment. 1 However, the tendency to think about 
the Spanish experience primarily in comparison to that of other recent 
democracies has led comparativists to neglect important signs of failure 
in the neoliberal economic adjustment strategy pursued by Spain's post-
Fr.anco governments. Indeed, the Spanish experience also holds dif-
ferent lessons about the association between political and economic 
liberalization. 
On certain scores, such as the fight against inflation, the performance 
of the Spanish economy during the 1980s compared favorably to that 
of other countries that had undergone recent political democratization, 
such as Greece and Portugal. The laudatory view of the Spanish experi-
ence, however, does not give due importance to the fact that Spain's 
economic starting point in the early 1970s, with an income per capita 
that stood at 53 percent of the OECD average, was different from that 
of these other countries. It also disregards the fact that Spain experi-
enced one of the most severe and prolonged recessions in Europe in the 
first half of the 1980s. Total employment between 1975 and 1985 fell 
by 19 percent in Spain, compared to only a marginal decline in the rest 
of OECD Europe, and the unemployment rate at 22 percent in 1985 
was more than twice the EC average. GDP per capita, meanwhile, fell 
precipitously in comparative terms, to as low as 39 percent of the 
OECD average in 1985. 2 The recession also lasted longer in Spain than 
in the rest of the OECD. Employment continued to fall through the first 
half of 1985 and a turnaround was possible only after Spairj signed its 
treaty of accession to the European Community, which set off a massive 
foreign-investment-driven boom that lasted almost five years. 
1 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), PP· 
8-9; and Nancy Bermeo, "Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength in Successful Dual Transi--
tions: Lessons from Spain," Journal of Politics, August 1994, pp. 601-27 Bermeo 
emphasizes the extent to which macroeconomic adjustment was postponed in Spain until 
after the Socialist victory, which she argues was critical to the success of the politicai 
transition. Although I do not disagree with her assessment of how policy accommoda 
political considerations before the Socialist victory, I focus on the agenda of institutional 
reform of the individuals in charge of economic policy since the first Suarez government· 
1976. 
2 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain (Paris, 1986, 1991). 
THE SPANISH ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL REFORM 
Eyen as it came out of recession the Spanish economy exhibited signs 
6t important underlying problems. An average annual growth rate of 
almost 5 percent from 1986.through 1989 allowed per capita income 
to rise ag~in to 56 percent of the OECD average;earning the Socialist 
government much praise for the acumen of its neoliberal policy stance 
from international observers. Yet by 1990, this second Spanish eco-
nomic miracle had given way to profound pessimism. Reports by 
various economic agencies noted virtually complete stagnation in the 
rate of productivity growth, a worrisomely low pace of technological 
innovation, and a~ c:1brupt halt to the process of modernization that 
Spanish firms had begun in the mid-1970s. 3 These problems were com-
pounded by the persisting failure to achieve certain macroeconomic 
policy objectives,-in particular the top priority of the Socialist govern-
ment in the late 1980s: the reduction of inflation to the level of core 
countries in th~ European Monetary System (EMS). The OECD repeat-
edly noted the "stickiness" of Spanish inflation rates (at around 6.5 
percent between 1989 and 1991), despite high interest rates and a tight 
monetary policy stance, and the inflation proneness of the Spanish 
economy. According to one of its estimates, "the ris_e in unemployment 
or loss of output necessary to bring inflation down by one percentage 
point" was "twice as large in Spain as in other EMS countries. "4 Other 
observers pointed out that the Spanish economy had acquired all of the 
central features of a "Dutch disease" economy: a combination of poor 
export performance, rapid growth of the less competitive sectors of the 
economy, an overvalued currency, high interest rates, and inflation. 5 
The most troublesome aspect of Spanish economic performance 
sine~ the. late 1970s, however, has been unemployment. It rose from 5 
perc~I'lt in 197'6,to 22 percent in 1985 and never declined below 16 
3 El Pais, November 12, 1990; Juan Antonio Maroto, "La situaci6n empresarial en 
Espaiia (1982-1989)," Cuadernos de Informaci6n Econ6mica (FIES), nos. 44/45, 1990. 
4 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain (Paris, 1992), pp. 63-65. 
5 Candido Muiioz Cidad, "Un ajuste febril," El Pais, March 27, 1991. The source of 
overvaluation in a "Dutch disease" economy is a sector that is experiencing explosive 
growth, thereby producing large inflows of foreign capital. The overvaluation of the 
currency and the inflationary effect of capital inflows create a bias against investment in 
other tradable sectors and is thus associated with deindustrialization. The term has 
typically been used to describe instances where a natural energy source played this role, 
such as the discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands or the windfall profits experienced 
by oil-producing countries following the price shocks induced by the Organization of 
~etroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In the Spanish case, the effect derived from the 
inflow of short-term capital responding principally to high Spanish interest rates and from 
the sale of national assets to foreigners. 
9 
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percent during the years of rapid growth. This outcome is all the more 
staggering because the rise in unemployment did not, as in many other 
European countries, reflect a rise in the work fore~ pc!fti~ipation;rate. 
Indeed, the participation rate actually decreased from 1976 thrm,lgh 
1985, and in the second half of the decade recovered only mode~tly 
because a rise in the female participation rate was almost outweighed 
by the continued decline in the male participation rate. After the EMS 
crisis in 1992-93, employment shedding led unemployment to rise 
even further, to almost 25 percent in 1994. In 1996, at the time of the 
Socialist government's electoral defeat, it remained above 22 percent 
(still more than twice the average of the European Union [EU]).6 
The story of Spanish economic performance thus appears largely as 
one of frustrated expectations. Economic analyses of Spain's economic 
problems almost invariably emphasize one (or both) of two factors: (1) 
labor market rigidities, attributed to the paternalistic labor law frame-
work inherited from the Franco era and blamed for excessive labor 
costs, and (2) the relatively high levels of public deficits that have 
appeared in the posttransition period. 7 The former is seen as a direct 
drag on job creation (and more indirectly on investment), and the latter 
is generally used to explain the persistence of high real interest rates, 
which discourage Spanish firms from investing in productive capacity 
and hence also constrain the creation of new jobs. It is this latter 
phenomenon that concerns us here. 
The overall level of Spanish interest rates during the 1980s is sum-
marized in Table 1. The table suggests that real interest rates in Spain, 
after being low by international standards up to 1982, shot up thereaf-
ter, reaching very high levels after 1986 and through the end of the 
1980s. Not only were real interest rates exceptionally high when com-
pared to the rest of the OECD, in particuiar after 1987, but they ap-
peared to respond little to the changing nature of economic activity, 
6 For an extensive review of the empirical evidence on the unemployment phenomen 
in Spain, see Olivier Blanchard et al., Spanish Unemployment: Is There a Soluti 
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995). This review does not, how 
consider the role of the financial market. 
7 On the role of labor market variables, see in particular L. Angel Rojo, "Desemplco 
factores reales," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 8, 1981; Juan Dolado and 
Bentolila, "Labour Flexibility and Wages: Lessons from Spain," Economic Policy 
(1994); and Blanchard et al., Spanish Unemployment. On the role of the deficit, see, 
example, L. Angel Rojo, "El deficit publico," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 
1984, and Jose Maria Gonzalez-Paramo, Jose Maria Roldan, and Miguel Sebastian, l 
of Fiscal Policy in Spain, Bank of Spain Working Paper no. 9121 (Madrid, 1991). 
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N 
* 0) ,- r- V tO tO 
inflation, and public deficits during the second half of the 1980s and 
0) in 
~~LOccitci ~ ~ 
the early 1990s:.Table 1 also shows that, although both real credit rates • 
and the real return on Spanish public debt were high ~fter J?~.2, J'rea- ~ ,{i; 
sury rates experienced greater variation at the end of the decade, yet 
0) MONr-'f-
0) cry ai O)··c.o M ,-....: . 
they had only a limited effect on credit rates, a point that I return. to 
~ 
later. 
The interest rate data in Table 1 illustrate the high cost of credit and 
C) 
* 0) LOC:Or-O">,-LOV 0) ~ lO ai cx:i r- N ,...._: 
tht high return on financial assets in the Spanish economy during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Both of these variables are important deter-
minants of firms' investment behavior. However, a more direct measure 
0) 
* a:, N,-O')U"),-(00::, 0) 
~LriCOCOC.O~C.O 
of the impact of interest rates on investment and economic activity is 
the actual cost of financing that firms incur to finance investment in 
productive capacity. Because of differences in accounting and reporting ~ * O'> LO 0::, N t-- O> ..::t 
standards, reliable comparable data of this sort are difficult to come by. 
0) O')~C:Occi-.::ic::i(O ~ 
One of the few sources is the European Commission's BACH project, 
which harmonizes data collected by European central banks on the r- ;f!. 
balance sheets of large nonfinancial firms. Table 2 shows the evolution 
a:, ,-r-l(),-,-0:::,0, 
0) ;:::~O'>ccii.riciC.O 
of the ratio of financial costs to external financing in different indus- ~ 
trialized countries, as computed from this data set. ~ co ;f!. >, 
The BACH project data indicate that the average cost of investment a:, NNONtOVtO en 0) ;::Lri~~L.O~,...._: :::, .2 
finance born by Spanish firms (even very large ones) was high in com- ~ > 
parison with that of firms in other EC countries from the mid-1980s 
,,.,-
N ~ 
0) c:: 
on. In the absence of perfect international capital mobility, this might 0) l:l3 ;f!. 
~ 
'T 0) ~U'.:?<X:?"!<X! N &l 
be attributed to the greater scarcity of capital in Spain than in the other 
N ~ ~LO~~a:, co 
-lg a:, 
0) 
countries covered by the data. Two observations, however, speak 
~ ~ 
.,; ~ a, 
against such a simple explanation. One is that the financial costs of 
·.:::: 
"E ti!; ;f!. <O :::, Lt')CX)t--C)C'I') LO 
Spanish firms not only were high; they also responded far less than the 
0 0) = u ~ ~U')~~cx:i co 
"' c::: 
Cl. 
•; en 
financial costs of firms in the other countries to major imprqvements in 
a, LU 
> 
a, a, 
en -0 
economic conditions over the course of the decade. Many of the stan- .s 
0 
en 
* 
u 
M c::: 
dard economic fundamentals commonly associated with high inter § 
a:, en O CO CD O'> 
"' 0) 
~tci~;!:c:ci a; 
CD 
rates-the public deficit, inflation, and excessive indebtedness on 
0, 
.!: 
c::: 
"2 
part of firms-improved significantly in Spain over the period. 
"§ 0 
J;l ·;;; 
:::, en 
overall public deficit (including that of both the central and territo 
c::: N 
* 
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governments and the social security system) was cut from almost 0 
,- ,- ,- ,- c..:, 
en c..:, 
percent in 1985 to 3.1 percent in 1987 and remained below 3.5 per 
0 !=!., ~ ~ 
through the end of the 1980s. Inflation was reduced from 8.8 percent 
in ~ 
* 
-0 
0 
u a:, O<O N LO u 0) o:::i c.o c:i c:i a, 
1985 to 4.8 percent in 1988, rising by 2 percent in 1989, but stea <i'i 
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moderating again thereafter. Over the same period, Spanish firms "' ::c c::: u:: c..:, 
matically increased their self-financing ratio, which had plumm ....; 
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from 31 percent in the late 1970s to an extremely low negative 12 
percent at the lkginning of the 1980s, but rose sharply thereafter to an 
average of 52 percent from 1983 through 1985 and ~n ~v.,er~e of 92 
percent for the boom period of 1986 through 1990. 8 • 
The second critical observation is that the cost of investment finance 
borne by Spanish firms over the period was high not only in comparison 
with that of firms in other countries but also in relation to the rate of 
return on investments. This point is captured by a parameter called the 
"leverage effect," which measures the difference between the average 
economic rate of return of firms and the apparent cost of external 
financing or real interest rate. 9 In a perfect financial market, this differ-
ential should be at or near zero. If it is positive, firms can (on average) 
increase the profitability (or rate of return) of their equity simply by 
borrowing money. This creates a perverse incentive for firms to borrow 
beyond the level justified by the profitability of their investments, a 
point often raised as one of the principal arguments against intervention 
in financial markets. If the leverage effect is negative, however, firms will 
on average be decreasing the profitability of their equity by borrowing 
or taking on other forms of external financing to finance their 
investments-a possibility that receives less attention in the literature 
on financial regulation, although it has its own serious implications. 
A series of analyses on the same sample of firms represented in the 
BACH project reveals a negative leverage effect in Spain of very serious 
proportions, beginning in 1978 and lasting through the early 1990s. 
The magnitude of the effect declines as the economy turns to boom · 
the mid-1980s, but the sign of the ratio remains negative througho 
the decade. The positive trend, moreover, ends at the very height of 
boom in 1988, and there is a sharp increase in the negative.magnitu 
of the effect thereafter. 10 Though these ~nalyses are based on da 
collected by the Bank of Spain, they received remarkably little attenti 
8 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1988, p. 48. The self-financing ratio is the ratio 
"retained income gross of depreciation and provisions divided by investment in 
financial assets." The 1986-1990 figure is based on data from OECD, Financial S 
tics: Financial Account of Non-Financial Enterprises (Paris, 1995), pp. 40-42. 
9 The leverage effect ratio is this difference weighted by the net debt-to-equity ra · 
firms. 
10 Juan Antonio Maroto Acin, "La financiaci6n empresarial en Espana y el · 
financiero," Economia Industrial, no. 293, 1993; Alvaro Cuervo, "Analisis econ6 
financiero de la empresa espaiiola," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 3, 1980. 
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in th.e economic literature on Spain. Nor did they feature prominently 
i11 Spanisq public debate during ' the 1980s. 11 Yet,tthe finding of an 
enduring and significant neg~,tive leverag~ effect is of indisputable sig-
nificance. for understanding the performance of die Spanish economy, 
as it suggests that, for well over a decade, Spanish firms on average 
were decreasing the return on their capital when they took on external 
financing to invest in productive capacity. 
The persistence of these conditions over such a long time represents a 
strong disincentive for investment in productive capacity, technological 
innovation, and job c~eation, in particular in sectors that were subject 
to external competition and could therefore not easily pass on their 
costs to consumers. Firms that were able to ride out the recession of the 
early 1980s respoljlded by drastically reducing their recourse to external 
financing. This is cdmmonly seen as a salutary development, since it 
brought about' a reduction in the financial vulnerability of Spanish 
enterprises. Yet the incentives entailed in the negative leverage effect 
apply not only to the decision to take on external financing but also to 
the way businesses allocate their own retained earnings. The balance 
sheet data of nonfinancial firms in Spain during the mid- to late 1980s 
shows that.the income firms derived from investing in financial assets 
grew far more rapidly than the return they made on their own opera-
tions (see Table 3). A large share of the profits accrued by Spanish 
industry during the boom years was therefore "ploughed [either di-
rectly or through the financial system] into the creation of speculative 
service industry ventures-mainly in the property market-rather than 
into production." 12 The high cost of investment finance, as reflected in 
the P.frsistence of the negative leverage effect, was thus limiting the 
share·of the fihancial system's resources that was directed toward pro-
ductive investments in competitive sectors. 
There has been little research into the causes of this problem in Spain. 
In theory, the leverage effect is as much a function of the factors deter-
mining the economic return to investment ,as of the cost of finance. 
Among the latter are labor costs, the variable emphasized by the gov-
~ According to officials I interviewed in Madrid during 1991-1992, this may have been 
re1a:ult of the general dearth of firm-level economic research in Spain an outcome 
.L. finato ~he overwhelming concentration of economic expertise in the ce;tral bank and 
1111: nc1al sector. 
12 
"ma' · 1-r· 
,., nc,a • tmes, March 15, 1991. 
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Table 3. Balance sheet returns of nonfinancial firms, 1985-1990 (growth over previous years) 
Balance sheet items 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Gross operating profits 10.9% 12.8% 18.2% 14.34/o ·5'.~o,{,-. 0.2% 
Net operating profits 7.7 13.7 23.3 19.4 3.7 - .4.4 
Income on financial ssets 14.2 24.5 34.7 14.0 26.3 8.0 
Source: Banco de Espana, Central de Balances, 1990, p. 20, Table I1.A.1.3. Item 2 is equal to item 1 minus 
provisions. 
Table 4. Rate of return on capital of U.S. firms abroad, 1985-1988 
1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Spain 14.1% 17.3% 39.8% 34.2% 26.3% 
World 15.0 15.7 19.3 15.2 16.3 
EC 21.6 21.6 25.6 14.7 20.9 
Portugal 22.2 32.4 26.9 32.9 28.6 
Italy 19.5 39.8 25.8 12.4 24.4 
Greece -8.5 -82.2 30.1 35.0 -6.4 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, in DECO, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991. 
ernment as the key to the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. 
Several facts, however, suggest that what was exceptional in Spain 
during the 1980s were the financial costs faced by firms rather than any 
other factor affecting the return on investment. The profit margins of 
Spanish manufacturing firms were, at an average of almost 4 percent 
for the 1980s, considerably higher than those of other EMS countries 
(which averaged 1.5 percent for the decade). And comparative data on 
the rate of return on investment by American multinationals (Table 4 
show that the return on their Spanish operations rose dramatically ov 
the course of the decade, doubling their w9rld average at its.end. Ext 
nal assessments of Spanish labor costs, moreover, tended to highli 
the moderating effect of wages on inflation. And although wage gro 
accelerated after 1989, Spain continued to be identified as a coun 
with very favorable gross wage levels and profit rates by the OECD 
late as 1991. 13 
If the exceptional factor behind the strong negative leverage effect 
Spain was the cost of investment finance, then the explanation is to 
found in the determinants of that cost. In any economy, the cost 
finance is determined by a combination of macroeconomic policy 
13 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, pp. 59-60, 63-64, 
THE SPANISH ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL REFORM 
sions., opportunity costs, and structural features of the financial mar-
ket. In Spain, where the capital market remained t,xtremely narrow 
. through the 1980s (a key strw::tural featur.e), the cost of finance was 
: main°ly defined by the rates charged .. by banks o~ credit, which re-
mained by far the principal source of -external financing for firms. 
Credit rates are a function of macroeconomic policy and of those struc-
tural aspects of the financial market that determine the degree of mar-
ket power of borrowers and lenders, as well as those that impinge on 
the price that the puplic treasury has to pay on its debt. 
Most attempts to explain the high level of credit rates in Spain focus 
on macroeconomic policy, particularly the level of public spending and 
public deficits.14 More specifically, the prevalent view among Spanish 
officials during tht 1_980s was that interest rates were high because 
monetary policy was forced to counteract a lack of fiscal restraint in the 
government's fight against inflation. The political dimension of the 
problem would accordingly have to be found in the government's in-
ability to impose a sufficient degree of fiscal restraint. In chapter 7 I 
argue that the policy strategy pursued by the Socialist (PSOE) gov-
ernment during the 1980s and the unorthodox policy mix that this 
brought about did indeed play an important role in aggravating the 
financial costs faced by Spanish firms, although my interpretation of 
the causes of that mix differ from the ones implied in the economic 
analyses referred to. For now, however, I will only point out several 
reasons why the "failure of fiscal restraint" thesis constitutes at best a 
very incomplete explanation of the level of financial costs in Spain. 
First, if the high level of credit rates in Spain was a result of "crowd-
ing-o~" by the public treasury, then 'this crowding-out effect itself 
seems 'to have catried an important structural component (i.e., one that 
cannot be attributed to the character of fiscal policy, present or past). 
Although the level of Spanish budget deficits-at an average of 3.5 
percent of GDP for 19 87-91-was not low, it was not particularly high 
by OECD standards. Moreover, the real cost pf financing the deficit in 
Spain (as reflected in the differential between real Spanish Treasury 
:;. ~• for example, Jose Luis Raymond Bara and Jose Palet, "Factores determinantes de 
~-re:iies de interes en Espana," Pape/es de Ewnomia Espanola, no. 43, 1990; 
for Paramo et al., Issues of Fiscal Policy m Spam; and the OECD surveys of Spain ani9~s-:io. The_~xp~an~tory r?le_of fiscal poli~y is questioned in Fernando Ballabriga ~ Sebastian, 1:efic1t _pubhco y t1pos de mteres en la economfa espaiiola: {Existe 
de causal1dad? Revtsta de Economia Espanola 10, no. 2 (1993). 
17 
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rates and international rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
dispropQrtionate with the modest level of the Spanish public debt, 
which at 47 percent of GDP in 1991 remained well below tl;ie EC 
average (and Maastricht convergence criterion) of 60 pe;~~nt. 
Second, the overriding importance attributed to fiscal variables'~lso 
is challenged by the limited degree of variation in credit rates. Although 
the level of public deficits rose significantly during the regime, transi-
tion, it also varied considerably over the 1980s, whereas the level of 
credit rates charged by banks hardly budged. As table 1 shows, real 
credit rates increased and remained very high in the second half of the 
1980s, when the general government deficit (which includes the ter-
ritorial government deficit and social security system) was being 
drastically cut, from almost 7 percent in 1985 to 3.2 percent in 1987 
Credit rates also varied little in relation to reference rates such as the 
rediscount and Treasury rates. The "feed-through of cuts in money and 
security market rates to credit institutions' rates vis-a-vis customers," 
one Bank of Spain analysis noted, was very weak. 15 All of this suggests 
that something other than the macroeconomic magnitudes so per-
sistently emphasized by Spanish officials accounted for the high cost of 
investment credit. This something else is to be found in the character of 
the Spanish financial market. 
In one of the few analyses that depart from the standard emphasis on 
macroeconomic variables, economist Antonio Torrero offers a closer 
look at how commercial banks in the 1980s were able to maintain high 
credit rates in the face of sharply changing economic conditions. 16 He 
suggests that the principal cause of high rates in Spain in fact changed 
repeatedly. In a first phase, lasting from 1977 to 1.982, the main factor 
allowing banks to charge high credit rates in the throes ?f a deep 
industrial recession was to be found in the desperate situation faced by 
Spanish businesses and in their high level of indebtedness. "This depen-
dence on external financing, the economic crisis, and high interest rates 
themselves, left Spanish firms struggling to survive with no option to 
negotiate costs," lowering their self-financing ratio to the extremely 
low - 12 percent referred to earlier. 
In a second phase, from 1983 through 1985, firms managed to re-
15 
"Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy," Economic Bulletin, Bank of Spain, 
April 1992, p. 27 
16 Antonio Torrero, "La formaci6n de los tipos de interes y los problemas actuales de la 
economia espaiiola," Economistas (Madrid), no. 39, 1989. 
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Table ~- Banks' credit portfolios, 1985-1989 (billions of pesetas) 
1/1/85 3~1/89 Percent variation 
credit io businesses . 
Total 10,208.8 13,982.3 37.0 
Agricultural ctivities 422.1 699.0 65.3 
Energy (nonutilities) 341.5 185.1 -46.8 
Utilities (electricity, gas, water) 688.1 1,429.9 107.8 
Mineral extraction/transformation 620.3 469.4 -24.3 
Chemical industries 475.2 432.2 -9.1 
Metal 985.3 1054.0 7.0 
Construction materials 960.0 452.3 -52.9 
Food and tobacco 551.6 700.8 271 
Other manufacturing 1,119.9 1,477.3 31.9 
Construction 1,119.7 1,738.4 55.3 
Commerce 1,267.7 2,255.6 77.9 
Transport and communicatio~ 415.6 694.9 67.2 
Real estate ventures 387.0 650.8 68.2 
Other activities (exC8J)t financing to other financial 
853.8 1,772.5 107.6 institutions) 
Credit to individuals 2,182.7 5,552.2 154.4 
For housing 1,273.1 2,690.2 111.3 
For consumer goods and services 4371 1,571.8 256.0 
Other (including purchase ofassets) 475.5 1289.8 171.3 
Source: Adapted fCQm Antonio Torrero, "La formaci6n de los tipos de interes y los problemas ctuales de la 
economra espaiiola, Economistas (Madrid), no. 39, 1989, Table 3, p. 40. 
duce their borrowing requirements drastically, increasing their self-
financing level to as much as 52 percent by 1985. During this phase, 
however, the banks were able to prevent a significant fall in their inter-
est margins (:\espite the collapse of credit demand from firms by shifting 
their Eesources into public debt. In a third phase, starting with the 
dema~d boo~id '1986, the economy recouped and the return on public 
debt became less attractive. Nonfinancial firms, scathed by the trau-
matic experience of the early 1990s, continued to rely heavily on self-
financing. However, the banks were able to raise both their interest and 
earning margins without cutting their ope,ating costs by shifting a 
substantial amount of their resources to those credit users that were 
least sensitive to high interest rates: utilities and service ventures that 
were not exposed to foreign competition and hence could pass on high 
financial costs to consumers (see the breakdown of credit recipients in 
Table 5) and households. Indeed, one of the most dramatic develop-
ments associated with this redeployment of bank credit was a boom in 
new consumer credit to individuals, which at 2.8 percent of GDP in 
19 
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1988 was triple the rate of 0.9 percent found in the United States. 17 
Meanwhile, t~ net lending capacity (or savings) of households de-
clined from ~.i percent in 1985 to 1.4 percent in J9~8. 1~., . 
Torrero's analysis identifies the changing sources of credit dem~nd 
that allowed Spanish banks to maintain their credit rates through. the 
1980s despite the altered behavior of nonfinancial firms. However, 
such demand factors resulted in extraordinary credit rate levels only 
because of the existence of an oligopolistic financial market structure. 
Tliis structure is reflected in cross-national data on commercial bank 
cost and profit margins in Table 6, which shows that Spanish banks had 
far higher cost, interest, and earning margins than other West European 
countries. The evolution of those margins for Spanish banks since the 
mid-1970s (see Table 7) indicates that the banks were able to increase 
significantly both their interest and earning margins without decreasing 
their costs during the onset of the recession in the 1970s and that they 
did not have to adjust these ratios in any significant way during the 
1980s. As one OECD report noted, "relatively high unit costs [had] not 
prevented banks from enjoying sizeable intermediation margins," and 
"high profits in a context of relatively high costs are a symptom of 
monopolistic behavior within the banking sector and of a monopolistic 
position of banks within the wider financial system." 19 
Whatever the effect of macroeconomic policy, any explanation of the 
high financial costs born by Spanish firms in the 1980s must include the 
impact of the financial market structure. The puzzle arises from the fact 
that the most perverse effects of that structure-the rise in the banks' 
cost and earnings margins in the midst of a deep recession-occurred in 
the context of a financial liberalization process and persisted more than 
a decade after the initiation of that process. Indeed, the persistence of 
oligopolistic conditions in the market for corporate finance might sur-
prise anyone who followed journalistic accounts of developments in 
Spain during the 1980s, which invariably emphasized the changes that 
17 Ibid., p. 43. 
18 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991, p. 67 The decline in household savings also 
was clearly affected by other variables, such as changes in taxation, but the role of the 
banks in promoting such credit is an important factor in this change in the saving 
propensity of households. 
19 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1988, p. 58. See also Economic Surveys: Spain, 
1986, pp. 44-48; Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, p. 33; and Ramon Caminal, Jordi 
Gual, and Xavier Vives, "Competition in Spanish Banking," in Jean Dermine, ed., 
European Banking in the 1990s (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 292. 
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Table 6. cost and earnings margins of large commercial banks in seven countries, 1990 (percent of 
average' balance sheet total) • 
Spain France G.ermany Bel~ium Italy Netherlands U.K. 
Gross earnings 
5.62% 2.39% 3.56% 1.75% 4.16% 2.69% 5.03% margin 
Interest margin 4.36 1.79 2.31 1.35 2.91 1.92 3.01 
Other income 1.26 0.60 1.24 0.40 1.25 0.77 2.02 
Operating costs 3.29 1.56 2.25 1.21 2.72 1.86 3.37 
Net earnings 2.33 0.83 1.31 0.54 1.44 0.83 1.66 
Profit pretax 1.72 0.31 0.83 0.33 0.90 0.51 0.65 
Profit after tax 1.22 0.36 0.49 0.27 0.70 0.38 0.34 
source: DECO, Bank Profitability,· 1981-1990 (Paris. 1992). 
Table 7. Income statements of rarge Spanish commercial banks, 1974-1990 (percent) 
Interest Gross earnings Operating Net 
Year mcl[gin margin• costs• earningsb 
1974 3.96% 3.97% 2.43% 1.54% 
1978 4.66 5.43 3.53 1.90 
1979 4.33 5.53 3.49 2.04 
1980 5.14 6.15 3.97 2.17 
1981 5.15 6.10 4.02 2.08 
1982 4.82 5.82 3.80 2.03 
1983 4.48 5.47 3.40 2.08 
1984 4.34 5.25 3.27 1.98 
1985 4.18 5.22 3.28 1.94 
1986 4.50 5.44 3.71 1.72 
1987 4.72 6.02 3.74 2.28 
1988 4.73 6.07 ·3.46 2.61 
1989 4.61 5.70 3.29 2.41 
1990 ,. 4._6;1 5.62 3.29 2.33 ', • . 
' ',. 
•Percent ofaverage assets. 
bBefore provisions and tax. . 
Sources: 1974-79: Antonio Torrero, Tendencias defsistema financiero espaiiol(Madnd: H. Bl_ume,_ 1982), p. 
19; 1980: OECD, Bank Profitability, 1980-1984 (Paris, 1987); 1981-90: OECD, Bank Profltab1flty, 1981-
1990 (Paris, 1992). f 
liberalization entailed and the way in which it challenged the status quo 
in the banking sector. A closer examination of developments in the 
Spanish financial sector, however, shows how regulatory change was 
calibrated to sustain the banks' position within the system through the 
end of the decade. 
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The perverse repercussions of financial liberalization in Spain de-
rived frolll a rf=!form process characterized by a fundamental set of 
biases. Credi~ deregulation, which was forcefully initiated in thf late 
1970s, failed to be accompanied for more than a decade ~y measures 
that would have breathed any real competition into the domestic tor-
porate finance market. Although other financial intermediaries, most 
notably foreign banks and domestic savings institutions, were allowed 
to expand their activities, they remained hampered by operational re-
strictions that discouraged them from exerting downward pressure on 
credit rates during the 1980s. Foreign banks were made to depend for 
resources on a domestic interbank money market that was tightly con-
trolled by the Big Seven commercial banks. Although they played a 
leading role in organizing syndicated loans and in other financial inno-
vations, foreign banks were therefore not able, despite several attempts, 
to exert downward pressure on credit rates in the market at large. 
Savings banks expanded their deposit base significantly at the expense 
of the domestic commercial banks, thanks to changes in their regula-
tory treatment. Yet they were prevented from expanding beyond their 
regional base until 1989. Moreover, because they had even higher oper-
ating costs than the commercial banks, they were inclined to allocate 
their resources in the same manner as the latter (toward public debt and 
consumer credit) rather than to compete aggressively in the market for 
corporate finance by cutting credit rates. The narrow and archaic Span-
ish stock market, meanwhile, was left virtually intact for more than a 
decade after the initiation of credit deregulation. 
The reform effort thus did little to create alternative sources of fi-
nance for the great majority of Spanish firms that were not large 
enough to access the Euromarkets, and it even skewed the finan•cial cost 
structure of the large firms represented in the BACH project data. 20 
The effects of this first bias were exacerbated by a second aspect of the 
reform process pertaining to the public debt market. As noted, the shift 
into public debt served as a compensatory mechanism for the banks 
during the 1980s. It allowed them to prepare the shift into consumer 
20 There was a substantial rise in the financing raised by Spanish firms on the Eu-
romarkets after 1979, but it was limited to a very small number of firms. Twenty-five 
firms (predominantly electric utilities and highway construction companies) accounted 
for over 80 percent of Eurocredits raised between 1974 and 1986. See Angel Berges and 
Emilio Ontiveros, "El coste de! endeudamiento exterior," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, 
Suplementos sobre el Sistema Financiero, no. 22, 1988. 
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!endiI].g in the face of drastically changed borrowing behavior by Sp_an-
ish firms, without undergoing any' significant chang~ in their margins. 
This strategy by the banks wa§_fac.ilitated by the government's resort to 
"negotiated" solutions to its deficit financing• problem in the 
mid-1980s (see chapter 6) and its decision not to promote an indepen-
dent public debt market more aggressively. The high return that the 
banks received on their public debt holdings as a result supported their 
earnings at a point in the economic cycle when the collapse of credit 
demand would otherwise have forced them to cut credit rates and 
reduce costs. It thus provided a pause in the reform process that had 
lasting consequences for the banks' behavior as lenders. 
The process of domestic financial liberalization carried out over the 
late 1970s and 19~0s in Spain thus placed deregulation ahead of mar-
ket reform, exacerbating the burden of adjustment for Spanish firms 
and creating an\ underlying bias in the economy against investment in 
productive capacity (at least in those sectors most exposed to foreign 
competition and thus less able to pass on their costs). This outcome 
contrasts significantly with that of market-oriented financial reform in 
another formerly interventionist European state, France. 21 The frame-
work of state-directed credit allocation instituted in Spain in the early 
1960s was directly rnodeled on that constructed in France during the 
early post-World War II period. As in Spain, the regulatory framework 
in France underwenra radical overhaul during the 1980s, in which the 
principle of state-dire~ted credit allocation was abandoned in favor of 
market-based allocation. Because France was so widely touted as the 
archetypical dirigist~ state in Europe, the move away from interven-
tionisw in.that country often is cited as evidence that financial liberaliz-
ation is·determured by systemic market forces that compel governments 
to adopt efficiency-maximizing institutions which result in better eco-
21 French financial reform has received significant attention from political scientists. 
Throughout this book, I rely on this secondary literature. An overview of the politics of 
reform in France is offered in Stephen S. Cohen, Jamds Galbraith, and John Zysman, 
"Rehabbing the Labyrinth: The Financial System and Industrial Policy in France," in 
Stephen S. Cohen and Peter A. Gourevitch, eds., France in the Troubled World Economy 
(London: Butterworth, 1982); Philip G. Cerny, "The 'Little Big Bang' in Paris: Financial 
Market Deregulation in a Dirigiste System," European Journal of Political Research, no. 
17, 1989; Jacques Melin, "Financial Deregulation in France," European Economic 
Review .34 (1990); Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and 
Financial Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and William Coleman, "Re-
forming Corporatism: The French Banking Policy Community, 1941-1990," West Euro-
pean Politics, April 1993. 
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nomic performance. This conclusion is boosted by the fact that the 
~bandonrn~nt pf state-directed credit allocation in France was closely 
tie~ (bot~ m_theory and in time) to the expansion pf ~lt~r,qat~ve forms 
of fmancmg for nonfinancial firms. Indeed, efforts to promote the capi-
tal markets as a source of financing for firms preceded the abandon-
ment of selective credit regulation in France. One of the first reform 
measures, the Loi Monory of 1978, thus expanded the stock market's 
potential as a source of financing for firms by offering French citizens a 
substantial tax deduction for share purchases, giving rise to a dynamic 
market in mutual funds. And when French policymakers decided to 
abandon dirigiste credit regulation in the mid-1980s, they simultane-
ously undertook a comprehensive overhaul of the domestic capital 
market. 22 
The abandonment of interventionism in France was thus accom-
panied by what appears as a clear thrust toward an alternative model of 
corporate finance that could support the adjustment efforts of nonfi-
nancial firms, whether this be the "German model" of bank-organized 
industrial finance or the "Anglo-Saxon" model of aggressive capital 
markets. The reality of the French reform may have confounded these 
two alternatives and fallen a good distance from either lofty ideal. Yet, 
the contrast between the French and Spanish cases is nonetheless stark. 
As Table 8 demonstrates, French efforts to expand the availability of 
non-~redit-ba~ed forms of corporate finance resulted in a very signifi-
cant mcrease m the proportion of funds that nonfinancial enterprises 
were able to raise in the form of securities, bonds, and shares by the end 
of the 1980s. The Spanish reform effort, by contrast, had resulted in 
only a marginal increase in non-credit-based financing, even though the 
~ere~~latio~ of credit had begun much earlier than in France. ·Equally 
s1gmf1cant 1s the contrast in the cost of investment finance in the two 
countries. Both France and Spain started the decade with higher costs 
then other OECD countries, but the financial costs of French firms 
~ubstantially declined, whereas those of Spanish firms decreased signif-
icantly only at the very height of the economic boom in 1988-1990 
and rose again dramatically thereafter. 
The contrast between the Spanish and French experiences with 
domestic financial liberalization is all the more interesting because it is 
found in what otherwise constitutes a most-similar-case comparison. 
22 Cerny, "'Little Big Bang' in Paris," p. 177 
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Table 8. Net funds raised by nonfinancial enterprises, France and Spain, 1977-1989 (percent of total) 
'France 1977 1982 1989 
Loans 79% 72% 47% 
Securities,. bonds, and shares 21 • 28 53 
Spain 
Loans 82 82 77• 
Securities, bonds, and shares 18 18 23" 
•1989-90 average. 
Source: OECD, Financial Accqunts (France 1990, Spain 1992). 
As I argue in chapter.3, the edifice of financial interventionism erected 
in Spain in the eclflY 19!,0s not only mimicked the institutional struc-
ture of the French framework, but also served very similar political 
purposes. The\adoption of interventionist credit regulation in the two 
countries followed a similar decision to place political stability ahead of 
economic stabilization, at a time when the two countries were governed 
by very different political regimes. The liberalization efforts, however, 
seem to reflect differing priorities, a divergence that occurred paradox-
ically at a tjpie when Spain was undergoing its transition to democracy. 
These contrasts ra~se important questions about the theoretical argu-
ments offered by political economists to explain the cross-national 
trend toward financial deregulation, in particular the decision by gov-
ernments to abandon financial interventionism. Indeed, they offer a 
unique opportunity . to test our theoretical understanding of the politics 
of interventionism and of liberalization in formerly interventionist 
states. Su_ch ·an understanding also is required if we are to draw any 
usefur leiSons-·f.rom the biased course of reform in Spain. The next 
section therefore considers the outcomes I have discussed in the light of 
prevalent arguments about the politics of liberalization. 
' Explaining Financial Liberalization 
The outcome of the Spanish financial reform process-and its con-
trast with the "most similar" French case-presents not just a problem 
for the Spanish economy but also a theoretical puzzle about why and 
how formerly activist states abandon state-directed credit regulation. 
This section therefore turns to a discussion of the theoretical literature 
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that addresses such a regulatory shift. The discussion departs from the 
assumption that_ any regulatory change as significant as the wholesale 
abandonment.of state-directed credit allocation capngt b~1 <;~plained 
simply as a public policy decision. It necessarily carries an important 
political component. As Frances Rosenbluth writes, "undiscriminati~g 
and relentless as market forces may be, they generate policy changes 
only to the extent that they incite important players in the domestic 
polity to alter the regulatory framework." 23 Or as Louis Pauly puts it, 
economic analysis may "demonstrate why policies should change, but 
only detailed examination of domestic policy making can explain how 
and why changes actually do occur. "24 It may be up to the economist to 
explain the consequences of various modes of financial regulation, but 
the challenge of explaining why such varying modes of reform are 
undertaken in different countries and at different times falls to the 
political economists. 
One of the writers who has drawn political scientists' attention to 
these questions is John Zysman, who has argued that differences in the 
way advanced industrialized countries adjusted to the external shocks 
of the 1970s were linked to differences in national financial systems.25 
Building on the work of the economist Andrew Shonfield, Zysman 
offered a typology that revolved around the contrast between two types 
of financial systems: (1 the capital market-based financial system 
found in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in which the price and availability 
of corporate finance were left to the markets and; (2) a system of state-
directed credit allocation, as found in France and Japan, in which state 
authorities administered prices in such a way as to direct financial 
resources to specific users. Alongside these two diametrically opposed 
systems, Zysman's typology also included a third type: a credit-based 
system in which financial flows were organized not by the state but by a 
few large private banks, as found in Germany. 
The distinctions in national financial systems drawn by Zysman 
came to play a very important role in the "institutionalist" and "na-
23 Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1989), p. 1. 
24 Louis Pauly, Opening Financial Markets: Banking Politics on the Pacific Rim (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 6. 
25 John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the 
Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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tional models" approaches that became popular during the 1980s. 26 At 
the very 'Same time, however, domestic financial ~gulation in many 
·parts of the world was becoming the ~ubject of _ref9rm ef~o_rts th~t were 
promoted with a remarkable degree of doctnnal and 1d1omat1c con-
sistency across countries. In almost all cases, such reform was cast 
under the labels of "liberalization" and "deregulation," two terms that 
appeared to militate against the continued relevance of historical 
differences in national regulatory institutions. Political scientists who 
focused specifically.on the subject of financial regulation therefore soon 
centered their attention on the apparent unraveling of the postwar 
pattern of divergence in regulatory institutions that had been captured 
in Zysman's typology. 
The actual measures to which the labels of domestic financial "liber-
alization" and "der~gulation" have been attached have differed greatly 
from country \ to country. They include everything from the simple 
deregulation of credit rates or lifting of credit ceilings to changes in the 
kinds of financial transactions that different economic agents (commer-
cial, investment, and savings banks, insurance companies, and broker-
age firms) are allowed to engage in, to the creation of new instruments 
and markets for both corporate and public finance. Given this com-
plexity, it is not surprising that most of the original work by_political 
scientists on this subject has focused on the experiences of single coun-
tries or regions. 27 · 
26 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Hart, Rival Capitalists: International Competitiveness in 
the United States, Japan, and Western Europe {Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 
pp. 4-+;5. P~ter 1_ ... Hall's concept of the "or?anization of capital~ ~ vario~s Europ~an 
countnes anti Mich"el-Albert's discussion of different modes of cap1tahsm, while centering 
more on the nature of corporate governance than on the state/market divide, parallel 
Zysman's typology to a significant extent. See Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 38-39, 231-58; and Albert, Capitalisme contre 
capitalisme (Paris: Seuil, 1991). 
27 Some examples of this literature are Pauly, Opening Financial Markets; Rosenbluth, 
Financial Politics; Benjamin J. Cohen, "European Financial Integration and National 
Banking Interests," in Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, eds., The Political Econo-
my of European Integration: States, Markets, and Institutions (Savage, Md.: Barnes & 
Noble, 1989); Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Loriaux, France after Hegemony; Jung-
en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991); and Kent E. Calder, Strategic Capitalism: Private 
Business and Public Purpose in Japanese Industrial Finance (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1993 ). 
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More often than not, this literature suggests, the reduction in regula-
tion implied by ;_the neoliberal labels under which reform has been 
promoted masks actual "re-regulation" or even an.in!ensiticMion of 
the regulation of financial market transactions. 28 One feature that can 
nonetheless be clearly distinguished in the reform wave of the 1980s· is 
the trend away from the state-led/price-administered model of financial 
regulation that was so central to Zysman's classification. This trend 
away from selective credit regulation represents an important change in 
the ·domestic political economy of previously interventionist states be-
cause it redefines the domain of political authority in the domestic 
economy. It is therefore an important development for political scien-
tists to understand. 
Attempts to explain the trend away from financial interventionism as 
a cross-national phenomenon place overriding importance on the role 
of international market developments in bringing about this type of 
regulatory change. 29 Indeed, the causal link between the growth of 
international capital markets and regulatory reform in formerly inter-
ventionist states is treated almost as conventional wisdom in much of 
the contemporary political economy literature. This stance, however, 
also leads to the sometimes unquestioned acceptance of a particular 
political model of how and why the abandonment of interventionism 
comes about, a model that has important implications for our expecta-
tions about such reform and that I refer to as the "market-driven" 
model of liberalization. 
The market-driven model is one in which change in domestic regula-
tion is determined by a relentless process of market integration (one 
that takes shape by way of new regulation-evading financial tech-
nologies), while the persistence of national differences is treated as 
residual variation that can be ascribed to institutional resistance or 
mediation of market forces. Two kinds of arguments are commonly 
28 See, for example, Michael Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: 
The USA, UK, and Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and Steven K. Vogel's 
discussion of financial reform in various OECD countries in Freer Markets, More Rules: 
Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
29 See in particular John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital 
Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics 46 
(October 1993); Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic 
Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 439. 
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offered to make the causal connection between international market 
forces and domestic regulatory reform. • 
· The first involves the emergence of pol-itically mobilized (or at least 
tappable) sectoral interests that favor liberaliza;ion. These interests 
may or may not be narrow (i.e., limited to the financial sector itself). In 
the narrow version of this argument, it is national financial institutions 
that seek a breakdown of national barriers to capital mobility and 
deregulation of domestic financial flows to enhance their ability to 
compete internatiqnally. 30 In the broader version, such reform is 
sought by holders of liquid assets (which include not only domestic 
financial institutions, but also multinational corporations) as opposed 
to holders of fixed assets (national industry and labor). 31 Foremost 
among the changes ~ought by the sectoral actors is the abandonment of 
international . capital controls. Yet, as Jeffry Frieden and Ronald 
Rogowski ha~e argued, the argument extends to any institutional ar-
rangement that impedes the ability of those favored by liberalization to 
reap the full benefits of market integration. 32 Institutions that give 
governments control over domestic capital flows clearly represent such 
a barrier. Because barriers to capital mobility are assumed to entail 
market efficiency costs, political entrepreneurs are predicted to seek to 
exploit the potential aggregate welfare gains of liberalization as a way 
to garner political Support. 
The second kind 'of argument that is commonly offered to draw the 
connection between : international market forces and domestic reform 
involves negative constraints on governments that result from uncoor-
dinated acti9n by economic agents, rather than positive political action 
or p,essure. Financial integration, not only alters the interests of sec-
toral ~ctbrs b~t Mso increases their exit options. Stephan Haggard and 
Sylvia Maxfield, for example, write that "changes in the opportunities 
30 Such an argument is made by, for example, David Dollar and Jeffry Frieden in "The 
Political Economy of Financial Deregulation in the United States and Japan," in Giacomo 
Luciani, ed., Structural Change in the American Financial System (Rome: Fondazione 
Olivetti, 1990), and by Benjamin J. Cohen in "European Financial Integration and 
National Banking Interests," in Guerrieri and Padoan, Political Economy of European 
Integration. 
31 Frieden, "Invested Interests." 
32 Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, "The Impact of the International Economy on 
National Policies: An Analytic Overview," in Robert 0. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, 
eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
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for savers-whether through the growth of parallel markets, access to 
international m~kets, or partial financial market reform-decrease the 
viability of state controls." 33 And John Goodman. aqd !-,Quis Pauly 
write that the liberalization of capital "has been driven by fundamental 
changes in the structures of international production and financial i'n-
termediation, which made it easier and more urgent for private firms-
specifically corporations and financial institutions whose aspirations 
had become increasingly global-effectively to pursue strategies of eva-
sion and exit." 34 Whether or not they are receptive to sectoral pressures 
in favor of liberalization, governments are thus forced to adapt their 
policies to take into account the interests of liquid asset holders. 
These two arguments emphasize causal paths that have fairly dif-
ferent implications. Yet they coincide in ways that often lead them to be 
conflated. Regulatory reform, in both pictures, is forced on reluctant 
governments by economic actors who are seeking to exploit new mar-
ket opportunities. It also is expected to conform in broad strokes to the 
logic of a wider, more competitive marketplace. This collective accep-
tance of the premise that it is markets that determine the nature of 
regulatory change also has other implications for the way political 
scientists think about the politics of liberalization in formerly interven-
tionist states. To the extent that liberalization is promoted by reformers 
within the state, the motivations of these reformers are assumed to 
correspond with the logic of competitive market forces-either because 
they respond directly to sectoral pressure or because they act as politi-
cal entrepreneurs seeking to internalize the aggregate social welfare 
gain that liberalization is assumed to entail. The same dynamic that 
leads them to seek the abandonment of interventionism hence is also 
assumed to lead to the kinds of market reforms that make these aggre-
gate economic benefits p_ossible. Liberalization is therefore expected to 
support an economy's performance, because whatever its distributional 
consequences, it is expected to render aggregate efficiency gains even if 
it causes dislocation along the way. Finally, there is the all-pervasive 
tendency to assume that liberalization (or for that matter change) is 
33 Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "Political Explanations of Financial Policy in 
Developing Countries," in Stephan Haggard, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, eds., 
The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 
p. 316. 
34 Goodman and Pauly, "Obsolescence of Capital Controls?" p. 51. 
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driven by economic forces, whereas only resistance to liberalization has 
· its roots Kl politics. • 
· The market-driven model. of liberalization links up with a rent-
seeking view of interventionism and fits well with the view of politics in 
much of the economic literature. Financial liberalization as an outcome 
is believed to reflect the intrinsic incentives of market forces. If it does 
not occur, its absence is attributed to resistance by rent-seeking agents 
who benefit from interventionist institutions. In this manner, political 
scientists construct ,an explanation of political decisions (actual liberal-
ization measures or the lack thereof) that is derived from the normative 
implications of economic models. Yet however compelling such cross-
disciplinary congruence may be for those seeking a systemic explana-
tion of contemporary regulatory trends, the market-driven model of 
domestic financial iiberalization entails some serious problems as a 
political model of domestic regulatory reform. 
We can best understand these problems by looking at the various 
proposed causal links individually. First, the narrow version of the 
sectoral pressure model offers a fairly convincing explanation for the 
kind of regulatory reforms that have been implemented in countries 
whose domestic financial institutions are, to begin with, major players 
in international financial markets (the United States, the United King-
dom, and Japan). 35 In the case of most other countries, however, the 
competitive pressure exerted by large financial institutions through the 
Euromarkets should be more likely to lead domestic financial institu-
tions to want to preserve regulatory institutions that reserved the 
domestic fo:?,ancial market to them, rather than to want to dismantle 
them. The narrow version of the sectoral pressure argument thus seems 
to apply' to ;; ie1atively limited range of cases in explaining market-
oriented regulatory reforms. 
The broader formulation offered by Frieden and Rogowski seeks to 
overcome this limitation by expanding on the range of potential eco-
nomic actors that may stand to benefit frc,m liberalization. Yet, this 
35 As several authors have argued, however, the growth of these markets was itself the 
result of regulatory decisions taken in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. 
See Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, "Markets beyond Politics? The State and the International· 
ization of Financial Markets," European Journal of Political Research, March/April 
1991; and Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton 
Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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more deductive model has its own problems as an explanation of actual 
regulatory-l'efonp. It translates putative costs and benefits postulated in 
economic mod.els under very strict assumptions into .a I!lOd~J ~( politi-
cal action that begins with sectoral actors (whose preferences are 
defined in terms of alternative ideal worlds that correspond to the 
assumptions of neoliberal economic models) and ends with a concep-
tual figure (that of the political entrepreneur) that serves as the analytic 
mechanism whereby latent interests are hypothesized to translate into 
political action. This analytic leap has the advantage of rendering the 
sectoral interest-based explanation universally applicable. But it runs 
against the grain of much of what political scientists believe to be true 
about the formation of political coalitions and the dynamics of prefer-
ence formation. The stipulation that potential social welfare gains will 
tend to bring about political action in favor of liberalization is chal-
lenged by the fact that the potential gains from liberalization are likely 
to be diffuse and relatively remote, whereas the costs are likely to be 
heavily concentrated and immediate. It also seems to hinge on the 
assumption that "numbers matter," and hence is meant to apply in 
particular to polities in which political power is based on electoral 
results. Yet, the technical nature of financial regulation and the diffuse 
nature of the benefits of liberalization make this an unlikely rallying 
point for the formation of electoral coalitions. 
If international markets are driving regulatory reform and the aban-
donment of interventionism, it is thus much more likely to be by way of 
uncoordinated economic action (i.e., the exercise of exit options by 
economic agents) than by way of positive political pressure from mobi-
lized sectoral coalitions. This second argument, which I term the "capi-
tal mobility-induced constraint" argument, offers an explanation for 
liberalization where domestic financial institutions have more to gain 
from resisting liberalization than from promoting it, and where the 
initiative for such reform comes from within the policymaking bureau-
cracy. Contrary to the first argument, it implies a state-centric, or tech-
nocratic, model of regulatory reform, in which public officials rather 
than economic groups are the principal agents behind market-oriented 
reforms. Many accounts of contemporary financial reform in France, 
Japan, and the Scandinavian countries support this view, as does the 
account of liberalization in Spain given in later chapters of this book. 
Nonetheless, the capital mobility-induced constraint argument is not 
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enti,rely convincing as an explanation of actual financial liberalization 
efforts. • • 
Because the growth of international financial markets is bound to 
affect the way in which governments are able to regulate domestic 
financial flows, it is appealing to conclude that, if there is a trend 
toward the abandonment of interventionism, it must be determined in 
some systematic manner by the secular rise in cross-national financial 
flows over the last few decades. However, only if regulation-evading 
technologies had raised capital mobility to an order that rendered ex-
ternal controls eff~crively obsolete, or so ineffective that their costs 
outweighed any potential benefits, would this itself explain liberaliza-
tion. Despite the widespread tendency to accept this assumption, there 
is significant evidence to the contrary. A number of empirical studies on 
the question suggest that controls were quite effective in allowing gov-
ernments to rliaintain interest rate differentials between domestic and 
international financial markets through the 1980s and that they were 
hardly as effectively evaded as is commonly assumed. 36 This fact also 
was dramatically illustrated by the experience of the European Mone-
tary System after several countries in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) lifted capital controls in compliance with the Single European 
Act at the end of the 1980s. Had capital controls been effectively ob-
solete, their lifting should have had at most a limited impact on the 
volume of flows ano the stability of ERM currencies. In fact, however, it 
brought about a m11ssive rise in speculative capital flows, setting the 
stage for the system's 'crash in 1993. 37 Moreover, because the causal 
path of the capital mobility-induced constraint argument moves from 
the growth of international capital markets to the unsustainability of 
extei1i'at tapit:~x:ontrols to the undermining of domestic credit regula-
tion, we would expect that the lifting of external controls would be 
36 Gerald A. Epstein and Juliet B. Schor, "Structural Determinants and Economic Effects 
of Capital Controls in OECD Countries," in Tariq, Banuri and Juliet B. Schor, eds. 
Financial Openness and National Autonomy: Opportunities and Constraints (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992); Paul de Grauwe, "The Liberalization of Capital Movements and the 
EMS," in Piero Ferri, ed., Prospects for the European Monetary System (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990), p. 171. 
37 On' this point see Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa, "The 'New' EMS," in Paul 
De Grauwe and Lucas Papadeos, eds., The European Monetary System in the 1990s (New 
York: Longman, 1990); and Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz, "The Unstable 
EMS," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity no. 1 (1993). 
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closely connected in time to domestic credit deregulation. Yet among 
interventionist st,\!es, external capital controls have often been lifted 
quite a long time after the initiation of domestic libtraJizatjp,Q, This 
observation suggests that if the lifting of capital controls ' correlates 
roughly with an increase in international financial flows, the forme~ 
may be giving rise to the latter, and not the opposite. 
The most important thing to note about the capital mobility-
induced constraint argument, however, is that it offers little reason to 
expect that the abandonment of interventionism will produce the ag-
gregate efficiency or competitiveness gains that are commonly as-
sumed. The threat of capital hemorrhage is likely to induce govern-
ments to tighten macroeconomic (and in particular monetary) policy, 
which in turn creates incentives for elected authorities to abandon 
selective credit regulation. But it does not create any similarly auto-
matic or powerful incentives for "market" reform; that is, reforms that 
create markets where they do not exist-such as venture capital for 
new firms or patient capital for the restructuring of firms-or that 
counter oligopolistic conditions in existing markets so as to approxi-
mate the assumptions on competition and external effects of neoclassi-
cal economic models. In the area of financial regulation, this problem is 
moreover complicated by the asymmetric relationship between nonfi-
nancial firms and financial investors. As Fritz Scharpf writes, "the mar-
ket clearing price for capital is not exclusively defined by the relation-
ship of relative scarcity between the supply of capital and the supply of 
profitable opportunities for productive investment." The supply side of 
the capital market has a choice between productive and nonproductive 
monetary investments, and "if interest rates climb while business 
profits are unchanged, savers will redirect their assets to unprodnctive 
monetary investment, thereby constraining the economy's capacity to 
produce," and leading to involuntary unemployment.38 
Under the kind of selective credit regulation instituted in countries 
such as France and Spain after World War II, the potential pitfalls of 
this asymmetry were addressed through credit and capital controls that 
created specific incentives and obligations for financial institutions to 
channel savings toward productive investments. This solution how-
. ' 
ever, reqmred the state to underwrite the risk to the financial sector of 
38 
. Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p. 19. 
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transforming short-term savings into long-term lending.39 Selective 
credit regulation was thus generally linked to generous rediscounting of 
·credits by the central bank. Where such policies did not result in grow-
ing. financial self-sufficiency among nonfinancial tirms (as th~y did_do 
in Japan), one of the side effects was the erosion of domestic capital 
markets. The effort to avoid the Keynesian liquidity trap and to pro-
mote productive investments under such regimes therefore often pro-
duced a concentration of power in the banking sector and the creation 
of an oligopolostic.financial market structure that intensified the latent 
asymmetry in the relationship between financial institutions and nonfi-
nancial firms. 
For financial reform in formerly interventionist states to result in an 
efficient and optunal use of savings thus requires an independent and 
proactive political ~ill to reform the structure of the domestic financial 
market in a nianner that addresses the financial needs of nonfinancial 
firms. However, there is nothing inherent in the kinds of pressures 
exerted by international financial markets on governments that neces-
sarily induces such reform. The specific motivations and objectives of 
reformers within the policymaking bureaucracy and their relationship 
to other members of the domestic political economy therefore are likely 
to be as important (or more) to the outcome of market-oriented reform 
as they were to the construction and uses of financial interventionism. 
This means that the balanced character of liberalization in France may 
represent the exception rather than the rule, and that it is likely to have 
depended, in any case, on factors other than market forces. It is also a 
critical poip.t in understanding the different pattern and repercussions 
of liberalization in Spain. 
,• . - , ..__,,_ 
Financial Reform and the Motivations ofState Elites 
In the political economy literature, state ,rlites are commonly concep-
tualized in one of two ways. One view (that promoted by public choice 
theorists) casts public officials as either politicians or bureaucrats who 
have vested interests in maintaining state controls over the economy to 
satisfy economic and political rents. The other view is that offered 
39 For discussion, see Loriaux, France after Hegemony, pp. 112-13; and Jean Pierre 
Pa tat and Michel Lutfalla, A Monetary History of France in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 122-25. 
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by scholars who conceptualize the state as an autonomous actor in 
the domestrt political economy; one whose objectives are defined by 
its place at the ,intersection of the domestic and intematio1;1.al s~teins 
and may therefore respond to aggregate rather than particularistic ob-
jectives. 
The first perspective does not offer much insight into efforts by state 
elites to dismantle interventionist practices. Authors who take the latter 
view have argued that such reform efforts may be seen as action taken 
by state authorities to promote economic adjustment.40 Because the 
potential economic benefits of abandoning interventionism depend on 
the presence of adequate market conditions, this perspective would lead 
us to expect that state elites who promote the abandonment of inter-
ventionism would be equally committed to market reform. The inade-
quacies of the financial reform effort in Spain might consequently be 
interpreted as reflecting a lack of state autonomy and/or insurmount-
able institutional resistance to state action. Such a conclusion, however, 
misses an important insight offered by the Spanish experience: the way 
in which the motivations of different, and contending, state elites may 
interact to bring about the abandonment of interventionism. Financial 
reform in Spain failed to support economic adjustment in the 198Os not 
because the Spanish state was intrinsically weak or inescapably cap-
tured by the private banking sector but because the reform process was 
driven by reformers within the state bureaucracy who had an agenda 
that led them to seek a working alliance with the domestic financial 
sector. 
State-centered analyses often assume that, other things being equal, 
the motivations of public officials in charge of the reform effort will 
correspond to the aggregate objective of prom(!ting national economic 
competitiveness. Such an objective is certain to feature in public justifi-
cations of any reform effort. Yet, given that international market pres-
sures are not sufficient to compel any particular pattern of reform away 
40 
Up until the 1980s, state-centered analyses tended to interpret interventionist forms 
of regulation principally as a source of state capacity and srrength. More recent state-
center~d. analys;_s, however, argue that interventionism can also limit the ability of state 
au~hont1es to impose the market," and this can serve as the motivation for public 
off1c1als to fav_or market-oriented reform. See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of 
State: 011 Politics and_the Capacity of American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); and Lonaux, France after Hegemony. Peter Katzenstein's argument about 
the "strength of the_wea~" in Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell Umvers1ty Press, 1985) follows an analogous logic. 
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from interventionism, aggregat~ objectives are likely to compete in 
practice with other objectives. There are reas~ns td expect~ moreover, 
that the motivations of state e1ites _may· deviate.systematically from 
those of a unitary state actor. To get at this point, however, we must first 
distinguish among different kinds of state elites who are likely to be 
involved in the reform process. 
Regulatory reform in formerly interventionist states involves at least 
three different kinds of state elites: ( 1) reformers within the state bu-
reaucracy or broader policymaking community who act as advocates of 
market-oriented reform; (2) other state elites, including technocratic 
planners and industrial policy authorities who held a privileged posi-
tion in policymaking under the regime of selective credit regulation; 
and (3) political 6r ~lected authorities. The decision to abandon finan-
cial interventipnism entails changes in the intrastate balance of in~u-
ence between the first two sets (reformers and planners). It also m-
volves an interplay of objectives and decisions on the part of the second 
two sets (reformers and political or elected authorities). The objectives 
of these latter two groups are likely to differ from each other and may 
also depart systematically from the aggregate welfare objectives set out 
in economic models. 
The economic literature on financial regulation emphasizes issues of 
allocative efficiency and of the total level of savings that is achieved in 
an economy, but ~ctual financial reform in formerly interventionist 
states has typically :Centered on a different, more immediate kind of 
problem: facilitat~g monetary control. This issue lay at the heart of 
both the French and Spanish reform efforts. One of the features of 
selective·,creQ-it regulation in these countries (and others) was that it 
subs~med mo~~tary policy instruments (such as interest rates and 
central bank rediscounting), placing these under the direction of politi-
cal authorities and indirectly at the disposal of planning or industrial 
policy authorities. This merging of monetary and industrial policy in-
struments was meant to allow government.t to reconcile otherwise in-
compatible policy objectives (such as boosting investment in key sec-
tors while slowing down credit growth). By implication, however, it 
also subordinated the policymaking role of central bank officials to that 
of planners or industrial policy authorities. It is therefore not surprising 
that much of the intellectual groundwork and promotion of market-
oriented reform in formerly interventionist states has been done by the 
research departments of central banks. The common theme in the argu-
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ments presented by central bankers against interventionism is that it 
constituted ·an obstacle to the pursuit of effective monetary control. 
The reasons put forth by central bankers as to why -this tis-so are 
mostly of a technical nature. The most common argument is that mone-
tary aggregates can be properly gauged and controlled only in the 
context of a fully developed money market, in which the central bank 
can add and detract liquidity in a routine fashion. Administrative credit 
ceilil}gs, as were typically used to control liquidity under a system of 
selective credit regulation, are considered inadequate tools for effective 
monetary control, because they do not allow adjustments in response to 
very short term liquidity changes. Because the practice of state-deter-
mined credit prices often had the effect of atrophying the market for 
monetary assets (money market), it hence interfered with effective 
monetary policy. The single most important objective of the financial 
reform efforts in countries such as France and Spain accordingly has 
been the creation of a dynamic money market in which central bank 
officials exert control over liquidity in an unincumbered fashion. 
Despite the widespread acceptance of these technical arguments, it is 
questionable that they offer a compelling explanation of the transcen-
dental decision on the part of political or elected authorities to abdicate 
their discretion over credit flows. The superiority of orthodox central 
bank instruments over other forms of credit controls was hardly estab-
lished in the mid-1970s, when reform was initiated in Spain. The 
French government in the late 1970s and early 1980s came just as close, 
when not closer, to meeting its monetary targets through selective credit 
ceilings as did the German Bundesbank. 4 1 And monetary aggregate 
targeting was being undermined at the time by unpredictable changes in 
money demand and by financial innovation even in those countries 
where central banks operated in well-developed money markets (the 
United Kingdom and the United States). 42 Last, it is unclear why such 
technical considerations would carry so much more sway in Spain than 
in France in the 1970s as to explain the difference in the timing of 
reform in the two countries. 
A different argument as to why interventionism hindered monetary 
control is the one offered by Michael Loriaux in his study of French 
41 OECD, Economic Surveys: France, 1983, p. 40; and Economic Surveys: Germany, 
1984, p. 30. 
42 David Cobham, "Monetary Targeting," in The New Pa/grave Dictionary of Money 
and Finance (London: Macmillan, 1992). 
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financial reform and centering on the "overdraft economy." Rooted in 
the work-of the economist John .Hicks and expan~d upon by French 
·central bank economists, the concept of• the "o':erdraft economy" is 
defined 'by contrast to that of an asset-based economy. Whereas an 
asset-based economy is characterized by a well-developed financial 
market in which "firms and banks, when faced by liquidity shortfalls, 
sell securities previously purchased and held in reserve in order to 
confront monetary emergencies," an overdraft economy is charac-
terized by the absence of demand for "precautionary assets" on the part 
of economic agents because of a presumption that credit from institu-
tional lenders is assured. In the French case, Loriaux argues, this "pre-
sumption of assured borrowing power" was caused by the state's role 
in directly regulatin,g the allocation of credit, which created a form of 
insurance for econ~mic agents, and an overreliance on institutional 
credit. As a c~nsequence, both firms and banks became both less sensi-
tive to gradual changes in interest rates and more vulnerable to assertive 
monetary policy measures. Hence, Loriaux argues, government offi-
cials in France chose to abandon selective credit regulation to bolster 
their ability to impose austerity. 43 
The problems of the "overdraft economy" offer a more compelling 
argument as to why ·governments would want to dismantle an interven-
tionist regulatory framework. They also suggest, however, that the un-
derlying reasons for abandoning interventionism were political, not 
technical. The overdraft economy was not a necessary consequence of 
financial interventionism in a technical sense. Other countries, notably 
Japan, engaged in similar regulatory practices during the postwar 
peric,d witho"!t experiencing the atrophy of domestic capital markets 
that o'ccurred in"France and Spain. It was rather the consequence of the 
way in which selective credit regulation was used to defuse social con-
flict through the extension of cheap credit to firms in the two European 
countries (see chapter 3). Once there was less room for an expansion-
ary credit stance (because of both international and domestic develop-
ments), the regulatory framework created during the postwar boom 
years had the effect of politicizing the task of macroeconomic adjust-
ment by requiring state officials to make the hard distributive choices 
that monetary rigor implied. Monetary rigor is politically easier for 
elected authorities when credit growth is controlled by the central bank 
43 Loriaux, France after Hegemony, p. 56. 
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through routine operations in a money market, because the allocation 
of hardship is left ~o the presumed neutrality of the market. If interven-
tionism hindered monetary policy, it thus did so not as mqch fQC techni-
cal reasons as by raising the political costs of monetary rigo; for politi-
cal authorities. 
If the principal motivation for political authorities in abandoning 
interventionism is to depoliticize macroeconomic adjustment, then the 
nature of their choice is essentially negative: it ends when governmental 
authority has been extricated from the task of allocating credit. Other 
factors are therefore likely to determine what corollary measures are 
instituted to accompany credit deregulation. Foremost among those 
other factors are the goals and motivations of anti-interventionist re-
formers within the policymaking elite. Given the ideological dichotomy 
between dirigisme and monetarism, the specific problems that credit 
regulation poses for monetary policy, and the subordination of central 
bank authority to that of other state officials under selective credit 
regulation, opposition to interventionism is likely to be institutionally 
anchored in the central bank. Yet, there are reasons to expect that 
central bankers, like elected authorities, may have motives for advanc-
ing market-oriented reform that depart from the purely economic ones 
emphasized in the policy literature. 
Most of the literature by political scientists on the role of central 
bankers espouses what Nathaniel Beck has called the "public interest 
theory of monetary policy," 44 which assumes that central bankers are 
essentially apolitical actors who, when freed from the electoral process, 
will pursue aggregate welfare objectives (such as fighting inflationary 
expectations) in a manner that elected authorities are unable to do. It is 
the very acceptance of this premise that makes it politically expedient 
for governments to abdicate control over credit flows and monetary 
policy to central bankers. Yet central bankers in interventionist finan-
cial systems may be guided by at least two kinds of motives in seeking 
and designing the dismantlement of selective credit regulation. To the 
extent that they themselves believe in the public interest theory of mone-
tary policy (i.e., in the inability of elected officials to commit to adequate 
monetary rigor, and, on a more technical plane, in the necessity of a well-
developed money market), they will have a strictly ideological motive 
44 Nathaniel Beck, "Politics and Monetary Policy," in Thomas D. Willett, ed., Political 
Busin1:ss Cycles: The Political Economy of Money, Inflation, and Unemployment 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 368. 
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for seeking the dismantlement of interventionism. However, reforms 
'that create the money market infrastructure that alldws central bankers 
to c,ontrolliquidity also implytlie dismantling of a.regulatory structure 
that gave other state elites a dominant voice in economic policymaking. 
Such a change may be consistent with the ideological convictions that 
central bankers espouse. Yet, it also involves a reduction in the influence 
over economic policy of planning bureaucracies, public enterprises, and 
other industrial policy elites in favor of the central bank. To the extent 
that central bankers believe that achieving their ideological objectives 
depends on such a shift, they therefore also will have strategic and 
political motives to seek liberalization, and they may be inclined to 
subordinate market teform to those objectives. A financial reform pro-
cess dominated ~y .central bankers may therefore fail to support an 
economy's ultpnate ·capacity for adjustment. 
More specitically, if the central bank comes to be targeted by re-
formers who see themselves as a contending policy network, and if it is 
able to control the reform process, one of the factors driving the course 
of liberalization may be simply the objective of curbing the influence of 
other state actors over economic policy. Another may be the reformers' 
need to g.rin the support of powerful social actors in their quest to 
bolster the authority of the central bank. Because the "natural constitu-
ency" of any centr 'al bank is the domestic financial sector, a financial 
reform process dominated by central bankers is likely to become the 
subject of a search for "reciprocal consent" between central and private 
bankers,45 a possibility made all the more likely by the fact that the 
tighter mooetary stance that reform is intended to facilitate places 
dire€t pn;ssur~ on the profitability of banks. Cheap central bank redis-
cound.ng in ~he' postwar period allowed banks to lend to industrial 
45 The concept of reciprocal consent is developed by Richard Samuels in The Business of 
the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and H1stor1cal Perspectwe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 8-14. The_ relatiofs~ip between central bankers and 
the financial community, their "natural constituency, 1s discussed as one of ~he most 
important sources of political influence of any central bank m Jo_hn T. Woolley, C~ntral 
Banks and Inflation," in Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., The Pol1t1cs of 
Inflation and Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and . Int~rnational Case 
Studies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 338. Dehvenng the coopera-
tion of the big banks was one of the ways in which central bank reformers sought to boost 
their influence in the course of the Spanish regime transition (see chapter 5). To do so, 
however, they had to preempt attempts by Adolfo Suarez and other politicians_ in the 
transition government to use the financial support of foreign banks as a lever agamst the 
private banks' oligopolistic hold over the domestic credit market. 
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firms at low interest rates, while making considerable profits for them-
selves, thus s"uppre~sing the latent conflict between restricting competi-
tion in the financial sector and providing adequately priced fimtnerng to 
industry. To maintain the profitability of the banking sector while mov-
ing away from the cheap credit policies under which financial interven-
tionism was instituted, banks either have to become more cost-efficient 
or be allowed to continue exploiting oligopolistic market conditions, so 
that they can pass on the higher cost of financing from the central bank 
to their customers. 
A financial reform process aimed at increasing the central bank's 
influence over economic policy and limiting that of other state actors is 
thus likely to entail considerable pressure for continued protection 
rather than aggressive market reform. To some extent this pressure 
reflects the dual institutional imperative of any central bank: to ensure 
both monetary rigor and the stability of the financial sector. Because of 
the tension between these objectives, reforms meant to facilitate mone-
tary rigor will inspire central bankers to mitigate the competitive im-
pact of liberalization on financial institutions. However, the search for 
a relationship of reciprocal consent between central bankers who seek 
to increase their influence and an oligopolistic banking sector also is 
likely to entail a political premium, so that protection is taken further 
than considerations of financial solvency alone might account for. A 
reform process dominated by reformers with an agenda to increase the 
policy influence of the central bank will therefore tend to protect the 
banking sector at the expense of nonfinancial firms. 
The politics behind the abandonment of financial interventionism 
may thus not be conducive to aggressive market reform. The motiva-
tions that lead elected authorities to abandon financial interventionism 
are not sufficient to bring about such reform, and those that lead central 
bankers to promote the abandonment of interventionism may militate 
against adequate market reform. If this is the case, then the likelihood 
that financial liberalization in formerly interventionist states will en-
hance a country's capacity for adjustment may be far more limited than 
is commonly assumed. The inadequacy of market-oriented reform may 
grow out of the very political dynamic that promotes the abandonment 
of interventionism. 
Stated differently, my stylized account of the likely political dynamic 
behind liberalization in interventionist states suggests that the success 
of reform depends heavily on the presence of other intervening factors 
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that.can counteract and redirect the tendencies we have considered. 
'Foremost •among those factors, I propose, are ( 1) •he way identities, 
~etworks, .and conflict among state elites are configured over time; (2) 
the ~xtent to which economic change interacts with domestic political 
conditions to alter the influence of different groups of policymakers; 
and (3 the nature of the relationship between the financial sector and 
nonfinancial firms. The first and second of these factors affect the 
likelihood that financial reform will become the vehicle of a political 
drive by activist cel).tral bankers to increase their influence within the 
state and the extent to which central bankers are able to dominate the 
reform process. The third affects the extent to which the search for 
reciprocal consent between reformers and the domestic financial sector 
is likely to come •at _the expense of nonfinancial firms. It involves the 
relationship between banks and their industrial clients and the extent to 
which the forriier pursue business strategies that are tied to the success 
of the latter. 
All of these factors are historical outcomes, and they may be largely 
independent of the economic forces that feed into them at any given 
point. Recognizing this allows for much greater variation in the effect 
of liberalization than do models that seek to explain the actions of 
governments and reformers in terms of objective international eco-
nomic constraints and opportunities. In the Spanish case, the political 
model that best captures the deregulation process is one in which 
changing economic and social conditions at the end of the 1960s tipped 
the balance in favor of a small network of reformers that was beginning 
to form ar~mnd the central bank's research department. These re-
form~rs yiew~d themselves as standing in opposition to a particular 
historic tend~ri.c'y in Spanish economic development in which monetary 
rigor and market discipline were subordinated to the principles of state 
discretion and private privilege in the economy. Their main agenda was 
to reverse the hold of a developmentalist-minded planning bureaucracy 
over Spanish economic policy by placing t!)e central bank in control of 
the financial system. The political regime transition propelled these 
central bank reformers into positions of leadership. Nevertheless, to 
ensure the centerpieces of their agenda of institutional reform, they 
actively pursued an accommodation with an initially resistant domestic 
banking sector. 
It is this interplay between the political objectives of contending state 
elites and the politics of accommodation with the domestic banking 
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sector that explains the character of Spanish financial reform. This 
story of shifts am6ng the policymaking elite, enhanced (but not deter-
mined) by changing economic conditions and premised 0n ad:ommo-
dations with the banking sector also applies to the creation of an inter-
ventionist regulatory framework in the early 196Os. In both instances, 
political struggles within the state served as the impetus for regulatory 
change, changing economic conditions as a facilitating factor, and ac-
commodation with the banking sector as a constant. In both cases, the 
central issue at the heart of domestic political struggles also centered on 
monetary policy, more specifically, on its political uses. The course of 
financial regulation in Spain over the present century thus reflects a 
remarkable degree of continuity across both political regimes and reg-
ulatory frameworks. 
In the following chapters I seek to illustrate this "continuity within 
change." In doing so, I hope to show how the politics of Spanish 
financial liberalization grew out of the politics of interventionism itself. 
To a much more significant extent than prevalent explanations of liber-
alization allow for, regulatory changes in Spain have been domestically 
rooted. Domestic political battles within the state elite not only im-
pinged on changes in Spanish financial regulation, but also drove those 
changes. Changing economic and social constraints, on the other hand, 
played mainly a facilitating role. The overall choice in favor of market 
oriented reform may seem to corroborate the market driven view of 
liberalization, but I contend that such a conclusion obfuscates the polit-
ical dynamic at the heart of the process. 
The elements of continuity that have persisted in Spain even in the 
course of seemingly dramatic regulatory overhauls compel an historical 
analysis. As I seek to illustrate in chapters 2 and 3, the political contest 
among Spanish state elites that motivated credit deregulation in the 
197Os and 198Os was configured a long time ago. This also is true of 
the regulatory overhaul that led to the establishment of an intervention-
ist framework in the early 196Os, and of the constant that has charac-
terized all forms of financial regulation in Spain during this century: 
accommodation between state elites and the private banking sector. 
2 
The Inflationary Origins of 
the Spanish Financial System 
• 
I n 1874, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under a parlia-ment~y constitution brought an end to the half-century of politi-cal upheaval that qad followed Napoleonic occupation in Spain, 
auguring a relative .stability that would last for almost five decades. 
That same year, the first government of the new political regime known 
as the restauraci6n phs~ed a banking law that granted the monopoly of 
currency issue to the Bank of Spain, one of fifteen private banks of issue 
that had come into existence during the nineteenth century. 1 This move 
set tlk.in&titutiQ(lal cornerstone for the creation of a monetary econ-
omy and a modem banking system in Spain. Yet, it also embodied the 
new regime's solution to the problem that had underpinned the long-
running conflict between liberal and absolutist forces: how to address 
the chronic economic indigence of a waning colonial state. 
' 
1 The Banco de Espana came into existence in 1856 when it replaced the former Banco 
de San Fernando, which had replaced the failed Banco de San Carlos in 1829. It had long 
had a privileged relationship with the Spanish Treasury, acting as its main creditor. The 
1874 law gave the remaining fourteen banks of issue the option of merging with the Bank 
of Spain (an option taken by all but four) or of limiting their business to other banking 
activities (the option taken by the banks of Bilbao, Santander, Barcelona, and Tarragona). 
See Rafael Anes Alvarez, "El Banco de Espana (1874-1914): Un banco nacional," and 
Pedro Tedde de Lorca, "La banca privada espanola en la Restauraci6n," both in Banco de 
Espana, La Banca Espanola en la Restauraci6n, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1974). 
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The polit~al re&ime of the restauraci6n rested on an accommodation 
between the ag~~ian and financial interests of the Spanish aristocracy 
and those of the emerging Catalan, Basque, and Madri:lifo • bour-
geoisies. The two premises of this accommodation were protectionism 
for both agriculture and industry and the forestallment of the radical 
tax reform that would have been needed to give the state a modern 
fiscal base.2 The monopoly of issue was therefore granted to the Bank 
of Spain as compensation for its agreement to finance the Treasury's 
chronic deficits, just as foreign creditors had received privileged li-
censes for ventures in mining, banking, and the construction of rail-
ways as payoffs for the crown's debts during the earlier part of the 
century. The new central bank's criterion for issuing currency was 
hence that of "answering to all of the credit demands of the State, and 
to those of solvent private actors within the limits allowed by metallic 
reserves." 3 Those limits were ampler than those of most of Spain's 
European trading partners, which in the late nineteenth century 
adopted the Gold Standard. The governments of the restauraci6n stuck 
to the bimetallic standard that had been adopted in 1868 and that in 
1883 became a de facto silver standard after the Bank of Spain revoked 
the convertibility to gold of peseta bills. The steady decline of the price 
of silver at the end of the century, moreover, resulted in a growing 
discrepancy between the value of metallic reserves and that of the cur-
rency in circulation, so that the monetary standard in practice was of a 
fiduciary nature. 4 In this way, "inflation became the expedient that 
Spanish governments would use to reduce the cost of their debt."5 
If the Spanish state's indigence served as the basis for the creation of a 
modern banking system, it would also strongly condition the character 
of that system. The political solution entailed in the Bank of Spain's 
2 C~los _Moya, El_poder econ6mico en Espana (Madrid: Tucar, 1975), pp. 55-91. On 
the h1stoncal evolution of the Spanish tax system, see Josep Fontana, La historia de /a 
hacienda en la historia de Espana, 1700-1931 (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
1980); Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "Los principios de! reparto de la carga tributaria e~ 
Espana," Revista de Derecho Financiero y de Hacienda, no. 41, 1961, and "Politica fiscal 
Y reforma tributaria," in Manuel Fraga, Juan Velarde, and Salustiano del Campo Urbano, 
eds., La Espana de los anos 70 (Madrid: Moneda y Credito, 1974), vol. 3, no. 2. 
3 Gonzalo Perez de Armiiian, "La autoridad financiera y la regulaci6n monetaria 
~redit_icia y de cambios," ~evista de Economia Politica, no. 65, 1973, p. 101. ' 
Ibid., pp. 95-98; Gabnel Torrella, Desarollo de la Espana contemporanea (Madrid : 
Alianza, 1995), pp. 138-39, 144-45, 177 
5 Franciso Comin, "Perfil hist6rico de la deuda publica espaiiola "Pape/es de Economia 
Espanola, no. 33, 1987 p. 96. ' 
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new-status implied an inflationary model of public finance, and the 
'banking sector that emerged in the context of the tl.ew law would be 
strqngly engaged in the prov-~ion of _publK finam~e. Its activities were 
therefore inevitably tied to the inflationary process. Until World War I, 
the sector was overwhelmingly dominated by the Bank of Spain itself, 
whose assets at the turn of the century outnumber those of other private 
banks by 3 to 1, and whose activities centered overwhelmingly on 
channeling resources into public rather than industrial finance. 6 This 
involvement of th1:: banking sector in the finances of a waning and 
penurious colonial state is commonly identified as one of the principal 
causes of the arrested pace of industrialization during the last quarter of 
the nineteenth centu'.ty and hence of what some economic historians 
regard as a criticAl l_oss ·of timing in Spanish economic development. 7 
The first imrorta~t change in this scenario came during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, which, as Table 9 shows, saw the 
rapid growth of a number of new private commercial banks. By 1929 
the Bank of Spain's overriding importance in the financial system had 
been outweighed by other private banks, reversing the situation that 
had existed up to 1913. The two most important factors in the growth 
of these new financial institutions were the repatriation of capital from 
Cuba after the final -colonial defeat of 1898, and Spanish neutrality in 
World War I. The latter increased· the demand for Spanish exports 
while forcing substantial import substitution, producing an economic 
boom in Spain that led commercial banks to become actively involved 
in promoting industrial firms. 
6 S(:ir l'ablp Mart,tn Aceiia, "Development and Modernization of the Financial System, 
1844-1935," in Nic"oias Sanchez-Albornoz, ed., The Economic Modernization of Spain, 
1830-1930 (New York: New York University Press, 1987); Gabriel Torrella, "Spain, 
1829-1874," in Rondo Cameron, ed., Banking and Economic Development: Some 
lessons of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
7 See, for example, Rosa Vacarro, "Industrialization in Spain and Italy (1860-1914)," 
Journal of European Economic History 9, no. 3 (Winyr 1980); and on the second point 
Francisco Comin, Hacienda y economia en la Espana contemporanea (1800-1936) 
(Madrid: lnstituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1988), pp. 527-41, 574. Other arguments about 
the role of the banking sector in Spanish industrialization are discussed in Torrella, 
"Spain, 1829-1874," and in Tedde de Lorca, "Banca privada." For more general discus-
sions of the failure of industrialization in Spain during the second half of the century, see 
Jordi Nadal Oller, "The Failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain, 1830-1913," in C. 
M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, pt. 2 (London: Collins, 
1973); and Gabriel Torrella, "Los Origenes de la industrializaci6n espaiiola, 1950-
1931," in Banco de Bilbao: 125 anos de historia (1857-1982) (Madrid: Banco de Bilbao, 
1985). 
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Table 9. Total assets of Sp~nish financial institutions, 1854-1935 (millions of pesetas) 
1854 1873 1880 1900 1913 1929 1935 
Bank of Spain 128 234 1,067 2,706 2,846 6,304 7,005 
Private banks 48 337 431 984 848 11,702 13,296 
Savings banks and credit 
companies 17 59 131 349 1,998 2,886 
Public redit institutions 19 59 63 236 2,075 2,720 
Total 176 607 1,616 3,984 4,279 2,207 25,907 
Source: Pablo Martfn Acena, "Development a d Modernization f the Financial System, 1844-1935, in 
Nicolas Sanchez-Albornoz, ed., The Economic Modernization of Spain, 1830-1930, trans. Karen Powers and 
Manuel Saiiudo (New York: New York University Press, 1987), by permission ofBanco de Espana. 
As before, however, the activities of the Spanish banking sector con-
tinued to be determined by its relationship to public finance. Starting in 
1917, the direct monetization of the public debt by the Bank of Spain 
was replaced by a less conspicuous mechanism known as pignoraci6n 
automdtica, whereby the private banks could automatically obtain 
credit from the Bank of Spain for up to 90 percent of the public debt 
that they subscribed. This change-which meant that the public debt 
was now effectively monetized through the new commercial banks-
gave rise to a "mixed banking" system in Spain once the World War I 
bonanza had ended. "Thanks to [the pignoraci6n]," writes one eco-
nomic historian, "the Spanish financial institutions, which without the 
support of the Bank of Spain's printing press would have had to tighten 
their business to the more modest dimensions of their capital, were able 
to find unlimited credit margins to promote all types of firms." s By the 
early 1920s, the sector was thus characterized by the "predominance of 
a small number of large banks practicing "mixed" activities 1 'in the 
manner of the German "universal" banks: commercial banks that also 
undertook extensive company promotion and held a sizable propor-
tion of private securities in their portfolio. "9 
The pignoraci6n mechanism turned inflationary public finance into a 
motor of industrialization. As Gabriel Tortella and Jordi Palafox note, 
it allowed the banks to "increase their ratio of productive to liquid 
assets at a negligible additional risk" and cost.lo This encouraged 
them to invest in industry and promote industrial activities. Yet, be-
8 Luis Olariaga, quoted in Juan Velarde, Sohre la decadencia econ6mica de Espana 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1969), p. 621. 
9 Gabriel Tortella and Jordi Palafox, "Banking and Industry in Spain, 1918-1936," 
Journal of European Economic History, 1984 (special issue), p. 88. 
10 Ibid. See also Velarde, Decadencia econ6mica de Espana, pp. 621-23. 
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cause· industrial promotion was 4nderwritten by inflationary public 
finance, it also stained the relationship between Spanlsh banks and the 
, industrial ,sector with an "original sio": that of rendering industrial 
investment a source of extraordinary profits for the banks, not requir-
ing them to develop the kind of internal capacity and culture necessary 
for the development of competitive, long-term industrial investment 
strategies. The banks' direct investment was heavily concentrated in 
those sectors that were either natural oligopolies (energy) or that bene-
fited from heavy tariff protection. And, aside from their direct holdings, 
they financed industrial ventures predominantly through the rollover 
of short-term debt. There was thus never the "patient capital" link 
between universal banking and export promotion that has received so 
much attention in ~ht; German case.11 
If inflationarx public finance shaped the relationship between Span-
ish banks and industry, it also shaped developments in the banking 
sector itself. The sector's assets experienced rapid growth during the 
interwar period, and this growth was accompanied by heavy con-
centration into a small number of banks. "By 1923 the 'big six,' numer-
ically just 6.6% of the bank population, had over 40% of the combined 
paid-in capifal and over 50<¾;, of the deposits," thanks to their wide-
spread branch networks. 12 This concentration was accompanied by the 
creation of extensive . networks of interlocking directorships with pub-
lic utilities and large industrial firms around each of the big banks, so 
that by 1921 they c~llecFively had directors on the boards of 274 com-
panies, whose combined capital amounted to 49 percent of the paid-in 
capital of all Spanish corporations. 13 The process also had a geographic 
dimer1$lorf,. "1':;1.a._1rid and Bilbao housed the headquarters of the 'big 
six.' Barcelona, once the leading financial center, was a more and more 
distant third [as] became dramatically evident when the venerable 
Banco de Barcelona had to close in 1920 and declare bankruptcy soon 
thereafter." 14 
The "mixed" and increasingly oligopolistic character of the sector 
11 
. An_drew J. Spindler, The Politics of International Credit: Private Finance and Foreign 
Pol,_cy t~ Germany and Japan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984); Michael 
Kre1le, West Germany: The Dynarrucs of Expansion," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., 
Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
12 Torrella and Palafox, "Banking and Industry," p. 83. The Big Six banks were Hispano 
;-;nencano, Bilbao, Urquijo, Central, Vizcaya, and Banesto. 
Ibid., p. 87 
14 Ibid., p. 83. 
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* Table 10. Industrial portfolios of private banks, 1922-1934 (millions of constant 1913 pesetas) '5 'X,"' t-Nf-....COLOCO ,-.. 0')0,Lt),--(00 ~ a: 1§ s ccicricciMNM T"'"" .,.... ,-- ,-- ,-- T"'"" «; 
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Source: Adapted from Gabriel Tortella and Jordi Palafox, 'Banking and Industry in Spain, 1918-1936, Journal ::c: 
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of European Economic History 13 (Fall 1984) (special issue), p. 88. § 
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importance of industrial assets in the large banks' balance sheets also M .5:Q= co N o:c ~ 0) 0, 
rose sharply in relation to their ordinary banking activities (compare ~ ~ c:-
columns 10 and 11 in Table 11). Table 12 shows the connections be- .l!l O'>LOCOMNN 
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Table 12. Interlocking directorates of Big Six banks and heavy industry, 1930 
Banco Hispano Americario 
Railways 
Ferrocarriles Santander Mediterraneo (1; IV) 
Electricity 
Hidroelectrica Espanola (1; Ill) 
Mining 
Minero Metalurgica Los Guindos (1; II) 
Banco-Urquijo 
Railways 
Caminos de Hierro del Norte (3; I) 
Ferrocarriles deMadrid aZaragoza y Alicante 
(1;11) 
Ferrocarriles del Oeste de Espana (1; Ill) 
Iron and steel 
Altos Homos de Vizcaya (3; I) 
Ouro Felguera (4; II) 
Industrial Asturiana Santa Barbara (1; IV) 
Basconia, S.A (1; IV) 
Electricity 
Hispano Americana de Electricidad (4;I) 
Mining 
Gia. Espanola de Petr61eos (1; I) 
Banco de Vizcaya 
Railways 
Caminos de Hierro del Norte (2; I) 
Ferrocarriles deMadrid aZaragoza y Alicante 
(1;11) 
Ferrocarriles del Oeste de Espana (1; Ill) 
Gia. Metropolitano Alfonso XIII (3; V) 
Iron and Steel 
Altos Homos de Vizcaya (2; I) 
Electricity 
Hispano Americana de Electricidad (2; I) 
Hidroelectrica Espanola (6; Ill) 
Gia. Sevillana de Electricidad (2; IV) 
Hidroelectrica lberica (?-VI) 
Mining 
Minero Metalurgica Los Guindos (1; II) 
Gia. Espanola de Minas del Rif (1; V) 
Banco de Bilbao 
Railways , . t . 
Caminos de Hierro del Norte de Espana (6; I) 
Ferrocarriles deMadrid a Zaragoza y Alicante 
(1; II) 
Ferrocarriles del Oeste de Espana (3; Ill) 
Iron and steel 
Altos Harnos de Vizcaya (3; I) 
Gia. Siderurgica del Mediterraneo (4;Ill) 
Basconia, S.A. (1; IV) 
Mining 
Gia. Minera de Sierra Menera (3; IV) 
Gia. Espanola de Minas del Rif (1; V) 
Banco Central 
Railways 
Ferrocarriles deMadrid a Zaragoza y Alicante 
(2; II) 
Ferrocarriles Andaluces (2; VI) 
Iron and steel 
Fabrica de Mieres (1; V) 
Electricity 
Hispano Americana de Electricidad (1: I) 
Hidroelectrica Espanola (1; Ill) 
Mining 
Gia. Espanola de Petr61eos (3; I) 
Banco Espanol de Credito (Banesto) 
Railways 
Caminos de Hierro del Norte (1; I) 
Ferrocarriles deMadrid a Zaragoza y Alicante 
(1; II) 
Ferrocarriles Andaluces (1; IV) 
Electricity 
Hidroelectrica Espanola (1; Ill) 
Hidroelectrica lberica (7; VI) 
Mining 
Gia. Espanola de Minas del Rif (1; V) 
Note: An arabic number indicates number of shared irectors (board members); a roman umeral indicates 
the firm's rank within its sector according topaid-in capital. 
Source: Gabriel Tortella nd Jordi Palafox, 'Banking and Industry in Spain, 1918-1936, Journal of European 
Economic History13 (Fall 1984) (special issue), pp. 85-87 
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Th~ same mechanism that turned inflationary public finance into a 
rnotor of industrialization in Spairi thus concentrateoeconomic power 
in the banking sector. Such newfound economic clout was reinforced 
: through strong personal connections between the new financial capital 
and the aristocracy of the restauraci6n, 16 which gave the bankers a 
great deal of political access and influence. Political power in turn was 
enshrined in 1921 in a new banking law which officially sanctioned the 
existing banking cartel through the creation of the Consejo Superior 
Bancario (CSB), a C?rporativist institution controlled by the Big Six 
that was given wide-ranging powers to regulate the sector.17 The 
oligopoly was thus institutionalized, creating what would henceforth 
be referred to in Spain as the banking status quo. 18 
Although it effe~tively closed entry into the sector, the law of 1921 
avoided any form of ~tate discretion over credit allocation. Despite the 
creation of a nbmber of parapublic credit institutions in the 1920s, 
these remained heavily circumscribed by the private bankers who con-
trolled their boards. 19 The legislation of 1921 thus established a regula-
tory regime that combined state-sanctioned oligopoly with laissez-fair~ 
for the banking sector. Like granting the monopoly of issue to the Bank 
of Spain in ·1,874, sanctioning the banking cartel reflected the political 
regime's solution to .the Treasury's continued indigence through an 
accommodation with the financial establishment that dominated its 
political class. As before, the interests of that class stood in the way of 
fiscal reform. The soJution once again therefore implied a symbiotic 
combination of inflationary finance and monopolistic privileges for the 
institutions on which the Treasury had come to depend. 20 
Thi.. politi~al compromise enshrined in the legislation of 1921 had 
broad" i'm~•licatibns for Spanish economic development. At the same 
16 Moya, Poder econ6mico en Espana, pp. 55-91. 
17 The CSB was empowered to fix the maximum interest rate to be paid on deposits, the 
minimum capital requirement for the creation of a bank, and other capital ratios, as well 
as to set the rules of proper business behavior. In 1946, if was authorized to set minimum 
credit rates and to scrutize any new applications for a banking license. For a full 
description of the CSB's powers, see Juan Mufioz, El poder de la banca en Espana 
(Algorta, Vizcaya: Zero, 1970), pp. 167-73. 
18 Ibid., pp. 60-68. 
19 Gabriel Torrella and Juan Carlos Jimenez, Historia de/ Banco de Credito Industrial 
(Madrid: Alianza, 1986). 
20 The political class of the Restauraci6n is commonly identified as combining the 
interests of the landed upper class, the large banks, and protectionist industrial sectors. 
See Moya, Poder econ6mico en Espana; and Comin, Hacienda y economia, pp. 536- 41. 
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time as competition was restricted, the role that the state could play in 
the economy was ;checked. One of the clearest illustrations of this was 
the private bankers' ability to maintain control over th~ -ianco de 
Credito Industrial, a parapublic institution chartered in 1921 to com-
pensate for the private banks' failure to extend long-term credit. 2 1 
Another was the fate of the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera 
(1923-1929), whose downfall is often attributed to loss of support 
from the financial establishment, which opposed its protostatist eco-
nomic orientation. 22 This effective veto by private interests of a more 
assertive state role persevered throughout the Second Republic (1930-
1936), whose leaders are said to have had an attitude of "reverential 
respect" toward the banks. 23 Juan Velarde observes that the single 
most important attempt at socialization under the Republic, the agrar-
ian reform effort, was "sentenced to death" when the Supreme Banking 
Council managed to halt the creation of the National Agrarian Bank. 
"The resistance of Big Spanish Capital [to any expansion of the public 
sphere] was so strong," he writes, that "one can observe a clear aban-
donment of any programmatic plan to socialize key economic sectors in 
the program of the Popular Front of 1936." 24 
State action to promote industrialization was blocked by the political 
ascendancy of the financial establishment. Yet, the political elites of 
both the restauraci6n and of the liberal Second Republic also lacked the 
kind of imperative that motivated state-led industrialization in other 
European late-comers. As Rosa Vacarro writes in seeking to explain the 
inverting trends in Spanish and Italian economic development at the 
turn of the century, "both the resources and the political energy de-
voted by the Spanish ruling classes to industrial development were 
much less than in Italy. "25 This lack of ideological thrust was ralated to 
21 Tortella and Jimenez, Historia de/ Banco de Credito Industrial, pp. 130-35. 
22 Juan Velarde, Politico econ6mica de la dictadura (Madrid: Guadiana, 1968). 
23 Juan Velarde, "Pr6logo," in Muiioz, Poder de la banca, p. 5. 
24 Juan Velarde, "La empresa publica en una encrucijada," in La empresa publica en 
Espana (Madrid: lnstituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1972), p. 66. 
25 Vacarro, "Industrialization in Spain and Italy," pp. 736-37 Vacarro points out that 
the trend between 1861 and 1881, when industrial production in Spain grew faster than 
in Italy, was sharply reversed between 1881 and 1911. Along with the ideological 
motivations of the political class, she emphasizes the different roles played by the banks, 
which "in Italy were agents of a powerful macroimpulse, while in Spain they were not" (p. 
722). By contrast to the Bank of Spain, the Bank of Italy lent less to the state and more to 
the national economy during this period, as did the other private Italian banks that were 
established with German capital after 1893. 
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Spain~ peculiar circumstances as a fallen colonial power at the begin-
ni.ng of the•century. Neither territorial unification nor militarism such 
as drove state promotion of industrialization in Germany or in Italy 
: offer~d themselves as motives in Spain.'Having irrep~ably lost its inter-
national position, the political elite of the restauraci6n rather turned its 
sight inward after 1898; an orientation that persevered in the Second 
Republic, whose governments, as Charles W. Anderson writes, were 
"preoccupied with agrarian and educational reform" and thus "did not 
recognize industrialiiation as a privileged problem. "26 
The opposition of private economic interests together with the in-
ward orientation of political elites thus failed to provide the political 
impetus for "catch-upn industrialization. In this context, the inflation-
ary model of industrtal finance through indirect monetization of the 
public debt served only to restart a moribund process of industrial 
investment and ~o strengthen the existing structure of economic power. 
In the absence of a stronger political imperative, neither the state nor 
the banks took on the role of a "functional equivalent" (in the Gersch-
enkronian sense) that would have allowed Spain to recover the loss of 
timing experienced in the latter part of the nineteenth century and catch 
up with its heighbors to the north. 27 Up until the mid-1930s, Spain's 
economic development thus appeared limited to the pace that a finan-
cial aristocracy with heavy links to: Spain's agricultural past would 
allow. This developmental impasse ended only with the civil war. 
The upheaval and economic destruction of the Spanish Civil War of 
1936-1939, .and the emerging regime's imperative of economic recon-
structmn in the context of a hostile international environment for the 
first ti~e crea~d the political circumstances for a more assertive indus-
trialization effort in Spain. Breaking with the complacent attitudes of 
prewar elites, the new regime espoused economic self-sufficiency early 
on as its prime objective and adopted a stance of unequivocal economic 
nationalism to achieve it. The political change was articulated by one of 
26 Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an 
Authoritarian System (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 38. 
27 In Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1962), Alexander Gerschenkron argued that late or "catch-up" industrializa-
tion required some institutional mechanism of capital concentration to finance the rapid 
and large-scale capital investments required to compete with earlier industrializers. He 
identified the banks and the state as the two most likely agents to fulfill this function. The 
point with reference to Spain is taken up by Comin in Hacienda y economia, p. 540. 
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the regime's most prominent economic strategists, Antonio Robert, 
who in a booklet titled A National Problem: The Necessary Industrial-
ization expounded an international conspiracy theor¥ of Spanish eco-
nomic backwardness, placing the blame on four groups: "the exporters 
of the few agricultural products that Spain can sell in the external 
market," "traders dedicated to imports," "other world powers inter-
ested in retarding our progress," and intellectuals "stupefied by the 
doctrines of Adam Smith and the propagandist discourses of Cobden, 
who when he visited the peninsula did so on behalf of British pro-
ducers. "28 Robert's "necessary industrialization" thesis became the 
rallying cry for the rigidly inward-looking, capital-intensive industrial-
ization drive pursued by the Franco regime during its first two decades. 
This period, generally referred to by Spanish historians as the autar-
quia, represents a watershed in Spanish economic history, for, as one 
critic of the regime admits, "though it is an irritating fact for many, 
[Spain] industrialized basically between 1939 and 1959." 29 
Two sets of circumstances coincided to explain the adoption of such 
an inward-looking industrialization strategy. The first was the inaus-
picious international environment in which the Franco regime had to 
face the task of reconstruction. The end of war in Europe was followed 
almost immediately by the United Nations' imposition of a boycott on 
Spain, which lasted until 1955. Isolation reduced the regime's policy 
options, as reflected most clearly in Spain's exclusion from the Marshall 
Plan. A number of observers thus conclude that the autarquia was the 
result of necessity rather than ideological preference. 30 
A second, less often noted, factor was the sharp internal conflict 
between two broad factions in the coalition that supported Franco's 
insurgency against the Republic. 31 As Velard~ writes, "two pa1tly con-
28 Quoted in Velarde, "Banca e industrializacion: La etapa autarquica," in Antonio 
Torrero, ed., Banca e industrializaci6n en Espana: Pasado, presente, y futuro (Madrid: 
Banesto, 1988), p. 38. 
29 Angel Rojo, quoted in Salvador Paniker, Conversaciones en Madrid (Barcelona: 
Kairos, 1969), p. 159. The biggest spurt occurred between 1951 and 1957 when the 
share of agriculture in national product declined from 41 to 25%. See Jacint Ros 
Hombravella et al., Capitalismo espaizol: De la autarquia a la estabilizaci6n, 1939-1959 
(Madrid: Edicusa, 1978), p. 219. 
30 Ros Hombravella et al., Capitalismo espaizol, pp. 74-85; Anderson, Political Econo-
my of Modern Spain, p. 27 
31 The coexistence of these factions under the Franco regime may be seen as one 
dimension of the "limited pluralism" model proposed by Juan J. Linz to describe the 
regime in "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein 
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tradictory messages were represented under the victorious flags of Ap-
ti1 first, 1939." On one hand "national syndicalism, with its then very 
~odern utopian content," on the other hand "representatives of tradi-
tion~!, right-wing Spanish nationalism , who believed that the time 
had come to make Spain an important economic power that would be 
capable of standing side by side other European nations," and who 
were inspired by "the economic progress experienced by Italy under 
fascism." The first faction "believed that it would be possible to estab-
lish immediately a i;evolutionary process that required three things: a 
syndical reorganization of the economy involving a new role for 
workers in the firm, a very radical agrarian reform, and the abandon-
ment of a liberal-or market-orientation in economic policy; that 
orientation woul«l be replaced by a growing presence of the state, 
which was to have a: socializing role." The second faction "backed the 
construction Jf a strong military industry that would allow greater 
influence in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and of course in Europe, 
where fascism had come to an accommodation with local capitalism 
years earlier," but "heavy-handedly sought to repress any socializing 
tendencies." 32 
The confl.ict between proto-leftist national syndicalists ensconced in 
the Palange and individuals · representing the main economic powers 
that had backed the regime (i.e., lan<led oligarchy, bankers, and indus-
trialists) was a significant challenge for the regime, because of the role 
that national syndic;alism played in its legitimizing discourse. As an 
ideology, national syndicalism "presented itself as highly suited to the 
task of recruiting a large part of the working-class militants who had 
subscribed to socialism and the CNT. "33 Velarde's analysis suggests 
' .. ' .... ,' 
---
Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics; Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1979), 
or of Amando de Miguel's model of coexisting "political families," in Sociologia de/ 
franquismo (Madrid: Euros, 1975), p. 154. However, the conflict between national 
syndicalists and conservatives represents a particularly sharp division among these "fam-
ilies" of supporters. For a discussion of the controversy raised by Linz's and de Miguel's 
characterization of the Franco regime and the positiorts of some of their critics, see Jose 
Felix Tezanos, Estructura de clases y conflictos de poder en la Espana postfranquista 
(Madrid: Edicusa, 1978), pp. 83-113. 
32 Velarde, "Banca e industrializacion," pp. 36-37 Velarde notes that Robert's autarkic 
industrialization strategy was not the only one entertained at the end of the Civil War. The 
economist Ramon Carande, for example, advocated a light industrialization model, 
premised on agricultural modernization, open external economic relations, and progres-
sive tax reform. 
33 Ibid. The CNT (Confederacion Nacional de! Trabajo) was the main anarchist trade 
union before the war. 
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that economic nation~lism served as a minimum common denominator 
under which these ~_onflicting factions could be rallied and by which the 
national syndicalist wing of the regime could be coaxed into postpon-
ing its agenda of radical, socializing reform in favor of promoting na-
tional capital. As another set of authors write, the word autarky pos-
sessed virtues that served to "firm the forces of the fatherland" and to 
"define political attitudes"-an effect captured in the following ex-
position · by a prominent Falangist member of the regime: 
Autarky and syndicalization form the two columns upon which stands 
the new economic policy of Spain. To systematically criticize the 
policy of controls and self-sufficiency or the purpose of achieving an 
organic and syndical structure of the Spanish economy is equivalent to 
being an enemy of the independence and freedom of Spain and a 
promoter of the spread of social anarchy and class conflict among us.34 
The autarkic industrialization drive involved a dramatic expansion 
of state interventionism, including extensive price and quantity con-
trols, the establishment of a highly protectionist regime for industry, 
sharp import restrictions, and strong limitations on foreign invest-
ment. 35 At the same time, investment in industry was bolstered by 
wage repression, which kept labor costs well below prewar levels 
through 1956 and created opportunities for very high profits. 36 From 
the standpoint of the present discussion, however, the most significant 
change was the 1941 creation of the lnstituto Nacional de Industria 
(INI), whose charter explicitly expounded on the inadequacy of private 
bank initiative to the task of industrialization in Spain and stated the 
need for "an agency that is endowed with the ecpnomic capacity-and 
legal character needed to realize and give form to the great programs of 
industrial resurgence of our nation." 37 
The creation of the INI appeared to represent a deliberate effort to 
embark on a statist model of development in which the initiative of 
private financial capital would be supplanted by that of the state. This 
vindicated at least in form some of the national syndicalist agenda to 
use the public sector to break the retarding tendencies that a monopo-
34 Jose Maria Areilza, quoted in Ros Hombravella, et al., Capitalismo espanol, p. 80. 
35 For a discussion of economic legislation during this time, see Ros Hombravella et al., 
Capitalismo espanol, pp. 86-117 
36 Ibid., p. 257 
37 Law of September 25, 1941, Boletin Oficial del Estado, no. 280 (October 7, 1941). 
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Hstic priv~te banking sector was seen to promote. Iq its initial phase, 
one of the functions thus ascribed. to the INI was to exert a competitive 
pressure in otherwise oligopo11stic sectors. 38 • 
Despite the political momentum behind its creation, however, the 
model of development that the INI embodied never took hold under the 
autarquia. Although its military architects had intended the institute to 
play the role of a large financial holding company modeled on the 
Italian Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and giving the state 
a significant market presence in the financial sector, the INl's activities 
were restricted early on to the sphere of production in three basic 
industrial inputs (coal, steel, and power.) 39 Thus, as Charles Anderson 
writes, it "did no~ preempt much industrial terrain from the private 
sector." At an average of 15 percent from 1943 through 1960, the 
"INI's participation in total industrial investment was quite modest 
when compared to public industrial investment elsewhere in Europe 
4 7% of total industrial investment in Austria, 45% in Turkey, 32 % 
in the United Kingdom, 31 % in France, 25% in Holland, and 20% in 
Belgium for approximately the same period." "Almost all the tools of 
conventionql public policy," Anderson notes, "were geared to the ad-
vantage of the domestic private industrial investor. "40 
Even more important in limiting th,e role that the public sector would 
come to play in the •autarkic industrialization process, however, were 
two sets of measures.in the area of monetary and financial regulation 
that were taken as .the , INI was being launched. First, and in sharp 
contradiction of the Falange's prewar call for nationalization of the 
banking s~ctor,41 the Franco regime sanctioned the status quo (i.e., the 
exis1:iri.g, eartel--)''ill the sector in 1939, officially closing access to the 
profession of "banker" and precluding the creation of any new banks, 
and reestablished the CSB in the banking law of 1946. Though the CSB 
was now chaired by a government representative (the Minister of Fi-
nance), it continued to function, just as it ·had done before the war, as 
the executive committee of what was noJ the Big Seven (Banesto, 
38 Pedro Schwartz and Manuel Jesus Gonzalez, Una historia del Instituto Nacional de 
Industria, 1941-1976 (Madrid: Tecnos, 1978). 
39 Velarde, "Banca e industrializaci6n," pp. 44-45. 
40 Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 40. 
41 The Falange's founder, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, who was killed during the Civil 
War, had made nationalization of the banking sector and agrarian reform the centerpieces 
of his platform; these reforms, he said, were the fundamental precepts for adherence to his 
party. Velarde, "Empresa publica en una encrucijada," p. 71. 
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Central, Hispano-Americano, Bilbao, Vizcaya, Santander, and Popu-
lar). One of the dearest indications of this is the anachr.onjsti~ ~ode of 
interest rate regulation that was adopted during this period, which 
made deposit rates subject to a maximum, and credit rates subject to a 
minimum. 42 This seemingly contradictory move from the standpoint of 
promoting industrial investment served the sole purpose of sustaining 
the b~nking cartel's cohesiveness in an environment of high liquidity by 
preventing individual banks from lowering their credit rates below a 
floor, ensuring the banks a high interest margin. The main difference 
from the prewar period was that the cartel's decisions now bore the 
official stamp of approval of the state. 
Along with the old framework of banking regulation, the new regime 
also reestablished the old mode of monetary regulation. After unblock-
ing the banking system by converting the pool of Republican pesetas 
into national ones according to a regressing scale,43 the new authorities 
reestablished the pignoraci6n automdtica, thus recreating the prewar 
pattern whereby the banks could expand their assets through the pur-
chase of public debt. Indeed, the leeway for this process of indirect 
monetization was expanded by the regime's decision to abandon the 
prewar metallic standard in favor of an unbacked fiduciary standard for 
the peseta and to abolish all legal limits on Bank of Spain lending to the 
Treasury.44 
The re-creation of the pignoraci6n in the context of a fully sanc-
tioned banking cartel placed the banks in an unsurmountable position 
to benefit from the large profit opportunities that the autarkic indus-
trialization drive created. It allowed them to monetize their purchases 
of assets in the economy through their purchases of public debt, supply-
ing them with such an ample guarantee of cheap liquidity as to make it 
virtually risk-free and costless to expand their industrial holdings and 
42 Vicente Gal bis, "Negligencia de la politica de los tipos de interes en la posguerra," 
Revista Espanola de Economia 7, no. 3 (1977): 84-85. 
43 During the war, two separate currencies had existed, and on both sides a great part of 
the cost of the war was financed through monetization. See Comm, "Perfil historico de la 
deuda publica espaiiola," p. 89; Velarde, "Banca e industrializacion," pp. 40-42. 
44 Exchange rate operations were charged to a new Instituto Espanol de Moneda 
Extranjera (IEME), which was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Industry. For 
discussion of this separation of exchange and monetary policy, see "Perez de Armiiian, 
"Autoridad financiera y la regulacion monetaria"; Ros Hombravella et al., Capitalismo 
espano/, pp. 86-91; and Mariano Rubio, "La organizacion de la autoridad monetaria," 
Moneda y Credito, no. 104, 1968. 
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lendi~g. As a consequence, the first two decades of the Franco regime 
. saw a new process of conceq_trat:ion in the_ sector, which reduced the 
total' number of existing banks in Spain from 200• in 1940 to 107 in 
1962. Virtually all of the absorptions were carried out by the Big Seven, 
which were able to increase their share of total bank deposits to 72 
percent in 1957 45 Because the inflationary mode of public finance also 
stifled the role of the stock market, the dependence of Spanish firms on 
bank credit also increased substantially during this period. The share of 
bank credit in the external financing of the private sector rose from an 
average of 30 percent during the prewar decade to an average of more 
than 60 percent for the two decades from 1941 to 1959.46 Through its 
effect on both the Qanks' industrial holdings and their increased control 
of the economy's fina'ncial resources, the pignoraci6n thus allowed the 
Big Seven to corlsolidate their dominant position within Spanish capital 
during the autarquia. 
Far from the statist model heralded in the creation of the INI, the 
mode of industrial finance that drove autarkic industrialization during 
the first two decades of the Franco regime was a vast expansion of 
private bank credit and asset purchases by the banks, fueled by the 
issuance and monetization of public debt. 47 Yet, once again, monetary 
expansion was not accompanied by state discretion. As one author puts 
it, the financial legislation of the 1940s was so concerned with freezing 
the institutional struc~ure of the sector that the government "declined 
to intervene even in:the distribution of credit and financing."48 This 
absence of selectivity in the way credit was extended not only precluded 
state ~µection over the way financial resources were allocated but also 
"made' any· attempt at even minimal control of monetary magnitudes 
impossible. "49 "The expansion of the money supply was not in the 
hands of the Bank of Spain or the Ministry of Finance, but rather, by 
45 See Arturo Lopez Muiioz, Capitalismo espanol/ Una etapa decisiva (Algorta, 
Vizcaya: Zero, 1970), p. 246; Ramon Tarnames, La lucha contra /os monopolios 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1966), p. 327; and Antonio Torrero, "La evolucion del ·sistema finan-
ciero," Boletin de £studios Econ6micos, no. 96, 1976, p. 860. 
46 Mariano Navarro Rubio, Mis memorias (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1991), p. 518. 
47 The inflationary thrust of this setup was justified in the early years of the regime with 
reference to the successful National Socialist experiment of inflationary war finance in 
Germany. Ros Hombravella et al., Capitalismo espanol, p. 180. 
4 8 Raimundo Poveda, "Politica monetaria y financiera, " in Luis Gamir, ed., Politico 
econ6mica de Espana (Madrid: Alianza Universitaria, 1980), p. 72. 
49 Torrero, "Evolucion del sistema financiero," p. 858. 
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virtue of the Il!echa~ism of pignoraci6n automatica of public debt, in 
the hands of the private banks." 50 
The choice to f&go state discretion over credit allocation duritlg the 
autarquia gave monetary policy a virtually untamed character as the 
banks could choose when to trade in their swollen public debt port-
folios for credit. This situation contrasts radically with the heavy-
handedness of state regulation over almost every other sector of the 
economy. The banking sector's widely noted influence with the leader-
ship of the Franco regime undoubtedly played a role in bringing about 
this hands-off stance. Yet the lack of regulation of bank credit expan-
sion was also uniquely suited to the political needs of the regime's 
conservative leadership, because it served to consolidate the role of 
private capital in the Spanish economy and to limit that of the public 
sector in a politically opaque but highly effective way, subverting the 
radical agenda of the national syndicalist wing. 
The reinstitution of the pignoraci6n and of the banking status quo 
under the autarquia simply raised the prewar pattern of inflationary 
public and industrial finance to a higher power. The viability of such an 
inflationary process, however, was premised on a relatively insulated 
and closed economy that was not yet subject to a strong balance of 
payments constraint in the form of import requirements. It was there-
fore inherently self-limiting as a model of industrialization for as small 
an economy as the Spanish. The experience of German inflationary 
finance was, in the words of another prominent national syndicalist 
economist, inapplicable to Spain, where various structural bottlenecks 
meant that a rampant monetary expansion would eventually produce a 
"pure inflation."51 
The most important of these bottlenecks inevitably turned out to be 
the economy's foreign exchange gap. A first balance of payments crisis 
in 1951 led the regime to seek foreign assistance and to moderate its 
autarkic stance in favor of a more traditional import substitution re-
gime. In 1953 it signed a series of "secret agreements" allowing the 
United States to establish military bases on Spanish soil in return for a 
package of military and economic aid and American efforts to lift the 
U.N. boycott on Spain. American assistance provided the foreign ex-
change that allowed for higher import levels and a rapid rise in indus-
50 Ros Hombravella et al., Capitalismo espaizol, p. 158. 
51 Higinio Paris Eguilaz, Diez aizos de politica econ6mica en Espana, 1939-1949 
(Madrid: CSIC, 1946), p. 126. 
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trial prnduction after 1951. Yet it was insufficient to keep up with the 
inflationary · dynamic of the pignoraci6n. • 
The .critical point came in 19:57, when two drastic wage increases 
decreed by the national syndicalist Minister of Labor, Jose A. Giron, led 
to a sharp increase in credit demand from businesses. Despite a restric-
tive fiscal stance and a sharp reduction in the amount of public debt 
issued during 1957 and 1958, the process of monetary expansion could 
not be halted, because the banks, which sought to take advantage of the 
surge in demand, could not be stopped from trading in their swollen 
portfolios of "pignorable" debt for credit at the Bank of Spain.52 Once 
the level of net reserves at the Bank of Spain turned negative in early 
June of 1959, the process became unsustainable. 
The economic crisis. of 1957-1959 had a profound effect on the 
evolving politica\ life ~f the regime. The government's first attempts at 
stabilization led to a sharp increase in the cost of living, which set off a 
wave of strikes in the industrial north. Coming on the heels of clashes 
between Falangist and traditionalist student groups in Madrid a year 
earlier, the strikes increased the hostility between national syndicalists 
and conservatives and heightened the sense of a mounting political 
crisis. After "the establishment of Atlantic convertibility and of the 
French stabilization plan of 1958, the sense of urgency was com-
pounded by the growi~g perception that the balance of payments situa-
tion left no alternative to external economic liberalization other than 
"an intolerable decline in the standard of living, perhaps accompanied 
by a drastic harshening of the political regime." 53 The result was the 
appointment of a new cabinet in 1957, in which neoliberal technocrats 
were placed fiqpJy in charge of economic policy, permanently displac-
ing th~ r~gime's na\ional syndicalist wing. 54 This decisive political shift 
opened the way for a radical policy reversal that was augured by the 
stabilization plan of July 1959. 55 
52 Manuel Jesus Gonzalez, La economia politica def franquismo (Madrid: Tecnos, 
1979), pp. 74-82. 
53 Ibid., p. 114. 
54 This group is sometimes referred to as the Opus Dei technocracy, because of the large 
incidence of membership in that lay Catholic organization among its leading figures. See 
Anderson Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 103-8, 168-69. 
55 Both ~he political and economic shifts were strongly encouraged by France's decision 
to devalue the franc in 1958 and by the onset of Atlantic currency convertibility at the end 
of that year, which created in Spain "a sense of danger and distancing" (Gonzalez, 
Economia politica de/ franquismo, p. 166). 
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The stabilization plan of 1959 represents another hiatus in the course 
of Spanish eco·uomit policy. To this day, it is regarded by Spanish 
economic historians as the end of a long inward-looking , periC>d in 
Spanish economic development that started at the turn of the century. 
The plan itself centered on the imposition of a ceiling on bank lending 
that served to guarantee a large IMF-organized package of foreign 
lending. But it also marked the abandonment of the autarkic industrial-
ization §trategy in favor of an outward-oriented development strategy 
premised on the intention of "integrating Spain into world markets."56 
The "new economic framework" (nueva ordenaci6n) that was adopted 
as a corollary of the plan resulted in a rapid and substantial liberaliza-
tion process from 1959 to 1962 that included the deregulation of inter-
nal prices, a sharp reduction in tariff levels, the adoption of a single, 
convertible exchange rate, and the liberalization of inward foreign 
investment. 
The reorientation in the regime's development strategy meant that 
henceforth monetary policy would have to be kept in line with the new 
requirement of peseta convertibility. 57 One of the centerpieces of the 
plan was therefore an irreversible commitment on the part of the gov-
ernment to end the pignoraci6n and with it the mechanism that had 
served as the motor of both Spanish industrialization and the private 
banks' stupendous expansion of assets during the preceding decades. 
The stage was now set for a change in the character of financial regu-
lation-an end to the passive role of the state in the allocation of the 
financial sector's resources. The ensuing turn toward interventionism, 
however, was strongly conditioned by the legacy of inflationary finance 
and the resulting pattern of accommodation between political e_lites 
and the domestic financial sector that had taken hold at the turn of the 
century. The apparently radical changes in domestic financial regula-
tion that were to follow the stabilization plan thus masked important 
elements of continuity in the objectives that financial regulation was 
made to serve. This continuity is critical to an understanding of both 
the political character of financial interventionism in Spain and the 
politics of later-day financial reform. 
56 Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "El plan de estabilizaci6n," Informaci6n Comercial Es-
panola, nos. 612-613, 1984. 
57 With Spain's entry into the IMF the same month that the stabilization plan was 
implemented, the system of multiple exchange rates developed in 1950 was abandoned, 
the peseta was devalued, and a single exchange rate was set at 60 pesetas to the dollar. 
3. . 
Cheap Credit and ·t~e 
Politics of Interventionism 
• 
T he Stabilization Plan of 1959 marked the abandonment of autarky in favor of a development strategy that sought to integrate Spain into world markets and to unequivocally es-
tablish the primacy of' private initiative over that of the state. In the 
years following the pla°n, the Spanish economy was transformed by a 
rapid and substantial liberalization of domestic product markets, inter-
national trade, and inward capital flows. 1 Because the success of this 
new developmt:nt strategy was premised on a convertible currency, and 
hence r~uir~d th~ abandonment of the unorthodox mode of monetary 
expans 'i'ori' that h"a~'clriven Spanish industrialization (the pignoracion), 
the stage was also set for a significant change in the regulation of the 
domestic financial system. Yet, contrary to the liberal thrust of the 
nueva ordenaci6n in the regulation of product markets and external 
trade relations, its effect on the financial system,involved the creation of 
a highly interventionist framework of credit regulation that, for the 
first time in Spanish history, gave state officials a direct say over how 
1 The evolution of effective tariff levels is discussed in Manuel Jesus Gonzalez, La 
economia politica de/ franquismo, 1940-1970: Dirigismo, mercados, planificaci6n 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1979), pp. 324-30. Gonzalez's discussion emphasizes the curtailment of 
tariff reductions after 1966. Nevertheless, the liberalization that took place from 1959 to 
1962 was very significant. 
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the financial sector's res~)Urces would be allocated. This apparent para-
dox is an important k~y to understanding the politics of financial inter-
ventionism in Spain. ' 
Financial interventionism has traditionally been interpreted by politi-
cal scientists in one of two ways, both of which center on the juxtaposi-
tion of state and market and on the notion of a balance between public 
and private power. The state-centric literature, always with an eye on 
questions of international political economy, has tended to interpret a 
state's ability to direct credit allocation as an important element of state 
strength, and more specifically, of a state's capacity to achieve its eco-
nomic objectives despite possible opposition from social actors. 2 Other 
authors, by contrast, portray interventionism as essentially clientelistic 
in nature, and in this sense, as typical of "weak" rather than "strong" 
states. 3 The Spanish financial interventionism of the 1960s fits neither 
of these interpretations very well. Its introduction was driven by spe-
cific economic policy choices that were linked to the legacy of inflation-
ary finance in Spanish development and involved fundamental (rather 
than particularistic) political objectives on the part of the regime's new 
technocratic elite. Financial interventionism was instituted to manage 
conflicting aspects of the regime's new economic strategy. It was also 
offered to private actors as an alternative to other, more intrusive forms 
of state control. Rather than a change in the balance between public 
and private power, interventionism in Spain is best understood as an 
attempt to reconcile economic liberalization with domestic political 
stability, and as entailing a new accommodation between public offi-
cials and the private banks in a changing domestic political economy. 
Interventionism and the Nueva Ordenaci6n 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the political life of the Franco regime had 
been defined by the uneasy coexistence of national syndicalists and 
their opponents. The years following the events of 1957-59 (which 
2 For example, John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems 
and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Chalmers 
Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., The Political 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
3 For example, Jorge de Esteban and Luis Lopez Guerra, La crisis de/ estado franquista 
(Barcelona: Labor, 1977); Arvid J. Lukauskas, "The Political Economy of Financial 
Restriction: The Case of Spain," Comparative Politics, no. 1, 1994. 
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effectjveiy marginalized the former), brought to the fore other cleavages 
~ among the regime's supporters and within its policyma~ing elite. One 
notable ,example was the early displacement of the neoliberal academic 
economists who had participated in the drafting of the IMF-sponsored 
stabilization plan by a more politically minded group of technocrats 
closely associated with the Catholic lay organization Opus Dei who 
spearheaded the introduction of French-style planning in Spain. 4 Under 
the leadership of Laureano Lopez Rodo, a professor of public admin-
istration and prominent Opus Dei member who had been named gen-
eral technical secretary to the office of the presidency in 1957, the 
Planning Commission was established in 1962, and a little over a year 
later, the first of four Spanish economic development plans came into 
effect. Over the following years, the Planning Commission quickly 
acquired the status of a virtual economic superbureaucracy 5 that 
gained its cohesiveness from the pro-business, managerial philosophy 
forged by Opus Dei members in opposition to radical national syndical-
ism during the previous decade. The central objectives of that philoso-
phy, as articulated by Lopez Rodo, were to advance the role of private 
initiative in Spain's economic development and to supplant the antiqu-
ated corporati;ism that characterized economic regulation with the 
principle of "administrative rationalization. "6 
The process of bureaucratic reforms i"riitiated by the Opus Dei plan-
ners included an ambitious attempt to change the legal framework of 
banking regulation. T~~ rpost important piece of legislation in this 
regard was a banking law passed in 1962 that departed from the regula-
tory framework established in 1921 and 1946 in four principal ways. 
First, it t).'atiQ~alizeq the Bank of Spain and the para public credit institu-
tions (henceforth called official credit institutions, or EOCs), whose 
private status was rejected as a vestige of the old economic corporativ-
ism. Second, it established a complex institutional structure, in which 
4 The principal figures in the first group were the econon!.ists Juan Sarda, head of the 
Bank of Spain's research service, and, among others, Enrique Fuentes Quintana and Angel 
Rojo, whose later-day role is discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Gonzalez refers to this group 
when he highlights the role of the "technical team" of "efficient functionaries " involved in 
the negotiations with the international bodies in 1957-59: Economia politica de/ fran-
quismo, pp. 29, 33. 
5 Richard Gunther, Public Policy in a No-Party State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting 
in the Twilight of the Franquist Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 
6 See the discussions of Lopez Rodo in Carlos Moya, El poder econ6mico en Espana 
(Madrid: Tucar, 1975), p. 91; and Charles Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern 
Spain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 103-18 . 
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regulatory authority over the financial sector was allocated to three 
public agencies (the;.Bank of Spain which was charged with overseeing 
the private banks;· a new Savings Bank Credit Institute which wais given 
regulatory authority over the Savings banks, and a new Medium- and 
Long-Term Credit Institute which was created to coordinate and over-
see the newly nationalized official credit institutions and to regulate 
medium- and long-term credit extended by the banking sector). Third, 
the law professed the intention to end the legally sanctioned status quo 
in the banking sector by imposing a regime of banking "specialization" 
(separation of commercial and industrial banking) and opening the 
door to the creation of new "industrial banks." Finally, the law set the 
legal basis for a regime of state-directed credit allocation by defining 
the credit system as an "instrument" of the Planning Commission. 7 
The new regulatory framework instituted in 1962 gave rise to two 
broad conduits of privileged financing (referred to as "privileged fi-
nancing circuits") that allowed state officials to direct a significant 
portion of the financial sector's resources to specific users and produc-
tive activities. The first circuit involved credit channeled through the 
now nationalized EOCs and financed through a compulsory public 
debt ratio that was imposed on both commercial and savings banks. 
The burden of this coercive constraint was carried disproportionally by 
the savings banks, which were forced to allot as much as 80 percent of 
their resources to state-designated investments, compared to a ratio of 
just 10 percent imposed on the commercial banks. Selective credit al-
location was, however, also achieved through a second, less coercive 
mechanism: so-called special rediscount lines that allowed the commer-
cial banks to rediscount credits extended to state-specified users ~ith 
the Bank of Spain. The special rediscount lines _also served to replace 
the pignoraci6n as the mechanism whereby liquidity was injected into 
the financial sector. They were first introduced as a special rediscount 
for long- and medium-term credit in 1960, in the throes of a severe 
recession that followed the implementation of the stabilization plan, 
and vastly expanded over the following decade to cover an ever-larger 
number of sectors and economic activities. 8 Together, the two "priv-
7 
"Ley 2/1962 sobre bases de ordenaci6n de! credito y de la banca," Boletin Oficial de/ 
Estado, April 14, 1962. 
8 It allowed the authorities a greater measure of control over the rate of monetary 
expansion than the pignoraci6n, however, because the banks could no longer hoard public 
debt that they could trade in when the authorities tried to impose stabilization measures. 
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ileged financing circuits" grew r~pidly over the 1960s, accounting for 
'49 percent of private sector financing by 1970. 9 • 
The technocratic ideology· that justified the new regulatory frame-
work asserted objectives (administrative rationalization and economic 
modernization) that coincide with the transformative or developmental 
agenda emphasized in the statist view of interventionism. Spanish ob-
servers, however, tend to associate the interventionist past with the 
authoritarianism of the Franco regime rather than state autonomy or 
strength, and to attribute it to the clientelistic relationships that could 
be fostered through selective credit regulation. 10 Such a "rent-seeking" 
explanation of interventionism, however, fails to consider the fact that 
very similar forms of financial regulation were adopted in countries 
with political reglm~s as fundamentally different from the Spanish as 
those not just pf France, but also of Norway or Sweden. It also over-
looks the fact that political patronage could be applied equally, if not 
more, effectively through alternate, less circuitous forms of state con-
trol that did not subsume the instruments of monetary policy, as illus-
trated by the case of Italy. While clientelism and patronage were un-
doubtedly part of the consequence of financial interventionism in 
Spain, they·· thus do not represent a compelling explanation for its 
introduction in the first place. 
A different expla~ation of why financial interventionism was intro-
duced in Spain at the same time that the rest of the economy was 
liberalized has been offered by Charles Anderson, who has argued that 
many of the techn~cra~s' actions were based on a direct and almost 
unqualified importation of regulatory institutions from Spain's imme-
diate'p ,eighbO{-tq_ the north, France. 11 In its complexity and detail, the 
edifice of privileged finance established in Spain in the early 1960s 
indeed bore a remarkable resemblance to the system developed in 
France over the 1940s and 1950s, and this degree of similarity is partly 
accounted for by the fact that France served as the model that the 
f 
9 On the privileged financing circuits, see Raimundo Poveda, "Politica monetaria y 
financiera," in Luis Gamir, ed., Politica econ6mica de Espana" (Madrid: Alianza Univer-
sidad, 1980); idem, La creaci6n de dinero en Espana, 1956-1970: Analisis y critica 
(Madrid: IEF, 1972). 
10 Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "Pr6logo," in Rafael Termes, Desde la banca (Madrid: 
Rialp, 1991), p. !iv; Lukauskas, "Political Economy of Financial Restriction." 
11 Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 164-67 
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Spanish technocfats w:ere seeking to imitate. 12 Yet the parallelism be-
tween French and Spiinish regulatory institutions during this period 
was not just a matter of simple institutional mimickry. · Rather: the 
wholesale adoption of the French model of financial regulation in Spain 
reflected fundamental choices in the area of economic policy strategy 
on the part of the regime's new technocratic elite, which had little to do 
with the regulatory framework itself but virtually compelled its adop-
tion. As in France, interventionism was intended to reconcile two con-
flicting elements in the economic policy strategy pursued by the Span-
ish technocrats: an open trade regime and a relatively relaxed flow of 
cheap central bank credit to the economy. 
Many features of the regulatory framework imported from France in 
the early 1960s are consistent with the Spanish technocrats' stated 
objective of "rationalizing" the character of public administration, and 
particularly the relationship between state and private actors in the 
economy. The nationalization of the monetary authority, the segmenta-
tion of financial operations, and even the principle of state-directed 
credit allocation all seem to conform to this idea, and in this sense 
support a statist interpretation of the adoption of interventionism (i.e., 
one that gives primacy to the transformative agenda of state elites). 
Other aspects of the new interventionism, however, are not so easily 
explained. The two-tiered structure of the privileged financing circuits 
and the integration into these circuits of the central bank's main mone-
tary policy instruments are not clearly linked to any industrial policy 
imperatives and even seem to constrain state capacity by compromising 
the independence of monetary policy. Both measures, however, were 
necessary corollaries of another type of choice by the technocrats: to 
maintain cheap credit as a central element in economic policy, even as 
the economy was opened to international product markets. In the 
12 The regime of banking specialization and the regulatory segmentation of the credit 
market with separate authorities to oversee commercial, industrial, and savings banks 
were directly modeled on French banking regulation. The dual structure of the privileged 
financing circuits in Spain was also an almost exact replica of the French privileged 
financing circuits, which involved a Treasury circuit (similar to the Spanish Official Credit 
circuit) and the more "indicative " use of selective rediscounting. The use of these circuits 
by state authorities is often described as the backbone of postwar industrial policy in 
France. See Stephen Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977); Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth; 
Stephen S. Cohen, James Galbraith, and John Zysman, "Rehabbing the Labyrinth," in 
Cohen and Peter A. Gourevitch, eds., France in the Troubled World Economy (London: 
Butterworth, 1982). 
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words ·of one critic, the planners in the 1980s chose, "explicitly or 
implicitly, to completely subordinate monetary and firiancial policy to 
,what we might term an economic policy of'production.' " 13 The evi-
dent external referent for this choice of relative continuity with the past 
in Spain was the French postwar policy-strategy, which has been vari-
ously described as driven by the imperatives of "creating an economy in 
which capital was both abundant and cheap," and of "of stimulating 
investment above all else."14 
In choosing to maintain a cheap credit policy stance, Spanish plan-
ners were opting, as their French counterparts had done before them, to 
eschew the alternative strategy of export-led growth, which was fol-
lowed by a number of other European countries in the postwar period, 
most prominently We:-st Germany, and also, up to the mid-1960s 
Italy.15 In both of those countries, long-term growth was premised on 
domestic price stability and an undervalued currency that bolstered 
exports and domestic savings and discouraged imports and consump-
tion.16 By contrast, the Spanish industrialization of the 1960s was 
based on a continuous expansion of bank credit supplied to producers 
at low, administratively set interest rates and instrumented principally 
through spedal rediscount line:;.17 The clearest evidence of this choice 
is the high level of central bank rediscounting that was maintained in 
the years following tht; stabilization plan (see in Table 13 the relatively 
high level of claims on banks and savings bank as a percentage of 
13 Luis Angel Rojo, "Polii:ica monetaria," in Espana: Perspectiva 1968 (Madrid: Gua-
diana, 1968), p. 63. For a discussion of Spanish interest rate policy during the 1960s, see 
Christopqer Browne and Leo van Houtven, "The Evolution of Monetary Instruments and 
Policy in:SpaiH,'!' IMFStpff Papers 21, no. 1 (March 1974); and Vicente Galbis, "Negli-
gencia de la politica de tipos de interes en la posguerra," Revista Espanola de Economia , 
no. 3, 1977 
14 Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Re-
form (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 113; Peter A. Hall, Governing the 
Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 244. f 
15 Sofia A. Perez, "'Strong' States and 'Cheap Credit': Economic Policy Strategy and 
Financial Regulation in France and Spain," in Douglas J. Forsyth and Ton Notermans, 
eds., Regime Changes: Macroeconomic Policy Regimes and Financial Regulation in 
Europe from the 1930s to the 1990s (Oxford: Berghan, 1997). 
16 In a fixed exchange rate system, a lower-than-average domestic inflation rate leads to 
an undervalued currency, encouraging exports and punishing imports, whereas a higher-
than-average inflation rate implies an overvalued currency, encouraging imports and 
hurting exports, and leading to balance of payments shortfalls where the current account 
is not covered by the capital account. 
17 Galbis, "Negligencia de la politica." 
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Table 13. Claims on commercial and savings banks in four countries, 1955-1965 (percent of total 
central bank assets) • 
Year Italy FRG France 
- ., 
1955 3% 10% 24% 
1960 1 2 27 
1965 3 5 19 
Source: Computed from IMF financial statistics. 
Table 14: Average inflation in four countries, 1950s and 1960s 
Years Italy FRG France 
1950-1959 2.8% 1.2% 6.2% 
1960-1969 3.4 2.4 3.9 
Source: Computed from IMF financial statistics. 
Spain 
21% 
12 
14 
Spain 
5.8% 
5.8 
central bank assets in Spain and France, compared to Germany and 
Italy). And its most important consequence was the continuation of 
relatively high levels of inflation in Spain during the 196Os (see Table 
14). 
The choice of cheap credit growth strategy can be linked to the 
adoption of indicative planning and the French/Spanish mode of finan-
cial interventionism in at least two ways. First, the idea that monetary 
expansion could be used as a forcing mechanism on the rate of growth 
required that such monetary expansion be channeled into those types 
of productive investments that would maximize productivity growth 
over the medium term and minimize the damage of domestic inflation 
to the economy's competitiveness. As Michael Loriaux writes for the 
French case, the cheap credit strategy was base~ on the governm~nt's 
"ability to accelerate economic reconstruction and to respond to the 
demand that excess liquidity generated by hastening the production of 
a commensurate supply of goods," so as to "bypass the need for mone-
tary stabilization." 18 This strategic imperative served as an important 
rationale for the adoption of both indicative planning and selective 
credit regulation. Second, as John Zysman notes, the institutionaliza-
tion of a cheap credit strategy in the form of administratively set credit 
rates also created a more immediate, technical need for instruments of 
selective credit regulation to make the strategy compatible with the 
18 Loriaux, France after Hegemony, p. 106. 
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mai~tenance of open trade relations and a convertible currency. Ad-
ministratively set credit rates implied excess demaJJ.d for credit over 
supply for credit at those points when the rates were below market-
clearing levels; that is, when monetary expansio~ needed to be re-
stricted to elude or address a balance-of-payments crisis. To maintain 
low credit rates at those times, state authorities needed some way of 
selectively allocating credit to address the imbalance between credit 
demand and supply.19 
These links lie ~ehind the parallelism between the Spanish and 
French modes of financial interventionism and explain why financial 
interventionism was adopted in Spain as a corollary of trade liberaliza-
tion. They also fit the manner in which interventionism evolved in 
France, where guidelines for selective credit allocation were first in-
stituted following de :Gaulle's decision to forgo a radical stabilization of 
the inflated wahime currency pool and in response to balance of pay-
ments problems during the late 194Os,20 and in Spain, where selective 
rediscounting was first instituted in 1960 as part of a decision to restart 
the process of credit expansion in order to end the severe economic 
inactivity that had been caused by the stabilization plan.2 1 In both 
countries, regulatory decisions that allowed public authorities to im-
pose selectivity in credit allocation closely followed more fundamental 
decisions to eschew a "price stability"-oriented policy course, such as 
was adopted in Germany and Italy after the war. Financial intervention-
ism in France and Sp~in may thus be largely understood as an attempt 
to rationalize a decision 'by state elites to pursue an expansionary policy 
rather than price stability. 
If iQ.tenrentionism was the necessary corollary of such an expansion-
ary pi:>hcy strategy, the underlying policy choice itself is best understood 
in political terms. The pursuit of a cheap credit strategy was endowed 
with a certain economic logic based in Keynesian theory (that of max-
imizing the internal use of financial resources and of avoiding the liqui-
dity trap that caused the interwar economic c,isis). However, the extent 
to which price stability was subordinated to growth in both France and 
Spain carried clear risks for export competitiveness. The failure to 
19 For discussion of this relationship between cheap credit and selectivity in the French 
case, see also Pierre Patat and Michel Lutfalla, A Monetary History of France in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 124-25. 
20 Loriaux, France after Hegemony, pp. 114-15. 
21 Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 114-52. 
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conform to Keynesian precepts in other ways (e.g., the limited role 
attributed to fiscal policy in both countries), moreover, suggests that 
economic ideas alone do not offer a sufficient explanation , for the 
choice of policy strategy.22 However, the rejection by French and Span-
ish planners of an economic strategy premised on domestic price sta-
bility does seem consistent with a tendency to use monetary expansion 
instead of expanding the state's tax base, which had a strong historical 
legacy ip both countries. 23 In the case of France, it has been argued, the 
postwar strategy grew out of a decision in 1945 to reject radical mone-
tary reform and to place political stabilization ahead of economic sta-
bilization to defeat the political threat posed by the left.24 Despite the 
very different political regime, an analogous set of reasons explains 
why the Franco regime's new technocrats opted for the French, rather 
than the German or Italian, policy course as they sought to integrate 
Spain into the world economy. 
The technocrats' actions, including both their economic liberaliza-
tion program and their regulatory reforms, must ultimately be under-
stood in terms of their overarching objective of sustaining the existing 
social and political order in Spain. As Charles Anderson writes, "the 
prime policy objectives-growth with economic stability, improved 
foreign trade, and centralized political order in society-remained con-
sistent. "25 The choice to tie Spain to a booming world economy was 
meant to commit the regime to a private capital-friendly policy course 
and to dispel any future chance of a turn toward the socializing agenda 
of radical national-syndicalism. Yet it was also meant to ensure a suffi-
cient rate of economic growth to sustain the political regime and to 
mitigate the latent crisis of legitimacy posed by its nonparticipatory 
character and its peculiar situation as an authorttarian regime in post-
war Western Europe. 
22 Fiscal policy in France was modestly expansionary through most of the planning 
period, but remained heavily dominated by monetary policy. See Hall, Governing the 
Economy, pp. 244-45 . In Spain, fiscal policy under the Franco regime remained ex-
tremely rigid and was restricted by the limited tax base and by a steady effort to cut the 
public debt after 1952. See Gunther, Public Policy in a No-Party State, chap. 1. 
23 On France, see Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century," 
in Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., The Political Economy of Inflation 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 55-60. 
24 Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981), pp. 192-202, 267-68; Cohen, Modern Capitalist Plan-
ning, pp. 91-97 
25 Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 141. 
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Ths:: regime's underlying political precariousness became patent in 
the large-s~ale industrial strike wave of the late 19501, which had been 
one of the factors precipitating the technocrats' rise within the regime. 
However, trade liberalization promised to create its own stresses. The 
first round of tariff reductions over 1959-1962 placed severe strain on 
the technologically outmoded steel and coal-mining sectors, both of 
which entered a stage of irreversible crisis in the early 1960s. 26 At the 
same time, the regime's ability to repress growing wage pressure (result-
ing from large rate~ of emigration of rural labor to other European 
countries during the 1950s) was constrained by the technocrats' deci-
sion to seek EEC associate status for Spain in 1962. 27 
All these circumstaflces strongly advised against the use of orthodox 
methods of price 9tabilization to control wage pressure and thus also 
against the adoption : of a strategy of export-led growth based on the 
imposition of domestic price stability. Once taken, this path perpetu-
ated itself. Over the course of 1959-62, the new government depenal-
ized strike activity and legalized collective bargaining, seeking to pre-
empt a more severe political crisis. The result was a veritable 
"explosion of collective bargains" and a rise in working-class mili-
tancy28 that-translated into a significant rise in nominal wages over the 
1960s, threatening the economic growth process by which the tech-
nocrats sought to sustain the political order.29 These developments 
became an increasingly important motive in economic policy. The gov-
ernment's response tp growing labor demands was to rely on cheap 
credit and monetary illusion to diffuse the cost of nominal wage in-
creases and ~estore profitability. As one critic of the planners described 
it, "Qne day the workers salaries are increased and the next day the 
~· 1 ' .... , ·, 
26 Arturo Lopez Munoz and Jose Luis Garcia Delgado, Crecimiento y crisis de/ 
capitalismo espanol (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1968), pp. 189-212. 
27 Anderson, Polical Economy, pp. 113-18, 190-94; Gonzalez, Economia politico de[ 
franquismo, pp. 165-71. Attainment of EEC associate status was considered critical to 
the success of trade liberalization, but it was denied. In 1970, however, the EC granted the 
regime a preferential trade agreement. I 
28 Jose Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco's 
Spain (London: Tavistock, 1978), p. 28; idem, El desarollo econ6mico y la clase obrera 
(Madrid: Ariel, 1970), pp. 93-100. Maravall notes that in 1959, 179 collective agree-
ments were met, covering 427,636 jobs, and by the end of 1964 as many as 4,772 
collective bargains had been negotiated, covering close to two million workers. The 
collective bargaining process was accompanied by a rapid rise in strikes and worker 
stoppages, which in 1962 alone involved 659,360 workers. 
29 Manuel Roman, The Limits of Economic Growth in Spain (New York: Praeger, 
1971). 
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employer is given a special credit line, so that he won't go bankrupt as a 
consequence of the;_ wage increase. This way, the wage increase is 
destroyed via prices [and] tension is defused. But the. instr1:1Il)ent of 
such a policy is that of inflation which serves as the palliative of 
social conflict." 30 
The economic logic of pursuing a cheap credit strategy thus shrouded 
a political strategy of diffusing the cost of economic transformation and 
thus defusing social conflict through monetary expansion. Financial 
interveiitionism, however crudely applied, was intended to reconcile 
such an inflationary domestic dynamic with a more open trade regime 
and with the planners' objective of linking Spain to a booming world 
economy. The motivations for such a strategy cannot be simply reduced 
to the clientelistic character of the Franco regime. It entailed a real 
formula for counteracting the ability of labor and of traditional sectors, 
particularly agriculture, to limit the process of accumulation and invest-
ment that the planners viewed as essential to the regime's survival. 31 
Nor can it be simply ascribed, as the planners themselves would have it, 
to the actions of a more rational and purposive state. It was the regime's 
underlying political precariousness, rather than its strength, that called 
for such a regulatory solution. 
Interventionism and Reciprocal Consent 
The introduction of selective credit regulation constituted an attempt 
by the technocrats to reconcile the integration of Spain into the world 
economy with a domestic policy strategy of relative continuity with the 
inflationary past. However, the imposition of an interventionist regula-
tory framework on a private financial sector that by almost all accounts 
was one of the regime's poderes facticos (de facto powers) also raises a 
question of historical discontinuity that requires attention: the implica-
30 Luis Angel Rojo, interviewed by Salvador Paniker in Conversaciones en Madrid 
(Barcelona: Kairos, 1969), p. 162. 
31 More specifically, credit expansion and the resulting diffusion of costs through 
inflation served to address two tasks. The first was to facilitate the shift of resources from 
some sectors into others. In this sense, the discussion of the strategic value of demand-shift 
inflation in France by Zysman in Governments, Markets, and Growth, pp. 138-44, is 
fully applicable to the Spanish case. Second, cheap credit to industry, the cost of which 
was diffused through inflation, also served to offset nominal wage increases and rising 
agricultural prices that were the result of labor migration. On the latter, see Roman, 
Limits of Economic Growth. 
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tions.of interventionism for the relationship between public and private 
riower in -Spain. 32 Two sets of literature are relevant to this question: 
the state-centric literature in. comparative . and international political 
economy, a·nd the "financial oligarchy'' thesis adva;ced by a number of 
Spanish social scientists in the 196Os. 
Instruments that allow state officials to direct capital flows to specific 
users are commonly interpreted by political scientists as an important 
element of a state's "capacity" to shape comparative advantage and 
impose its objective~ on social actors in the political economy. In this 
light, the creation of an interventionist framework in Spain in the early 
196Os might be interpreted as a shift in the balance between private and 
public power in favor of the latter. However, although undoubtedly the 
technocrats' ascent increased the state's ability to direct the allocation 
of credit by private e~onomic actors, the "strong state" interpretation 
of interventionism is contradicted by several aspects of the Spanish 
experience. The first is the banking sector's reaction to the sudden 
extension of state discretion over its activities. With very minor excep-
tions, there is no evidence that the banking sector raised real opposition 
to the expansion of state controls during these years,33 even though the 
new financial interventionism was instituted as part of a "new eco-
nomic order" that in every other way centered on market-oriented 
liberalization. Indeed, the banking sector itself participated in the 
design of this new economic framework, 34 and the new banking reg-
ulation was drafted a,.t a time when the banks were increasingly repre-
sented in policymaking 'organs.35 
One way (?f understanding the banks' apparent acquiescence in the 
•· 
' ,' ....... ~..  
32 Jose F'efoc Tezano?points out that there is almost complete unanimity among analysts 
of the Franco regime in identifying the heads of the Spanish banks as the power "nucleus" 
of the economy, thus attributing them a great deal of political influence within the regime. 
Estructura de clases y conflictos de poder en la Espana postfranquista (Madrid: Edicusa, 
1978), p. 70. Even those analysts who ascribe to Juan Linz's less class-based "limited 
pluralism" model of the regime, place the banks at the center of the regime's influence 
circle. See, for example, Armando de Miguel, Socioldgia de/ franquismo (Barcelona: 
Euros, 1975), p. 46; Anderson, Political Economy of Modern Spain, p. 76. 
33 The only significant exception was the CSB's proforma opposition to the nationaliza-
tion of the Bank of Spain. The annual reports of the large banks were conspicuously 
devoid of criticism of the new regulatory system. 
34 Much of the nueva ordenaci6n was first articulated in a report by the Research 
Service of the Banco Urquijo, an industrial bank linked to the Banco Hispano Antericano, 
tided La economia espaiiola, 1954-1955 (Madrid: Banco Urquijo, 1956). 
35 For bank board members in high public office, see list C-1 in Ramon Tamames, La 
oligarquia financiera en Espana (Madrid: Planeta, 1977), pp. 218-27 
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extension of state controls is offered in the work of a group of Spanish 
economists afl.d sociologists who in the 1960s sparked a heated public 
debate about the power of the financial cartel. 36 DocllIIlen#ng tjie vast 
pattern of holdings by the banks in large industrial firms as well as the 
extensive presence of their board members in the high echelons of the 
bureaucracy, the work of these economists supports the thesis that the 
state was so in thrall to the bankers that public policy could be made to 
serve t_he banks' interests whether the regulatory framework was inter-
ventionist or not. These authors offer compelling evidence of the bank-
ing sector's ubiquitous influence under the Franco regime. And there is 
much to support their argument that the banks were able to have their 
needs met in a multiplicity of ways. However, the singular focus on 
documenting the "bank power" thesis means that this work is geared 
almost exclusively toward explaining away the significance of interven-
tionism. It therefore overlooks some important subtleties in how the 
interests of public officials and the private banks were reconciled in 
interventionism. 
The relationship between public authority and the private banking 
sector at the heart of the new regulatory regime must be viewed in the 
light of the broader shift in economic orientation of which financial 
interventionism was part, and of the perceived alternatives to it. Al-
though the banks had been the most important beneficiaries of the 
autarkic industrialization experience, the limitations of this economic 
model had become apparent to all by the late 1950s. As the most 
important investors in the Spanish economy, the banks also stood to 
profit from a shift in economic policy that would tie the Spanish econ-
omy to the booming postwar world economy. Moreover, the economic 
and political crisis of the 1950s had shaken the existing political bal-
ance within the regime, raising the possibility that future social unrest 
36 The most prominent examples of this literature are Juan Muiioz, El poder de la banca 
en Espana (Algorta, Vizcaya: Zero, 1970); Ramon Tamarnes, La lucha contra los monop-
olios (Madrid: Tecnos, 1961); and a series of articles published under the pseudonym 
Arturo Lopez Muiioz in Triunfo and Cuadernos para el Dialogo by Jose Luis Garcia 
Delgado, Juan Muiioz, and Santiago Roldan. Their arguments revolved around a "finan-
cial oligarchy " view of the Franco regime that was broadly analogous to the "power elite" 
arguments made by American political scientists at the time. The publication of this work 
encouraged national syndicalists to renew their calls for nationalization of the banking 
sector and prompted a law that made it a conflict of interest for an individual to be 
simultaneously on the board of one of the official credit institutions and a private bank. 
See Muiioz, Poder de la banca, pp. 184-85; Velarde, Sohre la decadencia, pp. 657-60; 
and the ongoing debate in the 1968 issues of Cuadernos para el Dialogo. 
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mig~t bolster the influence of radical national syndicalists, whose calls 
for socialiiation of the economy had until then been t:hecked by private 
capital. . 
The support of the private banks for both the program and political 
leadership of the technocrats must thus be understood in terms of their 
support for an economically viable growth strategy that maintained the 
primary position of private as opposed to public initiative in the Span-
ish economy. Such a growth strategy was best pursued by engaging in 
some measure of external liberalization and by tying Spain to the West's 
major international 'economic institutions. The regime's perceived po-
litical inability to pursue a noninflationary growth strategy virtually 
compelled the financial sector to accept some mechanism of selective 
credit allocation t;hat could be used to reconcile monetary expansion 
with the external coii.straints of a convertible currency. 
There is ample evidence that, in the Spanish political context of the 
time, financial interventionism was viewed as an alternative to a more 
aggressive role by the state in the Spanish economy. The first World 
Bank report on Spain, for example, prescribed an increased role for 
public credit institutions at the same time that it attacked the privileged 
role that the. Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) had been given dur-
ing the autarquia ar,1d called for limitations on the activities of the 
public sector.37 This view of financial interventionism as an alternative 
to a powerful public sector is reflected as well in the actions of the 
technocrats who sharply downgraded the INl's role at the same time 
that the "privileged _financing circuits" were being instituted.38 A simi-
lar trade-off underpinned the compulsory public debt ratio. Given the 
limite,~ fis.caf capacity of the state and the existing retrograde tax struc-
ture, 'fhe iinpo's1tion of a ratio on the banks must be understood as an 
alternative to more progressive tax reform, from which the banks, as 
the largest investors in the Spanish economy, stood to lose far more. 
In these various ways, the Spanish banks' acceptance of the new 
' 37 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Development of 
Spain (Washington, D.C., 1962). 
38 The INl's role was redefined from serving the goal of economic self-sufficiency to 
playing a subsidiary role to private capital and initiative. In 1963 the INI was subordi-
nated to the planning authority, which radically reduced its role in public investment 
?utside of the energy sector and redirected the institute's activities toward supporting the 
investment needs of private firms and taking over failing firms for restructuring. See Pablo 
Martin Aceiia and Francisco Comin, INI:50 anos de industrializaci6n en Espana 
(Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1991), chap. 4. 
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interventionist framework is congruous with Richard Samuels's obser-
vation that ".rlthough credit allocation is an effective tool of the strong 
state, the creditor -or guarantor state may well be the le~st !hrea,tening, 
and hence the most acceptable to private interests." 39 Indeed, much of 
the relationship between the Spanish banks and the Franco regime's 
technocrats is captured by Samuels's concept of "reciprocal consent" 
between state and market actors and by his distinction between "juris-
diction" and "control" in the relationship between business and the 
state i~ Japan. "Jurisdiction," Samuels writes "is the territory within 
which authority can be exercised and control is the exercise of that 
authority. By consent I imply that both public and private jurisdiction 
in markets are negotiated and draw attention to the interdependence of 
public and private power. Market jurisdiction is not monopolized by 
states or private firms. Likewise control, defined in terms of leadership 
and authority, is something better discovered than attributed. "40 
The interventionist regulatory regime in Spain conformed to Sam-
uels's concept of a compact in which private actors, in this case the 
banks, traded jurisdiction (over credit allocation) for control (over the 
financial system). In the Spanish case, this compact was strongly prem-
ised on two conditions that protected the banks' profits and existing 
position in the economy: (1) the de facto continuation of the banking 
cartel's status quo; and (2) the continued (if now more controlled) 
provision to the banks of ample central bank refinancing. The first of 
these conditions was the sine qua non of the compact. While a signifi-
cant degree of discretion over credit flows was granted to the planning 
authorities, those aspects of the new legislation that challenged the 
banks' control over the financial sector and the economy at large were 
carefully calibrated so as to contain the competitive impact qn the 
sector. 
By requiring the banks to specialize in either commercial or industrial 
banking and by legalizing the creation of new "industrial banks," the 
Banking Law of 1962 purported to end the regulatory status quo in the 
sector and its control over Spanish industry. The technocrats' attempt 
to shift from a "universal" to a "specialized" banking system was, 
however, always beset by a lack of purposive clarity. The text of the law 
suggested that the regime of specialization was meant to address a 
39 Richard Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Compara-
tive and Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 13-14. 
4o Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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massiye "mismatching" in industrial finance that had developed during 
the autarqTJia, whereby long-term · industrial investment projects were 
financed by rolled-over ninetx,-.day credits.~.1 But it also referred to the 
: objective of" disengaging the banks from the life of industry. "42 Unlike 
the economic mismatch rationale, this second argument was of a politi-
cal nature. It was meant to address the increasingly widespread percep-
tion created by the rapid expansion of the banks' industrial holdings 
during the autarquia and seized upon by the "financial oligarchy" 
theorists that the banks' economic power made the Franco regime 
captive to private interests. The preamble to the law thus stated that the 
"preeminent position that the commercial banks [had] acquired in the 
financial system was favored by the so-called banking status quo and 
by a process of CQncentration in large organizations that, far from 
encouraging the specialization of the banks, turned them into multi-
functional instithtions. This situation increased the influence of the 
banks over private business" and had to be "confronted decisively," the 
preamble stated.43 
Despite these political vows, the status quo was never effectively 
broken, as a result of adroit adjustments in the application of the law. 
The newly chartered industrial banks were given the significant priv-
ilege of being the sole institutions allowed to issue long-term certificates 
of deposits, but they were prevented ,from effectively competing with 
the commercial banks by being allowed to operate only three offices. 
The regulatory regim~ for the creation of new industrial banks was, 
moreover, "cautious to the point of mistrust." It set very high capital 
requirement for the establishment of new industrial banks and left 
author_i.zation of new banks to the discretion of the Ministry of Finance. 
It also'· ~et no limitations to the control of industrial banks by commer-
cial banks. Nine of the fifteen industrial banks approved between 1962 
and 1972 thus were chartered by the existing commercial banks, which 
were quick to set up their own industrial subsidiaries to take advantage 
' 41 Jose Miguel Andreu and Carmen Arasa, Banca universal vs. banca especializada: Un 
analisis prospectivo (Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, IEP, 1990), pp. 267-68. The law 
classified private banking institutions in two categories: commercial banks, whose busi-
ness was to be limited to ordinary commercial credit lines and deposit taking, and 
industrial bariks (or merchant banks), whose function would be to finance industrial 
investment and to promote industrial companies. 
42 Poveda, "Politica monetaria y financiera," p. 78. 
43 Quoted in Antonio Torrero, "La evoluci6n del sistema financiero," Boletin de Es-
tudios Econ6micos 30, no. 96 (1976): 859. 
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of the privile~s gr~nted to this category of institutions. Hence, al-
though quantitativ~ measures show a significant decline in the de&ree of 
concentration in the sector from 1959 to 1973 when banks are con-
sidered as individual entities, they show no significant change when the 
sector is analyzed in terms of banking groups (i.e., the groups con-
trolled by the Big Seven along with two smaller groups, RUMASA and 
Grupo Catalana). 44 Independent industrial banks controlled only 2.5 
percent-of the banking sector's deposits by 1975 and hence never at-
tained the weight "needed to offer any noticeable competition to the 
large mixed banks. "45 
Other aspects of the implementation of the Banking Law com-
pounded this failure of the industrial bank experiment. Even without 
the use of their new industrial subsidiaries, the commercial banks were 
able to keep virtually all of their industrial holdings by simply issuing 
new stock, because the only actual limit imposed was that a commercial 
bank's portfolios could not exceed the sum of its capital and reserves. 46 
Ultimately, the specialization attempt thus produced only an artificial 
separation of activities, rather than any real change of the banking 
system's structure. 47 As one observer notes, "the specialization experi-
ment failed because it had very little chance in the institutional frame-
work in which it was attempted. [The authorities] tried to impose the 
idea in the context of a structure in which the initiative would have had 
to come from those who held economic power and experience in 
the banking system. "4 8 
Competition continued to be restricted in other ways as well. A 1962 
decree announcing the legalization of foreign bank entry was never 
implemented. The external liberalization of the economy thus never 
extended to the financial sectoi:, making the latter an island of protec-
44 Oscar Fanjul and Fernando Maravall, La eficiencia del sistema bancario espanol 
(Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1985), chap. 2, in particular pp. 73-76. RUMASA and 
Catalana, two groups created under the new legal framework, both failed in the early 
1980s (see chapter 6). 
45 Torrero, "Evoluci6n de! sistema financiero," p. 863, and Andreu and Arasa, Banca 
universal, pp. 271-73. See also Munoz, Poder de la banca, pp. 98-100; and Poveda, 
"Politica monetaria y financiera," p. 79. 
46 As a consequence, new stock issue, which had grown at an annual rate of 8.2 % from 
1955 to 1962, grew at a rate of 31.7% between 1963 and 1966. See Poveda, "Politica 
monetaria y financiera," n. 17 
47 Practically all of the independent industrial banks were involved in the real estate and 
tourism sectors, and failed during the 1970s when these sectors were hit hard by the oil 
crisis. See Andreu and Arasa, Banca universal, p. 287 
48 Torrero, "Evoluci6n de! sistema financiero," p. 867 
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tionism at .<! time when most other sectors of the econ9my were opened 
to foreign competition. Most pf the foreign investment that followed 
the liberalization of inward capital flows in 1959 was mediated by the 
Big Seven, providing the latter with a large new source of profits. A 
provision in the legislation of 1962 that made authorization of branch 
network expansions a function of a banks' total capital also supported 
the position within the sector of the Big Seven, "which were the ones 
that got branch expansions approved according to this criterion. "49 
Unfavorable tax treatment of the financing that firms raised on the 
capital markets; the discriminatory regulatory treatment of the savings 
banks;so an anachronistic system of interest rate regulation, which 
subjected deposit q1tes to a maximum and credit rates to a minimum; 
and the continued operation of the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB)-
all contributed 1to an oligopolistic financial market structure in the 
1960s. 
The trade-off between jurisdiction and control, however, is perhaps 
best seen in the way competition was indirectly limited through the 
imposition of the compulsory public debt ratio. I have noted that from 
the standpoipt of the banks, this ratio represented a relatively benign 
alternative to more radical tax reform. But its establishment also en-
tailed an important implicit bargain. The public debt ratio served to 
finance the newly nationalized official credit institutions and thereby 
kept these institutions from acquiring a commercial market presence. 
Indeed, the financing circuit established with the creation of the com-
pulsory ratio reduced the EOCs to mere administrative bodies that 
simply allqtte·d a share of the banks' resources to users selected by the 
plannitlg auth<)rities rather than compete with the Big Seven in the 
capture of deposits. This limitation made the expansion of official 
credit compatible with the existing financial market structure. It also 
meant that the state directly underwrote those credits that carried the 
highest risks (in many instances to companifs in declining sectors in 
which the banks themselves had invested), exempting the banks from 
this role without taking on a competitive presence in the financial 
49 Ibid., p. 860. 
so Ibid., p. 871. The savings banks were forced to allocate 80% of their resources to 
compulsory investments (65% of which was earmarked to financing the INI), did not 
have access to the Bank of Spain's special rediscount lines, and were prevented from 
issuing long-term certificates of deposits, as the commercial banks were able to do 
through their industrial subsidiaries. 
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market.5 1 The aspect of interventionism that appeared to be the most 
coercive and heavy-h;anded (the compulsory ratio) was thus an oblique 
means of supporting the existing structure of the financial sector. In this 
sense, the surrender of jurisdiction served to legitimize the de facto 
maintenance of the banking cartel. 
The interventionist framework instituted in the early 1960s to recon-
cile conflicting aspects of the technocrats' growth strategy was thus 
made a_cceptable to the banks through the continued restriction of 
competition. The banks gave up jurisdiction over the allocation of a 
portion of their resources, but they maintained their oligopolistic posi-
tion of control over the Spanish financial market. The accommodation 
between the technocrats and the banking cartel, however, also involved 
a second aspect of the way selective credit regulation was instituted: the 
continuation of cheap liquidity from the central bank. The "special" 
rediscount lines, which allowed the banks to rediscount those credits 
that they granted to qualifying sectors, were almost continuously ex-
panded over the 1960s to include an ever greater number of specified 
borrowers and uses.52 Interventionism thus imposed few constraints, 
for money was so cheaply and readily available to the banks that they 
were generously compensated for any opportunity costs entailed by the 
compulsory ratio. Such monetary expansion also reconciled the tech-
nocrats' objective of providing cheap credit to industry while maintain-
ing an oligopoly in the banking sector, because it allowed the banks to 
charge low rates on their credits to industry while enjoying oligopolistic 
interest and profit margins. This suppression of the latent conflict be-
tween the financial cartel and producer groups was a critical charac-
teristic of the interventionist regime. 
The upshot of these arrangements was that th.e Big Seven proticted 
and in some ways even strengthened their position in the financial 
sector, in spite of the avowed intention to end the status quo in the 1962 
law. Rapid economic growth allowed the savings banks and new indus-
trial banks to increase their share of deposits at the expense of the 
commercial banks. Between 1962 and 1974, the savings banks' share 
increased from 24 percent to 28 percent, and the industrial banks 
51 See Gabriel Tortella and Juan Carlos Jimenez, Historia de/ Banco de Credito Indus-
trial (Madrid: Alianza, 1986), pp. 142-45; Muiioz, Poder de la banca, pp. 180-81. The 
credits extended by the EOCs to the steel and coal mining concerns are prime examples. 
See chapter 4. 
52 Poveda, "Politica monetaria y financiera," pp. 93-95. 
CHEAP CREDIT AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONISM 
Table 15. Index of basic figures for Big Seven private banks and national income, 1965-1974 (1960 = 
190) • 
1965 1970 1974 
Capital and reserves 200 625 1,180 
Deposits 230 473 975 
Profits 166 477 1,210 
National income 211 378 733 
Source: Adapted from Antonio Torrero, "La evoluci6n del sistema financiero, Boletfn de Estudios Econ6micos 
30, no. 96 (1976): 868. 
acquired just above 8 percent (although, as noted, most of the latter 
were controlled by die Big Seven). The commercial banks, however, 
nonetheless increa~ed their share in the financing of the private sector 
from 57 perce~t to 60 percent over the same period. 53 Within the 
commercial bank category, the Big Seven's share of deposits declined 
only minimally, from 72.7 percent in 1952 to 70.2 percent in 1972. 
Moreover, the Big Seven capital and reserves grew by sixfold and their 
profits by fivefold in the 1960s (see Table 15). This steady accumula-
tion of assets in the large commercial banks became a particularly 
critical factor in the following decades, when most of the industrial 
banks failed, leading to renewed concentration in the sector. 
Rather than a shift in the balance between public and private power, 
financial interventio~ism in Spain thus reflects an accommodation be-
tween an elite of technocratic planners, who sought to sustain the 
existing political order by outwardly liberalizing the economy while 
continuing a relaxed rate of monetary expansion, and the private bank-
ing c~el, ·.wh~h was interested in the profit opportunities that such a 
policy t~;n could.._ bring and also in preempting an alternative policy 
turn that might have involved expanding the public sector's presence in 
the market or its fiscal capacity. This regulatory accommodation al-
lowed the technocrats to implement a cheap credit-driven growth 
strategy as they opened the Spanish economy/to international trade and 
capital flows, while preserving the banks' dominance in the Spanish 
financial system. 
Protection and continued liquidity were the bases of this relationship 
of reciprocal consent. The question remains, however, why the planners 
sought such a relationship in drafting the new regulatory framework, 
53 Torrero, "Evoluci6n del sistema financiero," p. 856. 
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in particular since it conflicted with some of the political objectives 
addressed by the text of the 1962 law. 
One answer is offered by the financial oligarchy theorists, for whom 
the position of economic control acquired by the large banks in the 
preceding decades translated automatically into control of the political 
regime. Such an interpretation, however, gives excessively short shrift 
to the technocrats' relative independence of purpose, and in particular 
to the important role of political objectives in their agenda. To be sure, 
the banks controlled a very significant share of the Spanish economy 
through their asset portfolios and their webs of interlocking director-
ships. Most political analysts of the Franco regime also attribute to 
them a very great amount of direct political influence with Franco, 
thanks largely to their support of the nationalist cause during the war. 
An even more compelling fact, however, is that by the late 1950s the 
cartel stood out as the sole clearly organized representative of national 
private capital in Spain. The banks' cohesiveness-their leadership met 
on a regular basis and was represented on the boards of almost all large 
enterprises in Spain-stood in sharp contrast to the virtual absence of 
any alternative coordinated economic elite. This scenario made it 
difficult for any group that opposed a stronger state presence in the 
economy to forgo the political partnership of the bankers. As we shall 
see, the central bank reformers who set out to dismantle the interven-
tionist framework in the 1970s made a calculation very similar to that 
of the Franco regime's technocratic planners. In both instances, how-
ever, it was the political objectives and ideological agenda of an incom-
ing elite of policymakers, rather than the banks' economic clout, that 
made the bargain necessary. 
4 
Shift within the State 
T he 1960s was the decade in which Spain experienced its own "economic miracle." From 1959 to 1966, real output grew at an annual average of 7.5 percent, and industrial production 
rose at an average 11 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of the work 
force employed in agriculture fell from 49 percent in 1960 to 29 per-
cent in 1970. Although this transformation had begun under the autar-
quia and would continue at an even faster pace in the early 1970s, in 
the minds of !Ilany Spaniards the 1960s marked an end to the back-
wardt).~s and marginalization that the country had experienced since 
the ttii:~"o{the'n'ineteenth century. The arrival of American multina-
tionals and of hoards of Northern European tourists are popular sym-
bols of this belated accession to the club of Western industrialized 
nations. Foreign investment and the tourism boom, along with the 
liberalization of trade relations initiated in 1,959, also feature promi-
nently in stylized accounts of the Spanish economic miracle. Folklore 
and standard economic accounts, however, tend to neglect the role of 
another factor behind the rapid transformation: the continued supply 
of ample and cheap credit to the Spanish economy. Tourism revenues 
(mainly) and foreign direct investment (to a lesser extent) did ease the 
foreign exchange constraint on the Spanish economy, but cheap bank 
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credit continued to be the principal motor of investment during the 
1960s.1 ~ 
The flow of cheap credit was a central element in the growth 
strategy of the technocratic planners who were given control over 
Spanish economic policy after 1959, because it defused social conflict 
and suppressed the latent conflict between an oligopolistic financial 
sector and other sectors in the Spanish economy. The success of such an 
expansiQnary policy orientation, however, hinged on a particular set of 
economic circumstances that involved aspects in both the international 
environment and the domestic political economy. The cessation of this 
context in the late 1960s created new problems for Spanish policy-
makers that would set the stage for a second major regulatory shift. 
This outcome, however, depended on the changing configuration of 
conflict and identities among different groups in the state's policymak-
ing elite. 
From a comparative standpoint, the initiation of the shift away from 
interventionism and in favor of market-oriented reform occurred at an 
early point in Spain, so early, in fact, that the international changes to 
which liberalizing reforms are commonly attributed had yet to acquire 
a compelling character. Growing economic constraints did not deter-
mine the decision to abandon interventionism, but abetted a shift 
within the policymaking elite in which the regime's technocratic plan-
ners were displaced by a group of central bank reformers who were 
committed to the dismantling of selective credit allocation for essen-
tially ideological reasons. The existence of this group of reformers and 
the nature of their reform agenda were the consequences of a long-
running domestic political dynamic. They formed in reaction to the 
legacy of inflationary finance in Spain and in dir~ct opposition t<> the 
planning bureaucracy's ascendance during the 1960s. Changing eco-
nomic conditions did not so much cause the move away from interven-
tionism as they were seized upon to forward a domestically incubated 
reform agenda that was driven as much by ideological antagonism as 
by economic realities. Moreover, those changing conditions did not just 
involve a changing external context; they also reflected the internal 
1 Gross foreign exchange receipts rose from $600 million in 1960 to $2.2 billion in 
1966. Close to $1.3 billion were tourism revenues; another $420 million were transfers, 
almost entirely worker remittances. See OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain (Paris, 1969); 
and Ramon Tamames, Estructura econ6mica de Espana (Madrid: Guadiana, 1974), 
2:479, 547 561. 
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exha1,1stion of a political strategy of using monetary expansion to facili-
tate economic change. t 
This chapter describes the origins of the financial reform process in 
Spain, linking it to this second, more subtle shift within the policymak-
ing bureaucracy under the Franco regime. It is important to point out 
that this shift, and the regulatory turn, began well before the political 
regime transition, though it would later be strongly expedited by that 
transition. Moreover, as in the early 1960s when the technocratic plan-
ners had gained pre~minence and instituted the interventionist frame-
work of credit regulation, change was accompanied by continuity. The 
new central bank reformers felt it necessary to establish a working 
alliance with the banking sector. From its inception, the financial re-
form process was therefore conditioned by the second-order objective 
of forging a new co~pact with the banks that would be compatible 
with the refonhers' agenda. This combination of change within the 
policymaking elite and continuity in the compactual character of re-
form is critical to understanding why domestic financial deregulation 
was initiated at such an early point in Spain, yet at the same time 
followed a very drawn-out and skewed course. 
A New Relay within the State 
Signs that the technocrats' economic growth formula might not be 
sustainable indefinitely first became clear with a sharp deterioration in 
domestic economic activity during the last quarter of 1967 After seven 
years. Qf rapid Rroductivity growth, industrial production came to an 
abrup~ 'hafr, l~~thg consumption to take up the whole increment in 
domestic demand by the end of the year. At the same time, outflows of 
short-term capital rose to such a level as to turn what would have been 
a $75 million basic surplus in the balance of payments into a net overall 
deficit of $140 million. The government's fir9t response was an attempt 
to restore the economy's external balance without significantly altering 
the existing policy strategy. In November, it took advantage of a 14.3 
percent devaluation in the pound sterling to devalue the peseta by the 
same ratio (and for the first time since 1959), accompanying this move 
by a package of stop-gap stabilization measures. 2 Contrary to 1959, 
2 These measures included a freeze on public salaries and pensions, price and wage 
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when devaluation had successfully underpinned the restoration of the 
external balance, the:. 1967-1968 measures failed to bring domestic 
demand into line with production. As they had done in tl}e l,iite 1~50s, 
the banks drastically reduced their liquidity levels to meet credit de-
mand, leading to a new surge in private credit growth. The economy 
thus experienced a new boom starting in late 1968, leading _again to a 
sharp deterioration of the current account in 1969. 3 
The failure to restore the economy's external balance through 
devaluation in 1968-1969 challenged the cheap credit-driven growth 
model by which the planners had sought to maintain the political re-
gime's viability. The sharp rise in capital outflows indicated that the 
policy of simply fitting interest rates to the growth objectives set out in 
the plan was untenable in the face of higher international inflation and 
interest rates and of changes in the domestic political economy that 
made it harder to repress wage demands. However, the consequences 
that these new economic constraints were to have on the course of 
financial regulation in Spain were entirely dependent on the particular 
configuration of conflict and identities within the policymaking elite to 
which the regulatory shift of 1959 had given rise. They were also 
cloaked by internal controversy in the Franco regime and by the effects 
of political scandal. 
The new balance of payments problems in 1969 coincided with reve-
lations that Spain's largest export firm, MATESA, the recipient of more 
than half of all the privileged export credit granted by the Banco de 
Credito Industrial (BCI), one of the official credit institutes, was 
defaulting on a large amount of its official debt, leaving the Treasury 
with massive losses. The scandal broke in an already very tense political 
situation that involved factional conflict within the cabinet .over 
Franco's July 1969 decision to name Prince Juan Carlos as his successor 
(a move backed by the Opus Dei faction but strongly opposed by other 
ministers). MATESA thus became the "the sole great politico-economic 
scandal in forty years of the Franco dictatorship. "4 And it did so pre-
controls, a rise in the rediscount rate for commercial paper and in the rate on time 
deposits, and depreciation allowances to stimulate investment. See OECD, Economic 
Survey: Spain, 1969, p. 17 
3 Ibid.; OECD, The Capital Market, International Capital Movements, and Restrictions 
on Capital Operations in Spain (Paris, 1971). 
4 Gabriel Tortella and Juan Carlos Jimenez, Historia del Banco de Credito Industrial 
(Madrid: Alianza, 1986), p. 188. 
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cise!y by connecting a growing public perception of corruption within 
. the regime with the privileged financing circuits thai.had been the prime 
instrument of the planners' ~growth stra~egy. As two observers write, 
the' scandal "cast doubt on the central elements of the economic policy 
followed after the Stabilization Plan of 1959, and in particular the 
organization of official credit as it was set forth in the Law of 1962. But 
it also undermined the individuals who had directed and inspired the 
economic policy of the sixties, and whose common link was assumed to 
be their membership in Opus Dei, an organization to which MATESA's 
management was als_o said to belong." s 
The MATESA scandal resulted in a major cabinet shakeup in 1969 that 
appeared to vindicate the "technocratic orientation" of Lopez Rodo by 
including almost; no one who was not a member of Opus Dei and by 
upgrading the position of planning commissioner to the ministerial 
level. 6 This apparent victory, however, proved to be a pyrrhic one, 
masking the rapid decline of the planners' influence over economic 
policy at the end of the 1960s, a development that was confirmed by 
Lopez Rodo's move to the Foreign Ministry three years later. Filling the 
void was the less public but easily documented rise in policy leadership 
of a group .of reformers connected with the central bank, an institution 
whose annual reports had begun to call for financial liberalization as 
early as 1966, yet whose influence .had remained strongly checked by 
that of the planning bureaucracy. 7 
The central ban~'s campaign to promote financial reform bore its 
first fruits in the summer of 1969; that is, at the very same time that the 
failure of the 1967 stabilization measures were becoming apparent and 
thatJhe MATESA scandal erupted into an open political crisis. The new 
presfo.re on ilie Spanish current account allowed the central bankers to 
push through a significant change in the way interest rates were fixed. 
Until then, maximum rates on bank deposits and minimum rates for 
lending operations had been officially set by the Ministry of Finance. 
The 1969 reform linked all bank rates to t9e central bank's rediscount 
5 Ibid., p. 156. 
6 The broader political crisis surrounding the cabinet shakeup is discussed in Raymond 
Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain, Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1981), pp. 189-94. 
7 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1966; OECD, Capital Market, p. 44; and the 
following annual reports of the Bank of Spain: 1967, p. 19; 1968, pp. 107 138; 1969, pp. 
111-15. 
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rate by way of fixed differentials and made lending rates subject to a 
ceiling rather than a floor. 8 
The spectacular turnaround in the country's external balance dµrmg 
the following year seemed amply to confirm the adequacy of this "flex-
ibilization. "9 Yet the 1969 measures made no link between the loosen-
ing of interest rates and the overall rate of monetary expansion. Indeed, 
despite the global rise in rates that the July 1969 measures produced, 
the fast rate of monetary expansion in 1969 was not significantly re-
versed until September, when an 18 percent ceiling on credit expansion 
was imposed.to To stop the outward flow of short-term capital, the 
credit ceiling had to be supplemented by the imposition of a six-month 
prior deposit of 20 percent on the value of imports, a measure that 
produced a sharp monetary contraction though it did little to reduce 
imports.11 Together these measures reduced the expansion of credit to 
the private sector from 25 percent in 1969 to 10 percent in 1970. Yet, 
once the initial six-month deposits began to be released in the summer 
of 1970, the government's ability to reign in monetary expansion came 
to an end, leading to a new acceleration of credit growth during the 
second half of the year. 
Underlying the resilience in credit growth was the planning bureau-
cracy's continued institutional influence over the financial system, in 
particular its indirect authority over the central bank's rediscount win-
dow. "Special" rediscount lines were sharply expanded after the cut in 
ordinary rediscount lines in 1969, reflecting a growing standoff be-
tween the reformers and the planners at the end of the 1960s. 12 The 
s The rediscount rate was raised by 1 % to 5.5%. In addition, time deposits with 
industrial banks carrying a maturity of more than two years, le~ding operations with a 
maturity of more than three years, and deposits in foreign C\Ilrency or convertible pesetas 
were liberalized, and preferential rates for the banks' principal customers were autho-
rized. None of these measures had much significance, however, because they affected only 
a very small proportion of bank operations in Spain. See OECD, Capital Market, pp. 44-
45. 
9 Ibid., p. 45. 
10 Given the fast rate of credit expansion reached in September, the ceiling implied a 
reduction of the (seasonally adjusted) rate of growth of bank credit in the last months of 
the year to about half the rate prevailing in the period up to September. See OECD, 
Economic Surveys: Spain, 1970, p. 34. 
11 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1971, p. 13. 
12 In the fall of 1969, for the first time the central bank instructed the commercial banks 
to keep a minimum cash ratio that had been on the books since the Law of 1962 yet never 
applied. It would, however, prove inadequate as a tool to stop the renewed credit 
expansion because it left "out of account" a number of "easily moneyable assets," such as 
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planning bureaucracy, in essence, vyas able to evade the limits imposed 
tltrough gldbal monetary policy decisions by expandihg the number of 
secto{s and uses eligible for auromatic r.ediscounting.In doing so, it had 
· negated the effect on credit growth of the interest rate increases and the 
reduction of ordinary rediscount lines imposed in 1969. 
The planners' ability to resist nonetheless soon fell victim to the 
growing influence gained by the reformers as a result of the MATESA 
scandal, which forced the resignation of the Bank of Spain's governor 
and brought a new, more resolute leadership to the central bank. Two 
appointments were particularly important in this regard: that of Enri-
que Fuentes Quintana to the Bank of Spain's board of governors in 
1970, and that of Luis Angel Rojo as head of the bank's Research 
Service in 1971. Often :referred to as the guru of the liberalization drive 
by public offici<lls involved in the process, Fuentes Quintana epito-
mized a precursor generation of academic economists who had spear-
headed the creation of economic faculties in Spanish universities during 
the 1940s and 1950s, and adhered strongly to a neoliberal, market-
oriented economic philosophy. 13 His prestige and influence were ex-
panded by his extensive mentoring of a generation of younger econo-
mists, many of whom went on _to the Bank of Spain's Research Service. 
With this network of disciples and colleagues, Fuentes's appointment 
to the board paved the way for a major transformation of the central 
bank's role in Spanish economic policymaking. 
A critical step in this process was the appointment of Fuentes's aca-
demic colleague Luis Angel Rojo to head the bank's Research Service in 
1971. According to Fuentes's own account, the Research Service in the 
early t.i7os ·.rem.._ained an enclave within a wider "technostructure" that 
.. ' ,_., ,: '-
limited the reformers' influence in the bank. The position of governor, 
for example, had been held by prominent regime politicians rather than 
economic experts. Under Fuentes's sponsorship, Rojo set out to trans-
form this technostructure in a way that would allow the bank to take a 
central role in economic policy over the next years. Rojo intensified the 
"effects rediscountable in special lines and unused margins of ordinary rediscount lines": 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1971, p. 29, n. 1. 
13 For discussion of the positions held by Fuentes under the Franco regime, see Ander-
son, Political Economy of Modern Spain, pp. 99-107, and Richard Gunther, Public 
Policy in a No-Party State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the 
Franquist Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 91-95. As Anderson 
notes, the regime tolerated a wide spectrum of orientations among academic economists 
as long as they did not refer openly to the political order. 
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Research Service) recr~itment of academic brainpower, turning it into 
a springboard for high~:ranking administrative positions in the bank. As 
one later-day reformer described it, the common experience in the 
Research Service-which often included advanced graduate study in 
leading American economics departments-produced a high degree of 
affinity in economic ideas even among members of very different politi-
cal orientations. A decade later the head of the service (a post that Rojo 
retained until his appointment as governor in 1992) was indisputably 
regarded as the second-ranking official in the bank.14 
In the early 1970s, Fuentes and Rojo set in motion a process of 
reforms that focused on redressing two key obstacles to the central 
bank's control over monetary policy: (1) the special rediscount lines 
that were outside of the central bank's authority; and (2) the absence of 
a money market through which the monetary authority could control 
the level of liquidity in the financial system in a routine and discretion-
ary fashion. Both of these obstacles were related to the interventionist 
regulatory framework created by the planners. Yet, although the 
central bank's agenda was defined in terms of its ideological opposition 
to that framework, the institutional battle against the planners did not 
turn out to be the most important obstacle for the reformers. 
The planning bureaucracy's influence over the general course of eco-
nomic policy in Spain was decidedly limited by a bill passed in 1971, 
which originally had been drafted to reform the official credit institutes 
in the aftermath of the MATESA scandal. The reformers were able to 
attach a number of "additional provisions" to the legislation; the most 
important was the elimination of the special rediscount lines, and their 
replacement by a compulsory investment ratio that obliged the banks 
to allocate a given proportion of their deposits as credits to specified 
users. 15 This move effectively ended the planners' ability to manipulate 
the expansion of bank lending and thus placed much stronger con-
straints on them. 16 In line with the reformers' agenda, the 1971 law 
14 Interviews, Madrid, 1991. 
15 Within this ratio, which was not to exceed 25% of the banks' liabilities, the Ministry 
of Finance set a percentage that had to be covered with purchases of public bonds, while 
the rest was to be covered with credits and loans to users that were previously eligible for 
special rediscount. The ratio was initially set at 22 % for commercial banks and at 7% for 
industrial banks. The minimum public bond ratio, which was imposed only on commer-
cial banks and served to finance the loans granted by the official credit institutions, was 
set at 15%. See OECD, Capital Market, p. 67 
16 Though the monetization of excess lending by the official credit institutions remained 
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also .shifted a large number of regulatory functions to the Bank of 
Spain, among them control of the Institute for Exchange and Foreign 
Currency (IEME) (formerly under the control of the Ministry of Indus-
try) and authority over both the savings banks (formerly under the 
Institute for Savings Banks Credit, ICCA) and the industrial banks 
(formerly under the Institute for Medium- and Long-Term Credit, 
ICMLP). The last two regulatory bodies were abolished, and the supervi-
sion of the official credit institutions was passed to a new downgraded 
Institute for Officia,l Credit (ICO). 17 The 1971 reform thus had three 
important consequences: (1) it ended the planners' ability to interfere 
with the central bank's rediscount policy; (2) it dismantled the seg-
mented regulatory structure that had served the planners' policies; and 
(3) it gave the Bank qf Spain authority over all private institutions in the 
credit market. 18 · 
I 
Interpreting the Initiation of Reform 
Before going on to describe the subsequent course of reform in Spain, 
it is worth ~onsidering the developments just discussed in light of gen-
eral arguments about the politics of liberalization in formerly interven-
tionist states. As discussed in chapter 1, the prevalent tendency is to 
attribute such domestic regulatory reform (at least as pertains to sec-
ondary economies) , fo ~hanges in the international economic environ-
ment. Two kinds of systemic changes receive particular attention in the 
literature. The first involves changes i.p the international monetary or-
der, ~tartfo.g wit;lt the rise in global inflation and international monetary 
instability caused by the changing policy stance of the United States in 
the mid-1960s, and resulting eventually in the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods order. The second is the emergence and rapid growth of off-
an unresolved issue for the reformers for a decade to come, the coup to the special 
rediscount lines in 1971 had the virtue of requiring explicit government authorization for 
any such monetization of credit. 
17 The law also authorized the Ministry of Finance to delegate its authority over 
"collective investment" institutions, such as pension funds, to the monetary authority. 
18 Because they did not operate as real banks in the sense of intermediating savings in 
the economy, the official credit institutions did not create money. They therefore did not 
interfere with the reformers' policy objective of controlling monetary expansion in an 
operational sense, but only to the extent that the central bank was forced to monetize 
official credit under political pressure. 
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shore financial markets during the 1960s (a result largely of regulatory 
decisions that accompanied the changing policy stance in the United 
States). The increased level of capital mobility that the growth of off-
shore markets is generally purported to entail lies at the heart of the 
prevalent market-driven view of liberalization, according to which in-
ternationalization undermined the segmentation of national financial 
markets that had allowed for relative policy autonomy under Bretton 
Woods, as.well as the ability of governments to regulate domestic credit 
flows, thus negating the practical value of selective credit regulation 
while strengthening the political leverage of social actors who stood to 
benefit from liberalization. In both of these ways, the growth of inter-
national financial markets is said to have compelled governments to 
abandon interventionism. 
The initiation of regulatory reform in Spain was undoubtedly influ-
enced by the international developments emphasized in the literature. 
But it also highlights the extent to which the domestic effect commonly 
attributed to those systemic developments (i.e., the move away from 
interventionism and toward market-oriented reform of the financial 
system) depended on a set of domestic conditions that are quite different 
from those commonly stipulated in the literature yet would have strong 
implications for the course of reform in Spain. The rise in global interest 
rates, combined with a previously unseen dynamism in short-term capi-
tal movements, was indeed the immediate problem that needed to be 
addressed to restore the current account balance after 1967 Yet these 
problems could be solved technically by a rise in Spanish interest rates 
and a commensurate restriction of credit growth, coupled with an 
expansion of capital controls. They did not compel the abandonment of 
selective credit regulation. What was required was that the rate of credit 
expansion be uncoupled from the way state officials imposed their 
criteria for credit allocation, not the abandonment of dirigisme. 
The experience of France, which in the second half of the 1970s 
effectively pursued such a change, coming just as close to meeting the 
government's monetary targets as the German Bundesbank, offers evi-
dence that such a regulatory adjustment was possible, at least from a 
technical standpoint. 19 So does the case of Spain itself, where, once the 
flexibilization of interest rates of 1969 was supplemented by new capi-
tal controls in 1970 and by the abolition of the special rediscount lines 
19 See OECD, Economic Surveys: France, 1983, p. 40; Economic Surveys: Germany, 
1984, p. 30. 
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in 1971, the current account was very quickly and effectively turned 
around in the.early 1970s. There is also no evidence of .iny substantial 
positive sectoral pressure on the .Spanish government to initiate a full-
fledged0process of anti-interventionist reform outside of the policymak-
ing elite.20 The changing economic context of the late 1960s thus may 
have contributed to the shift in the ideological orientation of Spanish 
financial regulation, but it did not compel such a shift. The magnitude 
of the balance-of-payments problem experienced before the OPEC oil 
shocks was simply not great enough. Something else was required to 
turn a necessary monetary policy adjustment into the categorical re-
direction of financial regulation that began in Spain in 1971. 
It might be argued in response that international market pressures are 
sufficient to explain,the political shift in favor of anti-interventionist 
reformers even if they did not compel such a change from a technical 
standpoint, and 1\ence that the market-driven view of liberalization 
does in fact account for the early regulatory turn in Spain. Despite its 
appeal, however, such an interpretation fails to recognize two other 
aspects of the Spanish experience that are not captured in standard 
systemic arguments yet played a crucial role in bringing about the 
regulatory turn and determining the subsequent course of reform. The 
first comprises the sources of constraint on the technocrats' economic 
policy strategy. The second was the prior existence of a contending 
network of policymakers in the central bank, who defined themselves 
by their shared ideologi!=al opposition to the interventionist practices of 
the regime's planning bureaucracy and who were determined to push 
forth a program of financial liberalization. 
A ke_x. consideration in understanding the shift in policy leadership 
that to6k"p1ace at 'the end of the 1960s concerns the differing rates of 
success of the attempts to achieve stabilization through devaluation of 
19 59 and 1967-69. A standard market-driven account of liberalization 
would attribute this difference to the greater mobility of international 
capital flows at the end of the 1960s. This fact9r, along with the chang-
ing character of the international monetary order, surely played a role 
in the balance-of-payments problems encountered by Spanish au-
thorities at the time. However, a closer look at the evolution of the 
domestic political economy during the 1960s reveals that the tech-
nocrats' cheap credit growth strategy was experiencing clear signs of 
20 The IMF and the OECD backed such reforms. Yet the 1969 crisis was resolved 
without substantial assistance from international monetary institutions. 
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internal exhaustion by late 1967 The sources of this internal exhaus-
tion had both an ecop.omic and a sociopolitical component. The first 
derived from the substantial structural transformation that the Spanish 
economy had experienced in the years up to 1967 As John Zysman has 
argued for the French and Japanese experiences, the completion of the 
basic stage of transformation from a predominantly rural economy to 
an industrial economy limited the productivity gains that could be 
achieved by selectively expanding the money supply.21 In the Spanish 
case, this problem was compounded by the limited attention paid for 
decades to the modernization of the agricultural sector and by high 
rates of labor emigration. By 1967, this trend had produced a declining 
rate of agricultural productivity (given the labor-intensive character of 
much of the sector) and a rise of industrial wages that "sustained an 
inflationary process that ultimately halted expansion. "22 
The second component lay in the declining utility of cheap credit as a 
political mechanism for defusing social conflict while keeping real labor 
costs down. The economic effects of having substantially exhausted the 
productivity gains to be had from simply shifting labor from agriculture 
to industry played itself out in the context of rapidly changing indus-
trial relations in Spain. During the autarquia, the Franco regime's labor 
legislation had been highly repressive, making virtually any kind of 
collective action on the part of workers impossible. The organizing 
principle of labor market regulation during that period was com-
pulsory affiliation with state-sponsored vertical syndicates that of-
ficially represented both workers and management by economic sector. 
Wages were set by the Labor Ministry. The official syndicate became 
the main institutional bastion of the national syndicalist faction of the 
regime. Yet by the late 1950s it was failing miserably as an instrume~t 
of state control. According to Jose Maria Maravail, 
The labour market began to operate increasingly independent of gov-
ernmental controls. Managerial strategies of linking productivity with 
wage increases resulted in a progressive gap between real and official 
wages, in a period where productivity and competition became the 
main concern for important sections of management. Wage drifting 
21 John Zysman, "Inflation and the Politics of Supply," in Leon N. Lindberg and 
Charles S. Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 140-71. 
22 Manuel Roman, The Limits of Economic Growth in Spain (New York: Praeger, 
1971), p. 4. 
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was especially acute in Spain in the ~id 1950s and contributed to the 
inflationary process. From a capitalist point of view, antf-inflationary 
policies required strict wage controls a~d wdrk conditions and pro-
ductivity more flexible than the official norms of the Ministry of 
Labour.23 
The growing economic drawbacks of the repressive framework of 
labor market regulation and the political failure to avert widespread 
labor unrest in the late. 1950s led to the legalization of collective bar-
gaining between elected works councils and management after the 
cabinet reshuffle of 1957 Although the law continued to recognize 
only the official syndicate as a legal trade union organization, it set the 
stage for the emergertce:of a clandestine trade union movement in the 
1960s. The main l?rotagonist of this movement hailed from ~either of 
the historical Spanish unions (the Socialist UGT and anarchist CNT) 
but rather from a new organization: the Workers Commissions (Comi-
siones Obreras, or CC.OO.). Sponsored by the Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE), the CC.OO. gradually managed to infiltrate the official 
trade union and gain control of the works councils, successfully under-
mining the control of the syndicate in the bargaining process. 24 
The explosion in collective bargaining that followed these changes 
led to substantial growth in nominal wages, the cost of which was 
diffused only through continuing high rates of inflation during the first 
half of the 1960s. It was ,also accompanied, however, by a dramatic rise 
in worker militancy and strike activity, which intensified in 1966, after 
shop-floor elections that placed the CC.OO. in firm control of works 
council~i,;These d.ryelopments placed clear limits on the extent to .which 
workers · c'otild be ciade to accept nominal wage increases that were 
subsequently eroded by inflation. Thus, although real wage growth in 
1965 had been successfully reduced to 2.3 percent through a 13.2 
percent inflation rate, it rose to 11.2 percent in 1966 and to 8.9 percent 
in 1967.25 This wage dynamic and the rise in worker militancy repre-
sented a very substantial new constraint on the uses of inflation to 
promote growth and were a prime factor behind the balance-of-
23 Jose Maria Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in 
Franco's Spain (New York: St. Martin 's Press, 1977), p. 23 . . . 
24 The historical unions were weakened by the political repression suffered dunng the 
preceding decades, but also because of their stance of open opposition to the official 
syndicates (ibid., pp. 30-31). 
2s Based on hourly labor costs in manufacturing and consumer price index data; OECD, 
Economic Surveys: Spain, 1969 and 1971. 
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payments difficulties of 1967-69. Yet they constituted a dynamic that 
was produced 'by the technocrats' growth strategy independently of 
changes in the international context. The growing constraints on the 
uses of monetary expansion in Spain in the late 1960s were thus largely 
endogenous and political rather than simply determined by external 
market forces. 
A primarily systemic interpretation of the shift toward market-
oriented. reform in Spain also fails to recognize the extent to which the 
qualitative shift in policy leadership at the end of the 1960s was depen-
dent on the preexistence of a network of reformers that were poised to 
seize the opportunity afforded by the changing economic context. The 
inception of the central bank reformers as a contending policy network 
espousing an alternative policy agenda had its origins in 1959, when 
the Bank of Spain's Research Service began to be staffed by a generation 
of neoliberal academic economists whose influence over economic pol-
icy had remained checked by that of the planning bureaucracy. Instru-
mental in this process was Mariano Navarro Rubio, who, although a 
member of Opus Dei, had close connections to the academic com-
munity, in particular to its leading neoliberal members. Named Minis-
ter of Finance in the 1957 reshuffle, Navarro Rubio had been a key 
advocate of the IMF-backed stabilization plan of 1959 and had re-
cruited the support of academic economists on the technical staffs of 
the ministries of Finance and Commerce in this effort. After he was 
dismissed from the cabinet in 1965 {according to most accounts be-
cause of his growing antagonism to Planning Commissioner Lopez 
Rod6), he became governor of the Bank of Spain, where he set in 
motion the transformation that Angel Rojo would later complete. Sev-
eral years before the arrival of Fuentes and Rojo, _Navarro had plac~d 
the Research Service in the hands of young economists who shared his 
opposition to the planning bureaucracy's policy orientations,26 a 
change reflected in the bank's annual reports which criticized the policy 
orientation laid out in the development plans and called for financial 
reform as early as 1966.27 
26 !"-first-hand account of this shift is offered by the then-governor Mariano Navarro 
Rubio, ~ Mis memorias (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1991), pp. 300-310. Some of the 
econor~ust~ brought mto the Servicio de Estudios at this time were Angel Madroiiero, 
Antomo Sanche~ Pedreiio, and Mariano Rubio Jimenez, who would become governor 
under the Socialist government in the 1980s. 
27 Bank of Spain, Annual Report, 1967, p. 19, Annual Report, 1968, pp. 107, 138; and 
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The e.mergence of a contending policy network in the central bank 
thu6 began well · before the change in the internationa• context at the 
·· end of the 1960s had become apparent. The . reformers' motivations, 
riloreover, had roots even further back, in the legacy of inflationary 
finance of the past. Fuentes and Rojo's bid to transform the central 
bank grew out of an economic perspective that clashed directly not 
only with the developmentalism of the planners but with the inflation-
ary tendency in Spanish economic development. The group of individ-
uals that they represen~ed had its brief heyday during the design of the 
Stabilization Plan in 1959, only to be displaced by the establishment of 
the planning bureaucracy. Their agenda for institutional reform re-
sponded directly to this experience, to a historical view of Spanish 
development that placed the Stabilization Plan of 1959 opposite the 
development plans of the 1960s, and to the notion that "there had 
existed no monetiry policy at all in Spain up to this point. "28 Strength-
ening the central bank's role in economic policymaking and providing 
it with the instruments to control liquidity in the financial sector, the 
reformers believed, would give them a lever on economic policy. Cut-
ting off the access of politicians to cheap credit was the philosophical 
imperative that informed their agenda for reform. 29 
These considerations belie the validity of a market-driven interpreta-
tion of reform in Spain. Indeed, they illustrate how the a priori accep-
tance of a powerful systemic explanation can obfuscate the more subtle 
endogenous dynamics qriving the turn toward market-oriented reform 
in interventionist states. The failed experience of restoring the external 
balance through devaluation in 1967-69 may indeed have been experi-
enced c\!i-an .in~rease in external constraint because of the novelty of 
-~ ,' ,.. ' ~~ .. ·, 
Annual Report, 1969, pp. 111-15. These calls were seconded in the OECD publications 
during the same period, reflecting the reformers' strong ties to this organization. See 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1966, and Capital Market, p. 44. The concentration of 
expertise that took place under Navarro Rubio also explains why, despite its subordina-
tion to the Ministry of Finance, the central bank was fullylresponsible for relations with 
the IMF. See Joaqwn Muns, Historia de las re/aciones entre Espana y el Fonda Monetario 
Internacional, 1958-1982: 25 anos de economia espanola (Barcelona, 1984). 
28 This view was repeated emphatically by several officials who participated in the 
reform process of later years, whom I interviewed in Madrid in 1991-92. It is captured in 
an oft-quoted remark: "The Stabilization Plan developed us, while the development plans 
destabilized us." 
29 For two personal testimonies, see the interview with Angel Rojo in Salvador Paniker, 
Conversaciones en Madrid (Barcelona: Kairos, 1969), and Enrique Fuentes, "Pr6logo," in 
Rafael Termes, Desde la banca (Madrid: Rialp, 1991). 
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sharper short-term capital movements, but that failure was largely pre-
determined by changes in the domestic political economy. The role 
played by international market developments was not autonompQS or 
generic. It did not compel the state to abandon interventionism, but 
rather fostered the rise within the policymaking bureaucracy of a con-
tending network of reformers, whose existence and motivations for 
promoting change were rooted in domestic experiences. These origins 
account f5>r the early initiation of a regulatory shift in Spain. But they 
also had other important consequences for the course of reform during 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
The Reemergence of Accommodation 
The reformers' growing influence at the beginning of the 1970s al-
lowed them to undermine the planning bureaucracy's control over eco-
nomic policy by abolishing the special rediscount lines in 1971. In 1973 
they scored another major achievement when the Bank of Spain be-
came one of the first central banks to adopt a policy of targeting mone-
tary aggregates after the breakdown of the Smithsonian Agreement. To 
gain an effective lever on economic policy, however, they also needed to 
create the institutional structure that would allow the central bank to 
exercise control over monetary policy. The key prerequisite here was 
the creation of a real money market in which the monetary authority 
could operate in a routine fashion to control short-term liquidity 
fluctuations. 
In this second objective, however, the reformers' policy agenda came 
into direct conflict with the interests of the private banks. The end.of 
lax central bank rediscounting in 1971 radically altered one of the 
principal elements of the compact that had underpinned credit regula-
tion in the 1960s. If the banks accepted this change, they did so because 
the other major pillar of that compact (protection from both domestic 
and foreign competition) was still intact. With the growing threat of 
competition from international financial markets, bankers had increas-
ingly come to view protection as resting on a rigid framework of inter-
est rate regulation that ensured their ability to maintain a pricing cartel. 
This regulatory framework, however, was precisely what stood in the 
way of the creation of a money market. The course of financial reform 
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in the folJowing years thus reflected the competing pressures of the 
monetfu-y authorities' attempts to gain a handle on monetary policy 
• ··an,d the banking sector's ability to.resist significant changes in the reg-
ulatory regime. 30 • 
The conflict became apparent in 1973, when the oil shock played 
havoc with Spanish price levels. In pursuing its new policy of monetary 
aggregate targeting, the central bank tried to use existing government 
bond issues to control liquidity in the credit markets. The long-term 
nature of these issues, however, rendered them a very rigid instrument, 
leading interbank interes·t rates to soar dramatically in response to the 
bank's tightening, and to drop sharply in early 1974 when the bank 
attempted to rectify its fir9t intervention. The principal problem for the 
reformers thus becam@ the central bank's inability to "inject liquidity 
into the economy in a regular fashion" so as to meet its new policy 
objective. 31 In respbnse, two measures were carried out in 1974: the 
creation of central bank credits to the banking system with a very short 
(usually one-week) term, and a modification of the commercial banks' 
liquidity ratio (from a daily ratio to a ratio averaged over ten days). 
These measures, it was hoped, would lead the banks to create a money 
market where they could place their day-to-day cash surpluses, and in 
which the central bank could intervene to regulate liquidity. 32 
The reformers' efforts to create such a market, however, did not bear 
fruit for over a decade. 33 This failure, which limited the success of their 
monetary targeting during the 1970s, was due to the banks' ability to 
resist any alteration in the re'gulatory framework that might undermine 
their oligopolistic modus vivendi. No money market was created in 
response ,J:o the ·offering of short-term central bank credits because 
these crelfits were"~Uocated to the banks in rigid proportion to their 
deposits rather than by public auction, so that any element of competi-
tion over the capture of funds was absent. Given the lack of price 
30 The changes of 1971 made possible a significant turparound in the balance of 
payments. Thus, from late 1971 through 1973 a substantial surplus in current accounts 
despite an increase in domestic demand allowed the authorities to support a strong 
upswing in economic activity by relaxing their monetary stance. 
31 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1975, p. 25. 
32 Ibid., p. 29. 
33 As we shall see, a real money market came into existence only after foreign banks, 
which were allowed to enter the domestic market at the end of the 1970s, provided the 
necessary impulse. 
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competition in the sector, the banks felt very little compulsion to maxi-
mize their operating ,piargins by creating a money market for their cash 
surpluses. 34 
Having successfully undercut the planning bureaucracy's capability 
for obstruction, the reformers thus came to face a much firmer obstacle 
in the resistance of the national banking cartel. Interviews of some of 
the principal reformers during this period clearly convey the sense that 
their task after 1971 became one of maneuvering around the veto 
power ~f an economic sector that seemingly comprised the regime's 
only untouchables. The banks' resistance to the reformers' agenda, 
however, differed from that of the planners not only because of their 
greater political staying power but also because they were the principal 
institutional clients of the central bank, in which the reformers were 
anchored. They were also the most important representatives of private 
capital in Spain. For both reasons, the financial sector could hardly be 
forgone as a political partner in a neoliberal agenda for institutional 
reform. Thus, even though the banks' determination to preserve the 
framework of the Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB) conflicted with the 
reformers' aspiration to expand the policy influence of the central 
bank, any real confrontation was precluded by the necessary institu-
tional connection between the two groups. 
It is thus hardly surprising that the reformers responded by seeking 
the banks' active partnership. The critical task was to find the basis for 
a new compact that would be compatible with the central bankers' 
monetary policy objectives. The strategy adopted by the reformers was 
to make their monetary policy agenda part of a broadly defined project 
of "financial liberalization." This broadening of the agenda served at 
least two purposes. One was to strengthen the general political appeal 
of their reform agenda by shifting the focus of future public debate 
from the politically divisive issue of monetary discipline to a "public 
interest" argument about the "allocative efficiency" gains that could be 
derived from liberalization. This conceptual transformation of the re-
formers' agenda was particularly important because it tapped into the 
easily made association between interventionism and authoritarianism 
and into the corresponding association between economic and political 
liberalism in the Spanish context of the 1970s. By presenting their 
34 
. Interbank money market rates therefore continued to fluctuate widely and monetary 
policy took on a pronounced stop-go character over the following years. See OECD, 
Economic Surveys: Spain, 1977 pp. 26-29 . 
SHIFT WITHIN THE STATE 105 
_agenda.for institutional reform in this light, the reforme_rs made it_more 
difficult for the banks to sustain an overtly antirefonmst stance m the 
long rµn. • 
Second, and more immediately, by broadening the reform agenda the 
reformers could present their objectives as part of a package of mea-
sures that could be fashioned to entice the banks' support. This strategy 
of co-optation can clearly be seen in the course that financial reform 
took in the years leading up to the political transition. The first critical 
measure in this regard .was the liberalization of commissions charged by 
the banks on their lending activities in 1972 .. In the context of an 
unaltered pricing cartel, this measure could have only a perverse effect 
on the economy, because it effectively deregulated the price of credit 
without making it subj_ect o competition. In a very concrete way, how-
ever it served to compensate the banks for the imposition of the com-
pul;ory investm~nt ratio in 1971 and created a puta~ive link be_tween 
their interests and the reformers' liberalization project. The liberal-
ization of commissions was followed by the liberalization of bank 
branches in 1974. This measure, which was also taken without any 
accompanying measures to alter the oligopolistic structure of the Span-
ish financial-market, led to a dramatic expansion of bank branches 
after 1974 which sharply increased the banking sector's costs of opera-
tion. Given that commissions had been deregulated, the banks had little 
trouble passing on these cost increases on to their increasingly vulner-
able clients. . 
The particular pattern'. of deregulation instituted in the mid-1970s 
made little economic sense. Yet it served to compensate the banks for 
the loSlj of ch~ap liquidity and, more important, got them implicitly to 
buy i~to 'tfi~ lib~i:ilization agenda. From the reformers' standpoint, this 
early stage of the reform process was therefore not fruitless because it 
sowed the seeds that would eventually strengthen the more reformist 
elements among the bankers. For the Spanish economy, however, it had 
a highly perverse impact because it bolstere9 the banks' ability to ex-
ploit their oligopolistic position precisely at the moment that industry 
was hit by the world recession. The full extent of these consequences, 
however, can be understood only in terms of the changing relationship 
between the banks and their industrial clients during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
It should also be noted that, although little progress was made in the 
creation of a money market in the years preceding the regime transi-
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tion, the reformers did gain further institutional ground in 1974 in two 
other ways. The firit was the liberalization of interest rates on bank 
activities (lending ··and deposits) with terms of more th'an ;two 'years. 
Although the economic impact of this measure was marginal (very few 
deposits and loans had terms of more than six months) and was there-
fore not opposed by the banks, it did create an expectation that such 
liberalization would be progressively extended to shorter-term opera-
tions. The second advance was the regulatory "equalization," or "har-
monization," of the different types of credit institutions now regulated 
by the Bank of Spain, which ended the experiment of "specialization" 
that had served as one of the organizing principles of selective credit 
regulation. 35 By simplifying the structure of credit regulation, this 
move served as another preliminary step toward the reformers' ulti-
mate objective of placing the central bank in control of monetary pol-
icy. Even though the reformers were prevented by the banks from 
achieving their main aims during the last years of the Franco regime, 
they thus managed nonetheless to enact reform measures that, although 
secondary or even perverse from the economy's standpoint, facilitated 
the future success of their agenda in one of two ways: either by eroding 
the institutional framework that had given the planning bureaucracy 
influence over financial flows or by involving the private banks in 
partial measures that imbued the broader liberalization agenda with a 
measure of de facto validity. 
Industrial Crisis: The Economic Backdrop 
As we saw in chapter 2, the Spanish banking se<;:tor developed in·the 
early part of the twentieth century along the lines of the universal 
banking model, financing industrial ventures through both lending and 
direct investment in industrial firms. In contrast to Germany, however, 
where such an institutional model led banks to become heavily in-
volved in the competitive strategies of their clients and where bank-led 
industrialization was linked early on to export promotion, in Spain the 
35 Between 1973 and 1974, all legal distinctions between industrial and commercial 
banks were abolished, and the latter were allowed to accept long-term interest-bearing 
deposits, a privilege previously granted only to the industrial banks. At the same time, the 
investment ratio of the savings banks was reduced, bringing it closer to that of the 
commercial banks and somewhat mitigating the institutional discrimination that these 
institutions had been subjected to. 
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banks' involvement in industry took hold in the con4!xt of a highly 
pr~tectionis~ • and inward-orien!~d policy regime and was driven by 
i:heir involvement in inflationary public finance, whicn enabled them to 
acquire industrial assets at very little cost and risk. All of these ten-
dencies were accentuated during the autarquia, when the banks' in-
volvement in industry became so thoroughly premised on the avail-
ability of extraordinary profit opportunities that it acquired a highly 
speculative character. Coupled with the institutionalization of a bank-
ing cartel and the complete suppression of competition in the sector, 
this tenuous relationship of the banks to their industrial clients pro-
duced a latent conflict obnterests between industry and finance, which 
was suppressed only ,by cheap central bank rediscounting. 
The abandonment oh:heap credit in the early 1970s and the chang-
ing economic fornmes of Spanish industry in the 1960s brought this 
conflict to the fore. The precariousness in bank-industry relations can 
be observed in three aspects of the banks' behavior, starting in the early 
1960s: (1) the banks' response to industrial crisis in sectors in which 
they were heavily invested; (2) their overall investment behavior once 
the generalized._industrial recession of the 1970s set in; and (3) their 
lending behavior once cheap rediscounting was discontinued. 
One of the most graphic illustrations . of the underlying character of 
the banks' relationship · with industry is offered by their response to 
economic crisis in two sectors in which they were heavily invested: steel 
and coal. Both sectors entered a stage of profound crisis after the first 
stage of import liberalization in 1962. Their weight in Spain's late 
industrialization was due largely to a pattern of investment in capital-
intensive\nd-6strJ •in.. which the banks had heavily participated during 
the autarkic period and which was to render the Spanish economy 
particularly vulnerable to the economic crisis of the 1970s. The banks' 
response in both cases contrasts sharply with that of their German 
"universal bank" counterparts, which in the P?stwar period took on 
the role of "insulating government from difficult and complex corpo-
rate problems" by taking the lead in organizing rescue operations of 
large industrial conglomerates. 36 The Spanish banks from the very 
beginning backed away from troubled industrial firms, leaving the pub-
lic sector to engage in a massive socialization of losses. 
36 Kenneth Dyson, "The State, Banks, and Industry: The West German Case," in 
Andrew Cox, ed., State, Finance, and Industry: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War 
Trends in Six Advanced Industrial Economies (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), p. 137 
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Steel was the first large sector to succumb to this fate. After a decade 
of significant expansion ,during the 19 5 Os, the private companies in this 
sector were hit by he.avy losses after the liberalization of imports in 
1962. 37 Under the autarquia, the banks had acquired a central position 
in the sector through a dense network of overlapping board member-
ships that included all of the main companies and extended through the 
coal-mining sector {which was vertically integrated with steel), so that 
they could act as an "authentic coordinating pivot of monopolistic 
interests." 3'8 As investors and creditors, they had enjoyed very large 
returns on their investments in the sector despite a conspicuous failure 
to innovate. As a result, most private companies in the sector remained 
specialized in processing iron ore and were incapable of supporting 
integrated production or continuous casting. Only ENSIDESA, the pub-
lic steel conglomerate created by the Instituto Nacional de Industria 
{INI) in 1950, had the scale and technology to compete in world mar-
kets. The lifting of tariffs on steel imports in 1962 therefore had an 
immediate and dramatic effect on profits. The banks' first reaction was 
to press for renewed tariff protection, which led to a moratorium in the 
planned tariff reduction schedule in 1963. When this me~sure failed to 
reverse the sector's trend, a program of "concerted action" was agreed 
on a year later between the state and UNINSA, a consortium of northern 
mining companies that had been formed in 1961 to challenge EN-
SIDESA's lead in integrated steel production. UNINSA was granted 30 
billion pesetas of privileged financing along with an extensive package 
of tax breaks. 
Remarkably, given their heavy involvement in the sector and the fact 
that they were the main creditors of the failing firms, the private banks 
did not participate in the financing of the investment program that 
UNINSA was to carry out under the agreement. The 30 billion pesetas 
received by the consortium were furnished instead and in roughly equal 
37 The crisis of the steel sector is discussed in Arturo Lopez Munoz and Jose L. Garcia 
Delgado, Crecimiento y crisis de/ capitalismo espaiiol (Madrid: Edicusa, 1968), pp. 207-
19; Arturo Lopez Munoz, Capitalismo espaiiol: Una etapa decisiva (Algorta, Vizcaya: 
Zero, 1970), pp. 73-93; and Francisco Comin and Pablo Martin Acena, INI: 50 afios de 
industrializaci6n (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1991), pp. 381-85. The banks' links to individ-
ual companies and central involvement in the sector through an extensive network of 
overlapping board members that also includes the coal mining sector is discussed in 
Ramon Tamames, La lucha contra los monopolios, 2d ed. (Madrid: Tecnos, 1966), pp. 
381-84, and detailed in Lopez Munoz and Garcia Delgado, Capitalismo espaiiol, pp. 
205-7 and graphs 2, 3, 6, and 7 
38 Lopez Munoz and Garcia Delgado, Crecimiento y crisis, p. 207 
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parts by the INI, the Banco de Credito Industrial (BCI, one of the 
official credit institutions), and a number of foreign baµks. 39 As one 
• team of observers reported, "the c:~ncerted action" program seemed to 
have beeh invented "for the exclusive purpose of avoiding the national-
ization" of companies that, "given their links to the banks, should have 
access to other means of financing. "40 Despite the massive injection of 
public funds, UNINSA's creditors requested a new refloatation scheme in 
1971 to cover continued losses. The INI eventually agreed to provide 
80 percent of the new capital needed. Yet, when the moment came, the 
banks refused to subscribe to any part of the new stock. The conglome-
rate was thus nationalized ·after all, and the INI ended up with duplicate 
integrated steel production facilities that made little sense from an 
international competi~ive perspective. 
The retreat of the banks and the massive socialization of losses that 
occurred in steel were repeated in 1966 when the coal-mining sector 
was threatened with massive default. Whereas they had initially op-
posed nationalization in steel, the banks in this case opted almost im-
mediately to forgo their stakes in favor of the state. The high profits 
that this sector had yielded in previous decades had been "based funda-
mentally on the low cost of the labor factor and on a level of tariff 
protection that had made any modernization of the works unnecessary 
for its beneficiaries." 41 In the early 1960s the sector was therefore 
characterized by "atomization, old plants, obsolete machinery, under-
investment, low product quality, and low profits. "42 Though coal had 
also been the beneficiary of a "concerted action" program under the 
First Development Plan, the program was abandoned only a year after 
the failin&. companies had received the second of two large aid packages 
in 1966.-:fn ·i~ -ste?i.cl,.eight of the largest mining concerns of the north 
were merged into a single company, HUNOSA, 70 percent of which was 
taken on by the INI. 43 Within three years HUNOSA had absorbed vir-
39 Lopez Munoz, Capitalismo espaiiol, p. 92. In the case oftthe foreign banks, the loans 
were guaranteed by either the Treasury or the INI. 
40 Ibid., p. 77 
41 Ibid., p. 106. 
42 Comin and Martin Acefia, INI, p. 375. 
43 Of the 2.6 billion pesetas of new capital provided by the INI, 65% was earmarked for 
the payment of bank credits. The remaining 907 million was paid to the old owners to 
cover assets that were estimated to be worth 780 million pesetas. See ibid., pp. 375-81, 
and Lopez Munoz, Capitalismo espaiiol, pp. 105-19. According to most accounts, the 
appraisal grossly exaggerated the companies' real worth, which explains why HUNOSA's 
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tually all of the remaining mining concerns in Spain,_,accumulating over 
8 billion pesetas in fosses by 1970 (i.e., more than twice the capital with 
which it had started). A new capital restructuring in 197-1 finally led the 
INI to become the conglomerate's sole shareholder. As with steel, the 
banks were conspicuously absent from the sources of external financ-
ing on HUNOSA's balance sheet during the years leading up to the INl's 
forced takeover. 4 4 
The. contrast between the response of the Spanish banks to these 
industrial crises and that of the German universal banks in the 1960s 
and 1970s, illustrates the extent to which the effects of particular in-
stitutional arrangements, such as "universal banking," are contingent 
on the broader structural and political context within which they 
develop. 45 Given the Spanish banks' well-established historical links to 
the coal and steel sectors., their abandonment of these sectors once they 
ceased to be sources of extraordinary profits was remarkably rapid and 
unqualified. A broadly similar story can be told for the shipbuilding 
sector, in which the INl's share rose from 40 percent to over 90 percent 
between 1966 and 1977 46 Certainly, all three of these sectors were 
former creditors not only gave their blessing to the nationalization but were its principal 
promoters. See Juan Velarde, Espana ante la socializaci6n econ6mica (Madrid: Zero, 
1970), p. 70, quoting YA, July 25, 1967 Moreover, the old proprietors never transferred 
all of the assets, keeping the most valuable parts of the old companies' fixed capital. See 
Comin and Martin Aceiia, INI, p. 379. 
44 The structure of HUNOSA's financing mirrored that of UNINSA, with the INI and the 
official credit institutions furnishing the bulk of the funds, supplemented in this case by a 
smaller financing package from two foreign banks. The contribution of the official credit 
institutions amounted to a direct bailout. When the INI subscribed 92.5 million in a 
HUNOSA equity extension in 1969, the amount was not cashed out by the public holding, 
but simply subtracted from the debt owed to the BCI. See _Lopez Muiioz, Capitalismo 
espaizol, p. 114, and HUNOSA balance sheet on p. 118. See also Pedro Schwartz and 
Manuel Jesus Gonzalez, Una historia de/ Instituto Nacional de Industria, 1941-1976 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1978), pp. 109-16. 
45 The solidity of the bank-industry relationship in Germany is sometimes overstated, 
as a number of authors have argued. See, for example, Kenneth Dyson, "The Politics of 
Corporate Crisis in West Germany," West European Politics 7, no. 1 (1984), and John R. 
Griffin, "Investment and Ownership in a Volatile Economy: Big Banks and the Case of the 
East German Economic Transition," Politics and Society 22, no. 3 (1994). Nonetheless, 
the response to industrial crisis by the German banking sector as described by Dyson 
involved a level of support to the restructuring effort that contrasts starkly with that of the 
Spanish banks. Griffin's analysis on the other hand, illustrates the extent to which even 
the postwar relationships between banks and industrial firms in Germany was dependent 
on other institutional and structural conditions. 
46 Schwartz and Gonzalez, Historia de/ INI, p. 133, and Comin and Martin Aceiia, INI, 
pp. 396-400. 
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particularly vulnerable to internatiop.al market conditions in the 1960s, 
add the soci~lization of losses that occurred in them Was not unique to 
Spain, What.is exceptional about tbe Spanish case is.that, after having 
played a major role in promoting the hothouse investment strategies 
pursued in these sectors during the autarkic period, the banks not only 
divested but refused even to participate in the financing needed for their 
restructuring. 
The banks' behavior in these early industrial crises foreshadowed 
their more general reaction to the recession in the 1970s. At the time of 
their retreat from steel and coal in the 1960s, the banks were increasing 
their investment in other sectors. Their holdings in nonfinancial firms 
expanded significantly throughout the first half of the 1970s, peaking 
at 33 percent of thbr : total portfolios and 4.2 percent of their total 
assets in 1975 (s~e Table 16).47 Thereafter, however, the banks began a 
steady divestment that continued unabated for more than a decade, 
leading these two ratios to decline to 12.8 percent and 1.5 percent 
respectively by 1986. The banks undertook a significant return to in-
dustry only in 1988, at the height of the economic boom of the late 
1980s, only to sell off large packages of industrial stocks in the early 
1990s, when .the Spanish economy was once more hit by recession. 48 
This strongly pro-cyclical investment behavior reveals the extent to 
which their relation to Spanish industry lacked the kind of long-term 
orientation typically a~sociated with "patient capital" or with a univer-
sal banking system. It supports one observer's contention that Spanish 
bankers, unlike their · Ge~man counterparts, regarded their industrial 
holdings principally as a source of extraordinary profits, or as assets 
that w~re easilx ~old to boost profits. 49 They also served to capture 
cliente'i~ ~nd, in\ii~ late 1980s, became a means of protection against 
the threat of hostile takeovers.so 
The banks' divestment from industry during the 1970s and 1980s 
illustrates the precarious character that bank-industry relations had 
' 47 The continued rise in 1974 is explained by the fact that the impact of the first oil 
shock on Spanish industry was deferred by a domestic oil price freeze. 
48 Jordi Blanch, Antoni Garrido, and Esteve Sanroma, "Las relaciones banca-industria y 
su incidencia sobre la eficiencia bancaria," Economia Industrial, no. 272, 1990, p. 91. 
49 Peter Bruce, Financial Times correspondent, interviewed in Madrid, spring 1991. 
50 The primacy of these motives and the absence of the kind of long-term strategic 
involvement in industry were also reflected in the atomized nature of the banks' industrial 
holdings across sectors. Blanch et al., "Relaciones banca-industria"; Carlos Chulia, "Re-
laciones banca-industria," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 44, 1990. 
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Table 16. Nonfinancial firm holdings of Spanish banks, 1972-1988 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
• Percent:of total bank portfolios 
21.1% 
25.7 
29.8 
32.9 
27.8 
27.7 
25.3 
23.1 
20.7 
19.9 
17.7 
22.1 
15.7 
14.3 
12.8 
13.7 
21.9 
Percent of total bank assets 
3.2% 
3.5 
3.8 
4.2 
3.4 
3.1 
3.1 
2.6 
2.1 
2.0 
1.6 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
2.1 
Source: Adapted from Jordi Blanch, Antoni Garrido, and Esteve Sanroma, 'Las relaciones banca-industria y su
incidencia sabre la eficiencia bancaria, Economfa Industrial, no. 272, 1990, p. 90. 
taken in the course of Spanish industrialization. In quantitative terms, 
however, this direct investment behavior was less consequential for the 
Spanish economy than the manner in which the banks altered their 
behavior as financial intermediaries in response to the tightening of 
central bank rediscounting. After the elimination of the special redis-
count lines in 1971, the banks increased their profits by switching from 
a strategy of earning a steady interest margin on an ample supply of 
cheap credit to one of using their "market power to shift costs from the 
financial to the productive sector." 51 This change in their busin~ss 
strategy was supported by the peculiar pattern of financial deregulation 
instituted in the early 1970s. The liberalization of commissions in 1972 
allowed the banks to pass on the increased cost of their resources to 
their borrowers through the operation of a price cartel that was institu-
tionalized in the form of a monthly luncheon at which the heads of the 
Big Seven met to agree on a common business course (a practice that 
continued until the end of the 1980s). The banks were thus able to 
increase their gross earning margins from 3.97 percent of average assets 
51 Alvaro Cuervo, "Banca, industria y crisis bancaria," Economia Industrial, no. 272, 
1990, p. 68. 
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in 1974 to 6.15 percent in 1980, when all other sectors were seeing 
their, profits ptummet. • 
., This shift in burden of adjustment from the financial sector to indus-
try was ·magnified by the liberalization ·of bank branches in 1974, 
which was ensued by a phenomenal race among the Big Seven to ex-
pand their branch networks. The oligopolistic process of nonprice 
competition "made growth the fundamental objective [for the banks], 
since it was assumed that profitability was a given." 52 The number of 
bank offices increased from 5,628 in 1974 to 12,238 by 1979, giving 
Spain the highest bank branch per capita ratio in Europe and sharply 
increasing the banks' operating costs (see table 7 in chapter 1). The 
peculiar pattern of dereg~lation carried out in Spain in the early 1970s 
thus "made it perfectlr. possible that an increase in the domestic level of 
• 
competition degenerated :into an increase in global inefficiency, without 
provoking the disappearance of the more inefficient units." 53 The 
price of this rising cost inefficiency was borne almost wholly by bor-
rowers. By 1976, the average return on capital of Spanish industry had 
sunk to 3.5 percent, while that of the Spanish banking sector remained 
above 12 percent.54 
The banks' massive branch expansion at a time when all other sec-
tors of the Spanish economy were hit by a severe economic crisis lays 
bare the extraordinary level of protectiqn afforded to the sector. Per-
versely, the banks' ability to pass on their rising costs was buttressed by 
the economic crisis itself. "The whole scheme rested," writes one ob-
server, "on the [dissipating} capacity for resistance offered by the pro-
ductive sectors of a progressively deteriorating economy" and on the 
"complete defenselessness of Spanish industrial firms in the financial 
arena."5.$,;0ne ohhe,most telling measures of this defenselessness was 
the debt-to-equity ratio of Spanish firms, which according to one esti-
mate rose from an average of 60 percent between 1965 and 1975 to 
over 300 percent by 1979. 56 Spanish industry thus was made to bear 
' 
52 Antonio Torrero, Tendencias de/ sistema financiero espanol (Madrid: H. Blume, 
1982), p. 25. 
53 Cuervo, "Banca, industria y crisis bancaria," p. 69. 
54 El Pais, August 5, 1979. Torrero estimates that the banks passed on as much as 82 
percent of the sharp rise in their costs to borrowers from 1974 to 1979 (Tendencias, p. 
53). 
55 Ibid., pp. 55, 44. 
56 Manuel A. Espitia, "Politica financiera y resultados de la empresa industrial espaiiola 
(1964-1988)," Economia Industrial, no. 272, 1990, p. 96. 
114 BANKING ON PRIVILEGE 
extraordinary financial costs precisely when it had to absorb the two 
external oil sh~cks. As another observer notes, this situation set in 
motion a self-feeding cycle in which high financial co~ts . raiseµ the 
number of defaults on bank loans, which increased the banks' costs, 
and these additional costs where passed back to industry through even 
higher borrowing costs, further increasing the number of failures in the 
industrial sector. 57 
Eventually, as we shall see, this process would spill over into the 
banking ·sector itself. The crucial point here is that the manner in which 
liberalization was carried out in the early 1970s supported the banks' 
changing business behavior and had consequences for the Spanish 
economy that far outlasted the first phase of the reform process. 
Among these consequences was the absorption of a large number of 
unprofitable private firms by the INI in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
After 1974, the INl's socialization of losses, begun in steel, coal, and 
shipbuilding during the 1960s, was generalized to a much larger num-
ber of sectors, a process abetted by both the banks' divestment and the 
heightened financial burden placed on Spanish firms. By the early 
1980s, the Spanish public sector, although still modest by European 
standards at just 8 percent of GDP, had grown considerably and was 
one of the least profitable among OECD members. Annual state trans-
fers to cover losses at public companies rose by almost 1.3 billion 
pesetas between 1975 and 1984 and accounted for more than 15 per-
cent of the state's budget in 1982. 58 The relationship between an indi-
gent and defeated colonial state and its domestic creditors at the turn of 
the twentieth century thus came full circle in the 1970s, with a public 
treasury that was saddled by massive losses at precisely the time of the 
political transition. The burden on public finances would in turn pla.y a 
role in the politics of accommodation between the banks' and Spain's 
posttransition governments, continuing to condition the process of fi-
nancial reform in the 1980s. 
Changes in the economic context did play a role in bringing about 
domestic financial liberalization in Spain. Yet this relationship was not 
a simple one. It required a particular domestic political configuration, 
and it did not determine the shape that reform was to take. Interna-
57 Cuervo, "Banca, industria y crisis bancaria." 
58 Olga Ruiz Canete, "Empresa piiblica y transferencias estatales," Pape/es de Econo-
mia, no. 38, 1989; Alvaro Cuervo Garcia, "La empresa piiblica y el deficit," Pape/es de 
Economia Espanola, no. 23, 1985. 
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tional conditions fostered domestic change but had little impact on the 
sh~pe of that change. Their effect was contingent on th~ existence of an 
.elite of reformers set on dismantling the ~pparatus of {inancial interven-
tionis~ and was overdetermined by the internal dynamics of the Span-
ish political economy in the 1960s. Stated differently, international and 
domestic economic conditions helped to bring about the shift to liberal-
ization because they fed into a cleavage within the Spanish policymak-
ing elite. Change in the economic context accelerated a shift in ~he 
leadership over Spanish economic policymaking in which the planmng 
bureaucracy was displaced by central bank reformers. Yet the course of 
reform was thoroughly determined by the internal struggle and histor-
ically defined agenda of these reformers, which came to center on the 
objective of strengthen .ing the central bank's influence over economic 
policy and estabFshing its exclusive jurisdiction over the financial 
system. 
Change in the character o( financial regulation also was accom-
panied by continuity in the compactual politics of regulation. To ad-
vance their principal objective of restructuring authority within the 
state, the reformers were willing to institute some deregulation mea-
sures withouetaking complementary steps that would have increased 
the level of competition in the f1nancial system. In the early 1970s, this 
tactic produced an embryonic liberalization process that was clearly 
punitive for the rest of the Spanish economy. Given the precarious 
commitment of the banks to their industrial clients, the pattern of 
deregulation that was :implemented allowed the banks to increase their 
oligopolistic profits in the face of tighter liquidity by expanding their 
income,p.argins a,nd passing the costs on to their borrowers. It also gave 
rise to·:; ' rriassi~ '"b:pansion of the banks' branch networks, which 
sharply raised the banks' operating costs, thus adding to the financial 
burden placed on industry. 
The shift within the Spanish policymaking bureaucracy that led to an 
early espousal of liberalization thus also shifotd the burden of adjust-
ment disproportionally to Spanish producers, the vast majority of 
whom did not have access to international financing. To be sure, the 
economic incoherence of the early reform process was in large measure 
due to the reformers' still-limited room for maneuver under the old 
political regime. As we shall see, the political transition strongly bol-
stered the reformers' position. Yet it also strengthened the politics of 
reciprocal consent between state elites and private bankers. 
5 
. 
Financial Reform and 
the Political Transition 
T he most important reform measures in the financial liberaliza-tion process in~tiated in Spain in the early 1970s were passed as two executive orders by the first democratically elected 
government in over four decades, just days after it took office in July 
1977 This link in the timing of political democratization and anti-
interventionist reform was reasserted in the Pactos de la Moncloa 
which were signed by all of the major parliamentary parties in Octobe; 
1977 and are commonly considered a cornerstone of the regime transi-
tion. The centerpiece of the Pactos was an incomes policy agreement 
that limited wage increases to 20 percent and morn;tary growth to 1·7 
percent. Yet this agreement was accompanied by a statement of intent 
on a variety of economic reforms that were meant to reconcile the 
democratization process with the widely recognized need for economic 
a~justment. Reform of the financial system appeared here side by side 
with tax reform and the creation of a democratic welfare state. 
Two contextual factors might explain the prominent place accorded 
to financial reform in the democratization process. One was the dire 
financial situation of a large number of Spanish firms and the invest-
ment crisis that the country began to experience after Franco's death in 
November 1975. The cost of credit became the focus of a public con-
troversy in the press which struck directly at the privileged position of 
ll6 
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the Spanish banking sector. The de~ate lent urgency to the idea of 
refotming the•financial system. The second factor was tl!e salient voice 
., gained ip Spanish political circles-by foreign bankers du.ring the critical 
years 1976-78. Like the acute financial situation of Spanish businesses, 
the efforts of foreign (principally American) banks to secure permission 
to operate in Spain appeared to add an element of direct political pres-
sure in favor of "liberalization." That pressure gained its significance 
less from the size of the foreign financial support (which at $13 billion 
in 1977 was relatively modest in relation to the almost $6 billion that 
the Bank of Spain continued to hold in existing reserves) than from its 
symbolic value in preempting a crisis of confidence in the Spanish 
economy at a moment wlien the domestic banks' backing for the transi-
tion government's econqmic program was all but clear.1 The foreign 
bankers' cooperatipn in the face of the domestic banks' recalcitrance 
seemed to place them in an unprecedented position to press for an 
opening of the Spanish financial market. Even the left-leaning daily El 
Pais argued that traditional "sovereignty" arguments against opening 
the financial market to foreign participation had little relevance when 
many of the largest Spanish industrial firms relied on foreign lending 
and some of tl'i'e most technologically advanced sectors of industry 
(including chemicals and electronics) were already controlled by for-
eign capital.2 The key, the newspaper noted, was to ensure that the 
foreigners came to compete by assertively liberalizing the domestic 
financial system at the same time that the foreign banks were let in. 
Given the position of privilege that the Francoist regulatory frame-
work had given .the banks while Spanish producer groups were being 
asked to . ijccept the_ heavy burden of adjustment to a post-OPEC eco-
. ' ,.~ ' ... 
nomic order, -there was thus an obvious link to be made between finan-
cial liberalization and political democratization. Such a link was also 
stipulated in the statements of the reformers anchored in the Bank of 
Spain, who began to refer openly to the need for increased competition 
in the financial system to ameliorate the terms of financing for Spanish 
1 Most of the foreign loans were syndicated by American banking giants and used, along 
with the reserves accumulated from 1971 through 1973, to finance the current account 
deficit caused by the oil shock-induced decline in competitiveness during the mid-1970s. 
See OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1978, p. 16; Sima Lieberman, The Contemporary 
Spanish Economy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 287 
2 El Pais, May 24, 1977 See also the editorial in the issue of May 12. 
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firms. 3 However, both the timing and the content of the financial re-
form package of July,. 1977 reflect the primacy of the original agenda 
that had been fashion~d in the central bank during the ye<¥"s leadi9g up 
to the transition: strengthening the central bank's ability to control 
liquidity in the credit market and its institutional position vis-a-vis 
other state actors. This objective required a working alliance with the 
private banks in the transition period which would lead the reformers 
to sacrifice many of the aspects of liberalization involved in the putative 
link between financial reform and democratization. 
The agenda for institutional reform incubated in the central bank 
during the early 1970s was dramatically boosted by the influence that 
the reformers attained in the transition process. One key development 
was the appointment by Adolfo Suarez (the prime minister appointed 
by the king in 1976 to oversee the transition to free elections) of 
Enrique Fuentes Quintana (the principal sponsor of Angel Rojo's mis-
sion in the Bank of Spain) as economics minister, and his reappoint-
ment as vice president for economic affairs after Suarez's Union de 
Centro Democratico (UCD) won the first free elections in June 1977 
From these two posts, Fuentes was able to define the economic pro-
gram of the transition including the content of the financial reform. He 
was also able to move other members of the reformers' network into 
key positions in the policymaking bureaucracy, ensuring that the 
central bank's agenda would have strong advocates at the center of 
executive power long after his own premature departure from office in 
1978. 
Fuentes's appointment and the position that the reformers gained in 
the Spanish regime transition were the result of several factors. One 
was the transition government's immediate imperative to curb the µn-
certainty created by Franco's death in the perioo leading up to the 
elections and to raise enough foreign financing to stave off speculation 
against the peseta during that period. While Suarez set out to secure the 
political transition by negotiating with the Socialist opposition at 
home, he went on a personal campaign to raise sovereign loans from 
American banks and the IMF in 1976 and early 1977 4 The reformers' 
connections through the central bank to the IMF, which organized and 
matched most foreign debt that Spain raised in the 1976-78 period, 
3 See, for example, L. Angel Rojo, "La reforma de! sistema financiero espafiol," in VI 
Jornadas de Mercado Monetario (Madrid: Intermoney, 1978). 
4 El Pais, May 10, 1977 
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clearly was an asset in this context. By placing Fuentes in charge of 
econo~ic policy, Suarez could reassure foreign credit~s that the neo-
liberal orientation represented .PY the central bankers would carry the 
day in the transition process. 
Such external constraints contributed to the reformers' ascent during 
the immediate transition period, but foreign creditors had very limited 
influence over the actual course of financial reform. Other factors 
played a more determinant role in establishing the reformers' influence 
over economic policy. The concentration of economic expertise that 
had developed in the cep.tral bank over the preceding decades and the 
reformers' cohesiveness as a network of policymakers with a clearly 
defined agenda are among the most important ones. The absence of an 
alternative network pf economic experts was compounded by the rapid 
deligitimization suffered by the planning bureaucracy as a result of its 
close associatioul with the authoritarian past, and by the precarious 
state of the public enterprise sector as a result of the INI's massive 
absorption of failing firms. 
The effect of this concentration of purpose and expertise in the 
central bank was magnified by the fact that individuals such as Fuentes 
and Rojo, even though having held important policymaking positions 
under the Franco regime, enjoyed reputations for independence from 
the political past, thanks to their antagonism to the regime's planning 
bureaucracy. Fuentes was also known for having fought (and lost) a 
battle to give the state~ wider and more progressive tax base (a goal he 
achieved after the elections). This background gave him significant 
moral authority in political circles during the transition period. 5 Last 
(and fo[.eshadowing the course that events would take in Eastern Eu-
rope);\ht reformeN>' ascent was facilitated also by the easy ideological 
association between any form of economic interventionism and the 
political authoritarianism of the past. 
The reformers' decision to launch a major financial reform initiative 
when the political transition had hardly overcpme its moment of crisis 
is explained by their calculation of the risks and opportunities that the 
transition entailed. The economic context of the late 1970s brought the 
reformers' agenda to the forefront of public debate in a manner that 
s Fuentes's 1973 tax reform bid is discussed in Richard Gunther, Public Policy in a No-
Party State: Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 91-95. On Rojo's trajectory, see 
Institutional Investor, May 31, 1994. 
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highlighted the more political and conflictual elements of financial reg-
ulation, especially th_e way the existing framework had sanctioned the 
operation of the banking cartel through the powers coQferred pn the 
Consejo Superior Bancario (CSB). Democratization thus did not just 
challenge the existing framework; it did so in a manner that empha-
sized the conflict of interest between the banks and other sectors of the 
Spanish economy rather than the issue of monetary control. The re-
former~ thus suddenly found their program at the heart of a hot politi-
cal debate over economic privilege in a free society. In Fuentes's first-
hand account of the reform process, he explains how this threat 
induced him to seek to pass the principal package of liberalizing legisla-
tion at the earliest politically feasible point: 
It was a question of visibly accelerating the liberalization process so as 
to demonstrate a political resolve to play the financial reform card. 
This objective had already been attempted in the measures of 
August 1974.6 Yet the financial system continued to respond to an 
interventionist framework. The measures of 1977 addressed these 
[remaining problems]. They were intended to catapult the financial 
reform process so far that the advance would be irreversible. From 
then on, the timing of subsequent steps toward greater freedom and 
competition could be debated, but it would be impossible to take a 
step backward without incurring a very high cost and highly criticiz-
able contradictions. This would inhibit any attempt to turn back the 
clock. 
The measures adopted in 1977 had, beyond their defects and limita-
tions, two very important virtues: that of affirming publicly and politi, 
cally the economic logic of financial reform and that of setting its 
future course, even if this was to be achieved with short steps spaced 
out in time. After 1977 [this] economic logic of financial reform 
held complete sway as a source of inspiration for economic policy. 
Nobody, absolutely nobody, was able to articulate a valid alternative 
to the reform criteria that the Bank of Spain had developed and begun 
to apply to the country's economic policy.7 
6 The reference is to the creation of short-term central bank credits. 
7 
. Enrique Fuentes Quintana, "Pr6logo," in Rafael Termes, Desde la banca (Madrid: 
Rialp, 1991), pp. Ix-lxii. 
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Th~ timing of the 1977 reform package (which, Fuentes acknowl-
edges, carried substantial risks) was thus determin,d neither by the 
pressure of foreign bankers J:\Qr by the short-lived rise in dependence 
on foreign debt but by the unique opportunity and threat that the 
reformers saw in the political transition. This political calculus is 
also reflected in the inclusion of financial reform in the Pactos de la 
Moncloa, which established a direct link between the central bankers' 
agenda and the democratization process. As Fuentes's account makes 
explicit, the agenda being advanced in this way had been drafted in the 
central bank during previous years. The reformers took the risk of 
launching such a substantive package such a short time after the elec-
tion to undermine the political chances of any alternative vision of 
financial reform b#ore the incipient parliamentary process had gath-
ered steam. Oppositibn came, according to Fuentes, from the "benefi-
ciaries of the traditional financial system," including the "traditional" 
bankers who were opposed to any changes in the rigid structure of 
credit regulation that supported their cartel, industrial firms receiving 
privileged credit, and politicians who enjoyed the "enlightened finan-
cial despotism of the concession of discretional credit." 8 Yet there are 
strong reasons to believe that the reformers' main concerns in imple-
menting the reform package before the opening of the legislative pro-
cess lay elsewhere. 
As Fuentes's statement intimates, the political transition carried the 
threat that other poli~ical actors would gain control of a reform process 
that up to now the central bank had managed to direct. The introduc-
tion of the 1977 reform measures by executive orders served to pre-
empt greater political and parliamentary involvement, at a time when 
the m~in -opposition party of the left (the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party, or PSOE) still endorsed nationalization of the banking sector. 
The reformers' choice to pursue the liberalization agenda at the high 
point of the transition, moreover, rendered the reform initiative hostage 
to the imperative of securing the banks' su-'tport for the new govern-
ment's economic program. In the month leading up to the election, the 
reform package had to be formulated in the course of ongoing negotia-
tions to ensure that the bankers would not try to sabotage the transition 
process. The timing of the reform initiative therefore placed the re-
8 Ibid., p. liv. 
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formers in a particularly weak position vis-a-vis the bankers. Fuentes's 
choice to proceed ndnetheless is explained by his desire to forestall a 
political challenge ·to the central bank's agenda and by his .belief that 
this agenda required a working alliance with the banking sector. "I was 
convinced," he writes, "that these liberalization measures were a crit-
ical part of the adjustment policies that the country would have to apply 
to get out of the crisis," and "even more convinced that without the 
support . of the Spanish bankers and the heads of the savings banks, 
which together accounted for 90 percent of the Spanish financial sys-
tem at the time, those reforms, no matter how adequate they were, 
would not become a legal reality or guide the daily practice of the 
Spanish financial system." 9 
The effort to establish a powerful working alliance with the banks 
involved at least two tasks. The first was to get the banks to sign on to 
the basic principle of liberalization and to change the way they oper-
ated in the political arena. They would not do so unless the leadership 
structure in the cartel changed to favor bankers who were more recep-
tive to the idea of shifting away from the corporativistic framework of 
the CSB toward granting greater authority to the central bank and 
allowing the latter to act as their mediator vis-a-vis the government. 
Such a change, along with the adoption of a defensible public position 
on the issue of liberalization, was essential to make the banks a viable 
political ally. 
The task of "reforming" the bankers was accomplished with the 
creation in November 1977 of the Spanish Association of Private 
Bankers (AEB) at Fuentes's behest. His account is again worth quoting 
at length: 
In my talks with the men who headed the large national banks I 
soon became convinced of their opposition to the liberal orienta-
tion of the reform. Among my memories of the difficult months I spent 
in charge of the country's economic policy there are few so bitter as 
that of a luncheon with the heads of the big Spanish banks in the Bank 
of Spain [where] the [bankers] were informed of the financial 
reform process that I had in mind, some of which was contained in the 
already passed measures of July 1977 No comments were forthcom-
ing other than laconic admonitions about the perils of such a 
9 Ibid., p. !xii. 
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reform agenda, and its untimelin!!SS in an economy that was undergo-
ing a deep crisis and in a society that was attempting tb find a constitu-
tion that would create a pluralist derp.ocracy, capable of sheltering all 
Spaniards. 
Two bankers-only two back then-understood how much was at 
stake for the financial sector in choosing to play the liberalization card: 
Rafael Termes and Jose Angel Sanchez Asiain. From that day on I was 
determined that one of them should head the AEB. The appoint-
ment by the banking sector's hierarchy, at that time headed 'de facto' 
by the Banco Espanol de Credito, was still to be negotiated. Its chair-
man, an executive of great authority and long tenure whom I respected 
and admired, proposed a number of individuals who, however, did 
not meet the re'qujrements for the reformist objectives that were to 
orient the fil\ancial sector. I insisted on my idea of what the AEB should 
be and on my candidate for its presidency. He responded with polite 
forcefulness that I had the wrong mission, and therefore the wrong 
person in mind. "The AEB's mission is modest and limited, no more 
than negotiating the collective wage agreements of the banking sector. 
The rest is fantasy. But let it be as you wish. I'll do everything 
possible ·fo see that your candidate becomes the first president of the 
AEB." 
Fuentes's candidate, Rafael Termes, was indeed appointed and "un-
derstood the role tht bµsiness association had to play in the process of 
change of the Spanish banking sector." The AEB could not be simply a 
"platform for the negotiation of collective bargaining in the banking 
secttli " Rathe~ .in Termes's own words, it would have to be "the in-
.. ~. ~ . , "'- . 
stitution that would define the image, thinking, and voice of the banks 
as private enterprises, [able] to relate to the economic and monetary 
authorities in the government in the matters that affect [the banking 
sector], and capable of relating to the unions that would be its inter-
locutors in the industrial relations process, as well as to public opinion 
so that its positions would be well known and understood." 10 Unlike 
the CSB, where the big banks had exercised public powers behind 
closed doors, the AEB was meant to operate as a conventional lobbying 
organization that would orient the banking sector's position on policy 
issues and represent it in public. Breaking with the bankers' initial 
10 Quoted ibid., p. !xiv. 
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opposition, the new organization declared the banking sector's en-
dorsement of fin~ncial ·liberalization and launched a campaign to refute 
the accusation that the high cost of credit to Spanish firms was.linked to 
the banks' extraordinary profit margins by pointing the finger instead 
at the heavy liand of the state in the financial system. Parting with the 
corporativist rhetoric of the past, the new AEB president thus took it 
upon himself to defend the banks in the language of neoclassical eco-
nomics, a. practice that was soon emulated by other bankers. 
However, if the bankers were willing to adopt a democratic de-
meanor and to endorse the principle of liberalization, their support was 
based on the premise that liberalization would be carried out in a way 
that protected their interests. The second task for the reformers was 
therefore to reach a compact with the banks over the manner in which 
reform was carried out. The deregulation process had been molded so 
as to make it acceptable to the banks even before the transition. If the 
reformers were now in a stronger political position to impose some of 
their agenda on the bankers, their desire for the bankers' support meant 
that reform would nonetheless continue to be driven by the search for 
mutual accommodation. 
The new regulatory compact is clearly discernible in the content of 
the reform package designed by Fuentes's team in the months leading 
up to the elections and passed in July 1977 The package centered on 
measures that advanced the main objectives of the reformers' original 
agenda: giving greater technical control over the banking system's liq-
uid assets to the monetary authority and dismantling the institutional 
structure that had given other actors in the state a say in financial 
policy. The most important measure regarding the first objective wa~ 
the establishment of an auction system to allocate the short-term bonds 
and credits through which the central bank was s~eking to routinize 
liquidity control. This measure, vetoed by the banks in 1974 when the 
credits were first created, promised to be a big step forward in the 
central bank's effort to create a money market. 11 Nevertheless, access 
to the auctions continued to be restricted to the banks, which were able 
to coordinate their bidding, and the development of a real money mar-
ket therefore did not take hold until well into the 1980s. 
Other measures included in the July 1977 package also were meant 
11 As discussed in chapter 4, the existing system of proportional allocation of public 
debt to the banks curtailed the emergence of a money market. 
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to fulfill the central bank's original agenda. One of these was the 
deregulatiol'l of interest rates. According to officials, t~s measure could 
be expected to improve the financin~ available to .. firms with good 
investment prospects, because regulated credit rates subsidized ineffi-
cient users of capital at the expense of more efficient users. A more 
immediate concern behind it, however, was the central bank's desire to 
create a financial environment in which economic actors would be 
malleable to its interventions. Market-determined interest rates were a 
key requirement for t.he attainment of this goal. Opposition from the 
banks (which were particularly averse to paying higher interest rates on 
deposits) nevertheless was so intense that only rates on credit and 
deposits with terms of more than one year were included in the original 
package; rates on shorter-term deposits and credits were only gradually 
liberalized over the foilowing years. 12 
The third main component of the July 1977 package focused on 
eliminating the institutional bases of selective credit regulation. It in-
cluded the immediate abolishment of the Junta de Inversions, a Minis-
try of Finance committee that had decided which sectors and activities 
were eligible for privileged financing during the indicative planning 
years, and a ·schedule to dismantle the compulsory investment ratio. 
The authority to decide which sectors qualified for the investment ratio 
while it was being dismantled was raised to the ministerial level, and 
supervision of the banks' compliance with the ratio was shifted to the 
Bank of Spain. 13 As with the liberalization of interest rates, the re-
formers argued that dismantling the ratio should help to reduce the 
financial burd~n on efficient firms, because the banks needed to charge 
higher r-ates on the portion of their credit that fell outside of the ratio to 
comp~-~sat~-for" th~ low return on the credits they granted to comply 
with it. Undeniably, however, the same measures also served to give the 
coup de grace to the institutional framework that had given state actors 
outside of the central bank control over the financial system, offering 
one more illustration of how aggregate welf~ arguments used to jus-
tify a reform process that was driven by the monetary policy concerns 
of the reformers. 
The reform package of July 1977 thus salvaged as much of the origi-
12 El Pais, May 15, 1977 
13 The number of sectors that could qualify was also radically cut. See Raimundo 
Poveda, "Las financiaciones privilegiadas de las entidades de dep6sito," Pape/es de 
Economia Espanola, Suplementos sobre el sistema financiero, no. 11, 1985. 
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nal Bank of Spain agenda as was compatible with the reformers' corol-
lary objective o~estab~ishing a partnership with the banks. By contrast, 
it conspicuously failed to reform the structure of the Spa~ish c.redit 
market to allow some measure of competition. Though credit deregula-
tion and the dismantling of the compulsory investment ratio shifted a 
greater proportion of the credit system's resources into the market, the 
oligopolistic structure of that market remained virtually unchanged. 
The accommodation between central and private bankers therefore 
came entirely at the expense of other economic sectors, continuing the 
pattern established in the early 1970s. 
The failure to reform the structure of the Spanish financial market is 
particularly evident in three areas, the first of which was the entry of 
foreign banks. Some of the largest Spanish industrial firms were able to 
resort to the Euromarkets in the transition period,1 4 but most enter-
prises lacked access to these markets. Foreign borrowing thus could not 
significantly alter the costs imposed by the banking cartel on the major-
ity of domestic producers. Opening the domestic financial market to 
foreign banks therefore offered a powerful opportunity for the govern-
ment to alter the Big Seven's collusive behavior in the credit market. 
There was, moreover, a compelling legal precedent for such a move, as 
the intention to allow foreign banks in had been on the books since a 
1962 decree that had never been implemented. In addition, the minister 
of finance in the first post-Franco government (prior to Suarez's ap-
pointment) had promised foreign bankers access when he negotiated a 
$1 billion loan in 1976. All the same, the measure was first delayed and 
then implemented in such a way as to ensure that the foreigners would 
not undermine the Big Seven's ability to act as a cartel. 
The issue was dealt with in the months leading up to the election 
amid growing friction between some members of the government, in-
cluding Suarez, and the bankers. The prime minister and some of his 
close associates apparently viewed the rising cost of credit as a sign of 
"disloyalty" to the government and as an attempt by the banks to 
extract concessions in exchange for their support of the government's 
transition program. 15 In the spring of 1977, Suarez began negotiations 
with the heads of several American banks, independently of Fuentes. 16 
14 For figures and details of loans, see Reyes Fernandez Duran, "La segunda entrada de 
la banca extranjera en Espana, " Informaci6n Comercial Espanola, no. 545, 1979. 
15 El Pais, August 3, 1977; January 18 and June 1, 1978. 
16 El Pais, May 10, 1977 
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In April the rumor spread that he had reached an agreement with 
several American banks to allow their entry in retun\ for a large pack-
age of credits. 17 El Pais repoi;ted that its sources in the banking sector 
deni~d the possibility of such an agreement, argui~g that it would be 
political suicide for the prime minister to take such an action uni-
laterally. The next day, however, the paper reported that Suarez had 
reached a deal with the head of Citibank, whereby five American banks 
would grant an IMF-matched loan of $500 million to Spain in return 
for a promise that t.hey, along with a small number of European and 
Japanese banks, would be allowed to set up operations in Spain by the 
end of the year. Yet only three days later, just as several Spanish firms 
were signing new loan agreements with foreign banks, Ministry of 
Finance officials announced that foreign banks would not be allowed 
to establish offices i~ Spain in 1977 after all.18 
The disjoint;d manner in which the entry of foreign banks was han-
dled in the months before the election reflected a growing split between 
the so-called politicians in the government and the central bank re-
formers. Suarez's eventual retreat demonstrates the reformers' ultimate 
ability to maintain control over the reform process, in a manner consis-
tent with their objective of enlisting the domestic banks as partners. 
When a decree authorizing the entry of foreign banks was finally passed 
in the summer of 1978, it imposed such heavy restrictions on their 
operations that it made it impossible for them to exert the competitive 
pressure that would have tangibly changed the credit conditions faced 
by Spanish businesses. The entry of foreign banks was made subject to 
discretional authorization by the government upon the advice of the 
Ban~,~f Spain _and the still operative CSB. Those institutions that did 
recei~e·aufhori:iation were allowed to open only three offices, including 
the head office, and the amount of financing that they were allowed to 
raise in the Spanish market was limited to 40 percent of their lending to 
Spanish firms, excepting funds raised on the Spanish interbank market. 
The decree also included other significant ,estrictions on the invest-
17 A month earlier, officials had launched a campaign to raise international financing for 
the public sector in Japan and the United States, including a trip by the king to Saudi 
Arabia. The director general for financial policy announced on his return that foreign 
banks would be allowed to operate in Spain in 1978. See El Pais, March 15, 1977 
18 El Pais, April 1, May 7, May 8, May 11, May 12, 1977 Shortly thereafter, Telefonica 
signed a $25 million loan headed by Chase. See El Pais, May 15, 1977 
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ment activities of foreigners, limiting their ability to invest directly in 
Spanish firms.19 • 
These restrictions effectively curtailed the ability of foreign entraats 
to engage in retail banking and forced them to raise a large part of their 
resources on the interbank money market, over which the Big Seven 
exercised control.2° Attempts by foreign banks to assert competitive 
downward pressure on credit rates in the early 1980s were thwarted by 
the Big Seven's manipulation of rates in the interbank money market.21 
This situation led in the late 1980s to the withdrawal of several Ameri-
can banks, whose comparative advantage rested on their ability to 
operate under competitive market conditions that did not exist in 
Spain. Those foreign banks that were more successful made their Span-
ish operations profitable by assenting to the Big Seven's collusion and 
exploiting the opportunity for oligopolistic price fixing.22 This strat-
egy, however, reduced their potential for expansion, and the market 
presence of foreign banks remained very limited until some of the 
restrictions were lifted in the early 1990s in compliance with European 
directives. One important impact that the foreign banks nonetheless 
had was to boost the role of the interbank market in their efforts to 
circumvent the 40 percent restriction on deposit taking, thus helping to 
create a money market during the 1980s. 
The objective of infusing a greater degree of competition into the 
domestic credit market was also compromised in two other areas. The 
first was a long-announced plan to reform the official credit institutions 
(the EOCs), which in the 1960s had mediated a significant share of the 
financial system's resources. In 1971 EOC financing had been tied to 
the compulsory investment ratio imposed on the banks when the spe-
19 El_ Pais, May 31, 1977; Daniel Alvarez Pastor and Fernando Eguidazu, "La banca 
extr~nJera en Espana: Regimen legal," Informaci6n Comercial Espanola, no. 545, 1979. 
S1gmficantly, the Bank of Spain took the most protectionist position, delaying the decree 
by argumg for a 25% limit. See El Pais, June 9 and July 6, 1978. 
20 The limitation on the capture of domestic deposits was viewed as by far the most 
1mporta~t by foreign bankers, as deposits represented the cheapest source of fimding for 
the Spamsh credit market (as opposed to raising funding from other intermediaries on the 
Euromarkets), and the restrictions placed them at a clear disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
domestic banks. See El Pais, March 8, 1978. 
21 
_Acting as a cartel, the Big Seven were able to raise interbank money rates whenever a 
foreign bank announced a cut in credit rates. See, for example, El Pais, August 19 and 
September 13, 1984, and August 8, 1985. 
22 Interviews, Madrid, 1991. 
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cial rediscount lines were abolished. 23 This scheme had entailed an 
i~pli'dt bargain whereby the private banks surrendered .t part of their 
"deposits to finance the ECOs and ·the EO<;:s refrained f{om competing 
with the private banks in the capture of available savings. "Thanks to 
the implicit lack of competition," a high-ranking EOC official writes, 
"the resources of the private banks were greater than those they could 
have raised in the face of a more 'aggressive' stance by a public banking 
sector." Moreover, "the official credit institutions were forced to allo-
cate an important part of their resources to the financing of sectors and 
firms that were not profitable, thus freeing the private banks from 
the need to shoulder this burden. "24 
The EOCs were a read'ily available avenue for the government to 
inject a measure of com.pttition into the domestic credit market while 
controlling the speed at· which competition occurred. Turning the 
EOCs into a single institution and allowing it to take deposits in com-
petition with the private banks would have given the government the 
market presence that might have allowed it to break the Big Seven's 
collusive behavior without recourse to nationalization and without the 
risks that the unhindered entry of foreign banks might entail. The 
feasibility of such a design derived from the instant (and very substan-
tial) deposit base that could be tapped by including the Postal Savings 
Bank and from the fact that the EOCs had an extensive national net-
work of offices. Although this option was never officially articulated 
during the years of the centrist government, there is evidence that it was 
seriously entertained by some of the economic policy officials closest to 
Suarez.25 Jn the end, however, the reform of the EOCs was limited to a 
,,._4· 
23 Jaime R~~ueijo, "L~) 'eircuitos privilegiados de financiaci6n y reforma de! credito 
oficial," Informaci6n Comercial Espanola, no. 596, 1983; Luis Tarrafeta,_ "Evoluci6n de! 
credito oficial," Economistas (Colegio de Madrid), no. 30, 1988; Gabnel Tortella and 
Juan Carlos Jimenez, Historia del Banco de Credito Industrial (Madrid: Alianza, 1986), 
p. 200. 
24 Tarrafeta, "Evoluci6n de! credito oficial," p. 11. 
2s In 1978 there were repeated reports in the press that a number of government officials 
were considering reorganizing the EOCs and using them more aggressively in response to 
the banks' perceived bullying of the government in the credit markets. See El Pais, J~ne 1 
and August 8, 1978. An article in an economic journal put out by the Banco _de Bilbao 
arguing against the EOCs' transformation into a public bank, suggests that this alterna-
tive was regarded as a serious possibility in policymaking circles in the early 1980s. See 
"El credito oficial y su reforma," Situaci6n, no. 2, 1982. Reports of plans for such a 
reorganization appeared again in 1982, after the government failed to persuade the banks 
to lower their interest rates. See Mercado Financiero, February and December 1982. 
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change in the way they were financed (a direct corollary of the disman-
tling of the compulsory, investment ratio) and to a commitment to give 
their management grtater autonomy. The basic character of the institu-
tions as administrative bodies that played a subsidiary role was main-
tained.26 A reorganization along the lines just outlined would take 
place only a decade and a half later, and then for a different set of 
reasons (see chapter 6). 
As in the case of foreign bank entry, the centrist government's failure 
to use the EOCs to inject greater competition into the credit market 
reflects the central bank reformers' ability to maintain control over the 
financial reform process. The central role that these institutions had 
played in the planners' privileged financing circuits made them a prime 
target of the reformers. The transition offered the reformers an oppor-
tunity to complete what they had first attempted in 1971. The com-
pulsory ratio had been introduced then as the lesser of two evils in the 
struggle against the planners' cheap credit policies. Now the ratio itself 
was the target. The minimalist approach to the EOC reform reflects the 
reformers' fundamental animosity to the idea of giving other state ac-
tors authority in the financial system. But equally important, an aggres-
sive use of the EOCs would have conflicted with the objective of estab-
lishing a working alliance with the private banks. The reformers' 
decision to constrain the EOCs by forcing them to raise their resources 
in the market without equipping them to compete with the banks in the 
capture of deposits mirrors the way the entry of foreign banks was 
handled. It also shows that both the bankers and the central bank 
authorities regarded the private banks' hold over short-term savings as 
the cornerstone of their position in the financial system. 
The accommodation between the reformers and the banks is also 
seen in the stance taken toward the domestic capital markets. The 
principal characteristic of the Spanish securities market in the late 
26 Tortella and Jimenez, Historia def Banco de Credito Industrial, pp. 199-201; Requei-
jo, "Circuitos privilegiados." The actual reform conformed to that outlined in the Pactos 
de la Moncloa and in the government's Programa de Saneamiento y Reforma Econ6mica 
of 1977 drafted under Fuentes's direction. It required the EOCs to raise 30% of their 
financing in the market so that the compulsory investment ratio could be dismantled. This 
objective was stalled for three years because private banks stopped extending long-term 
credit after 1977; it was addressed again after the Socialist victory, when the EOCs were 
forced to balance their books with limited access to public funding. See Robert Graham, 
"Spain Feels Its Way toward a Liberal Financial System," Banker, January 1981; Tar-
rafeta, "Evoluci6n de! credito oficial." 
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1970s was its extreme narrowness. In contrast to the situation in most 
·ot}.1.er i'ndu~~rialized countries, industrial stocks accqunted for only 
about 10 percent of capitalization, _whereas the stock of the banks and 
public •utilities accounted for more than 70 percenvThis "bankariza-
tion" of the market had become particularly acute after 1974, when, 
with higher interest rates and economic uncertainty, the stock market 
had virtually ceased to be a source of long-term industrial finance. As 
part of the liberalization agenda, a committee of prominent economis~s 
was established in 1977 to produce a report on stock market reform. 
Made public a year later, the report spelled out a basic set of goals: to 
increase the transparency, flexibility, depth, and competition in these 
markets, to integrate t1'em electronically, and to alter the form of bid-
ding. It also set out the steps to be taken to move from the Latin capital 
' market model, in which state-licensed agentes charging a fixed commis-
sion were the primary actors, to the Anglo-Saxon model of "market 
players and makers." 27 Yet no measures to implement the commis-
sion's recommendations were taken until almost a decade later, when 
the prospect of European financial integration finally led to the Capital 
Market Reform Law of 1988. 
The virtually complete inaction in this area of reform is striking 
because, in contrast to the official credit institutions, the capital mar-
kets were assigned a central role in the liberal market model that con-
ceptually underpinned the reformers' program. In that model, it is 
precisely the capital m~ket that is intended to be the prime supplier of 
long-term investment.finance for private firms. When asked about this 
paradox, the officials I interviewed offered two explanations. The first 
was the opposition of the agentes, who .under the old law exercised a 
state-li~;ensed m().t\_opoly on trading, charging fixed commissions on 
transactions while bearing no risks. The second was fear that the "di-
sintermediation" process that would be set in motion with capital mar-
ket reform would contribute to the problems of banks that were hit by 
the crisis that started in 1978. 
The first of these explanations is contradicted by the fact that when 
the reform of the capital market was finally carried out a decade later, 
the agentes were quickly sacrificed once their main clients, the banks, 
had signed on. In hindsight the crisis in the banking sector clearly 
27 This distinction is discussed by Enrique Fuentes Quintana in "La bolsa de valores: 
Problemas de hoy y soluciones de maiiana," Bolsa de Madrid, no. 100 (May 1987). 
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represents a more compelling reason for the delay, but as we shall see in 
chapter 6, the crisis W;aS circumscribed until late 1982. Up until that 
point, it affected only the smaller industrial banks that had been created 
in the 1960s, and they were effectively taken over without a crisis of 
confidence in the system. The banks' problems, moreover, were driven 
by the failure of nonfinancial firms, not by competition in the credit 
market or the availability of alternative sources of financing for indus-
try. Although the large banks had to write off large amounts of bad debt 
in the lare 1970s, they continued to increase both their interest and 
profit margins through 1981. Thus the banking crisis was surely a very 
major concern to the authorities, but it is difficult to see why it would 
have called for complete inaction on capital market reform. 
A more likely explanation is the fact that capital market reform 
threatened to curtail the big banks' control over the Spanish financial 
market. As two observers write, "the banks were, on the one hand, the 
most important individual investors [in the market] in terms of the 
volume of their stockholding. On the other hand, they were also the 
main institutional investors [trading on behalf of their clients]. In addi-
tion, they were the most important issuers of stock. [However,] 
bringing savings to the markets was a form of increasing their own 
competition in capturing cheap resources, and taking firms to the stock 
market meant giving out information, and, in all likelihood, loosing 
power." 28 
Although there were inherent contradictions in their role in the capi-
tal markets, the banks were thus able to resolve them through their 
extensive control. The traditional institutional structure of the capital 
markets and the monopoly of the agentes guaranteed that control. The 
opposition of the banks represents a much more congruent explanation 
of the long delay of stock market reform, and it fits the pattern man-
ifested in other reform areas of postponing any change that might 
significantly weaken the economic position of the Big Seven. Like the 
careful calibration of foreign bank entry and the minimalist reform of 
the official credit institutions, the inaction in the area of capital market 
reform fitted the reformers' strategic objective of establishing a work-
ing alliance with the banks. Measures that would have injected greater 
competition into the Spanish financial market were postponed in the 
28 Jose Manuel Garcia Herrnoso and Sebastian Ubirrla Zubizarreta, "Reforrna y trans-
forrnaci6n de! rnercado de valores," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 44, 1990, p. 138. 
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late 1970s in order to get the bankers to accept those changes most 
important- to the central bank's agenda. t 
There was one exception to this rule in yet another area of the reform 
process: domestic savings banks. These institutions, which had the 
character of nonprofit trusts dating back to the nineteenth century and 
tied to a local regional base, had carried the brunt of the interventionist 
system, being forced to allocate as much as 80 percent of their savings 
to the financing of the public sector under the Franco regime. They had 
also up to this point been barred from a wide range of banking activities 
(including the discouqting of commercial paper, the most common 
form of bank lending in Spain). The greater part of their free deposits 
had therefore been d€posited with the commercial banks, reducing 
them to adjuncts of the latter in the financial system. The reform of 
1977 included several:important alterations to this regulatory subjuga-
tion. It cut the c'ompulsory investment ratio of the savings banks from 
80 percent to 60 percent and set a schedule for further reductions, and 
it allowed the savings banks to engage in lending activities. The 
deregulation of interest rates would also allow the largest of these 
institutions to act more aggressively over the following decade and to 
increase their share of deposits at the expense of the commerical 
banks. 29 
In view of the savings banks' limited political influence in relation to 
the Big Seven, this regulatory equalization may appear to challenge the 
political analysis of th~ reform process advanced here. There are several 
reasons, however, why this deviation fitted the reformers' agenda and 
even the accommodation with the Big Seven. First, dismantling the 
saving~. banks ·• compulsory ratio was one more way for the central bank 
to lirrii't'the autntit"ity of other state actors over the financial system. 
This was particularly important in the case of the savings banks because 
most were ruled by regional governmental authorities. The process of 
regional devolution that took place during the regime transition con-
fronted the reformers with a new wild card, ope that potentially threat-
ened the central bank's authority over the whole financial system. By 
harmonizing the regulatory treatment of the savings and commercial 
banks, the reformers were therefore furthering the central bank's objec-
tive of maintaining regulatory control over these institutions in the 
future. 
Second, the savings banks were not regarded to be as great a threat to 
29 Fernandez Duran, "Segunda entrada." 
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the Big Seven as either the foreign or official credit institutions. They 
therefore representeq the one way in which the reformers could address 
calls for greater competition in the sector that conflicted least with their 
priority of establishing a working alliance with the Big Seven. This 
estimation was borne out by the savings banks' behavior in the initial 
years after the reform, when, despite prodding from government offi-
cials, they refused to expand their lending to firms and continued to 
deposit a high proportion of their resources with the commercial 
banks. 3b Until 1989, the _savings banks' competitive potential also con-
tinued to be limited by legal restrictions that kept them from expanding 
beyond their regional base. As a sector, they did manage to increase 
their share of deposits at the expense of the commercial banks by 10 
percent over the 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the two largest savings 
banks (Cajamadrid and La Caixa) had acquired a deposit base that 
placed them in the league of the big commercial banks. However, be-
cause their operating costs were even higher than those of the commer-
cial banks and they required high credit margins to cover those costs, 
the savings banks were not inclined to exert downward pressure on 
credit rates in the 1980s. They continued to allocate their credits over-
whelmingly to households rather than enterprises, intensifying rather 
than mitigating the effects of the commercial banks' reallocation of 
credit from productive activities to sheltered sectors (see Table 5 in 
chapter 1), and they did not place any significant pressure on the com-
mercial banks to cut their operating costs or credit margins (as reflected 
in Table 7, chapter 1).31 
The way the 1977 reform was carried out thus meant that credit 
deregulation took place in an essentially unaltered oligopolistic market 
structure. The result was a significant deterioration in the financial 
costs and terms faced by Spanish firms when the second oil shock 
struck them. As a result of the reduction in the compulsory investment 
ratio, the availability of term credit declined dramatically within a 
year.32 And contrary to the reformers' argument that the reduction in 
30 See El Pais, March 1 and June 1, 1978. 
3 1 Juan R. Quintas, "Cajas de ahorro y financiaci6n de la empresa espafiola," Economia 
Industr,al, no. 293, 1993, Table 1 and Fig. 7; Jordi Canals, Competitive Strategies in 
European Banking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 119. 
32 Total fixed-interest stock investment in industrial concerns by the banks declined 
trom 40 percent in 1977 to as little as 10 percent just a year later, and term financing for 
mdustry practically disappeared. See Graham, "Spain Feels Its Way," p. 105; Antonio 
Torrero, Tendencias de[ sistema financiero espanol (Madrid: H. Blume, 1982), p. 127 
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the rati.o would bring down the cost of credit, the reform was followed 
bj a sharp :rise in credit rates from 1976 to 1979. "Tile cost of credit" 
to coi;ripanies, one report of the SpaQish Employ~s Confederation 
declared, was "prohibitive for all but speculative investments. "33 Ac-
cording to one survey, investment credit was averaging 21 percent in 
1980 (representing a real interest rate of over 5 percent in the context of 
an acute recession) and the head of the AEB admitted to 20 percent. 34 
The result was rapid decapitalization accompanied by a sharp rise in 
firms' indebtedness as. they struggled to protect their market share and 
capital by borrowing to finance reposition investment, even if they had 
to do so at a negative internal rate of return. 35 
In the Spanish political context of the late 1970s, such economic 
repercussions provetl ~nsustainable. With the UCD torn by factional-
ism and by fallin~ popularity, and with an increasingly open stand-off 
between Suarez and the bankers, Fuentes resigned in 1978. To mitigate 
the disappearance of term lending, the bimonthly cuts in the com-
pulsory investment ratio had to be interrupted in 1979. 36 During the 
following year, the government expanded the amount of credit being 
granted by the official credit institutions and forced the central bank to 
monetize the ihcrease. The result was a resurgence of inflation in 1980-
81. Worse yet for the reforme~s was a rapid rise in the public deficit, 
which was to add a whole new dimension to their agenda. 
Aggravating the impact of the second oil shock, the accommodation 
with the banks thus appeared to threaten the principal objectives on the 
reformers' agenda in the early 1980s. This threat, however, would 
prove to be temporary, tied to the political precariousness of the centrist 
govern~ent~ T~ .. reformers' rise to a position of leadership in Spanish 
policym~king duritlg the transition proved to be far more enduring 
than the UCD. It would be fully realized precisely with the Socialist 
victory of 1982. The character of both financial reform and economic 
policy in Spain during the 1980s therefore continued to be driven as 
much by a shift within the state elite that b~gan in 1969 as by the 
political transition of 1977 
33 Quoted in Torrero, Tendencias, p. 120. 
34 Antonio Torrero, "Banca y crisis econ6mica," Informaci6n Comercial Espanola, no. 
570, 1981, and Tendencias, pp. 36-37 108. 
35 Alvaro Cuervo, "Analisis econ6mico-financiero de la empresa espafiola," Pape/es de 
Economia Espanola, no. 3, 1980, and Torrero, Tendencias, pp. 123-25. 
36 The cuts were later resumed, but at a significantly reduced rate. 
6 
Socialist Victory and 
Regulatory Accommodation 
T he neoliberally inspired process of financial reform initiated in the early 1970s and advanced forcefully by central bank re-formers during the political transition deregulated credit with-
out significantly altering the highly oligopolistic structure of the Span-
ish financial market. It therefore exacerbated rather than mitigated the 
rise in financial costs that Spanish industrial firms experienced as a 
result of the centrist government's efforts to fight inflation through 
monetary restraint. After the second oil shock, and with the increas-
ingly precarious hold on office of the Union de Centro Democratico 
(UCD), the economic repercussions of this pattern of liberalization 
seemed to threaten the prospects of neoliberal reform itself. 
The elections of 1982, however, decisively altered this situation by 
giving an ample absolute majority to the Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party (PSOE). The Socialist victory served to consolidate the central 
bank's leadership, and with it the shift in the Spanish policymaking 
bureaucracy that had begun in 1969. In the first half of this chapter, I 
discuss the reasons for this outcome, and its consequences for the 
reform process during the mid-1980s. I also discuss the impact of the 
"banking crisis" of this period, suggesting that it did not, as is often 
argued by government officials, represent a hardy economic reason for 
delaying a more fundamental reform of the Spanish financial market, 
136 
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but th;it it played an important role in shaping the relationship be-
tween centr-al and private bankers within the Spani~h policymaking 
community. • 
After 1982, the reform process came increasingly to center on the 
reformers' new imperative of finding a way of financing growing bud-
get deficits without compromising the central bank's room for maneu-
ver. However, it also continued to be constrained by the reformers' 
determination to sustain a close working relationship with the private 
banks. The result w~s a new accommodation that allowed the re-
formers to finance the growing budget deficit without recourse to mon-
etization, while preserving the banks' dominant position as financial 
intermediaries in the eeonomy. This accommodation was to have im-
portant implications f~r the development of the Spanish public debt 
market, the financial costs born by the Treasury, and, by extension, 
those faced by Spanish firms. 
In the second part of the chapter, I cover the reform process after 
Spain entered the European Community (EC) in 1986. The prospect of 
European financial integration added an important exogenous dimen-
sion to the reformers' agenda in the late 1980s because it threatened the 
"national" character of the large Spanish banks and with it the relation-
ship on which the central bankers had staked their position. The focus 
of the reform process shifted, forcing advances in some areas that had 
been neglected (such as the stock market), but also heightening concern 
for the banking sector.;The result in the late 1980s was the adoption of 
a distinctly nationalistic stance toward the financial sector that belied 
the reformers' anti-interventionist philosophy and contrasts with the 
central ,bank-inspired strategy of encouraging foreign investment in 
other ~~cfors. " ··. ·• 
The Consolidation f Central Bank Policy Leadership 
' As befits any electoral victory by an untested left-wing party, the 
PSOE's coming to power in 1982 produced uncertainty and concern in 
Spanish financial circles. The party's e~onomic program had included 
an open call for nationalization of the banking sector as late as 1978. 
Yet, such apprehension turned out to be remarkably short-lived. It was 
allayed by a series of appointments that clearly established the central 
bank's position of leadership in economic policy. These included the 
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reappointment of the incumbent Bank of Spain governor and, most 
important, the-appointment of a prominent young Bank of Spain econ-
omist, Miguel Boyer, to head a new consolidated supenpinistry, of fi-
nance, economics, and commerce. Boyer's replacement in 1985, Carlos 
Solchaga, also was a bank-trained economist and a personal pupil of 
Angel Rojo (the head of the Bank of Spain's Research Service). Many of 
the individuals named to the second-tier positions in the new super-
ministry had similar curricula.1 
The Socialist top appointees represented a younger generation of 
economists, many of whom belonged to the network that had been 
sponsored by Fuentes Quintana and Rojo in the 1970s. These appoint-
ments not only affirmed the policy leadership of the central bank but 
established it in a more unequivocal fashion than ever before. They also 
marked the onset of an increasingly symbiotic relationship between the 
Bank of Spain and the Ministry of Finance, as the latter came under the 
control of individuals who had strong personal ties to the central bank's 
Research Service and who unabashedly accepted that institution's intel-
lectual authority. The identification between these new cadres and the 
central bank, as numerous interviewed officials described it, was so 
strong that one can speak of a veritable colonization by that institution 
of the upper ranks of the economic policy bureaucracy. One manifesta-
tion of this was the rapid dissipation of the tension between "politi-
cians" and "reformers" that had persisted in the economic team of the 
centrist government. 2 The Socialist victory of 1982 thus resulted in the 
consolidation of a shift within the Spanish economic policy community 
that had begun as early as 1969. 
The consolidation of the central bank's leadership within the policy-
making bureaucracy and the new government's unequivocal endqrse-
ment of the reformers' policy orientation can again be attributed to a 
1 During the PSOE's first term, the three posts of state secretary in the ministry reflected 
an attempt to balance the neoliberal orientation of Boyer with the party's left faction 
headed by Vice President Alfonso Guerra. The Economy post was given to a party 
member known for his neoliberal orientation, the Finance post to an inspector of finance 
who was not a party member, and Commerce to a party member who was closer to the 
party's left. Before his resignation in 1985, Boyer dismissed the second and effectively 
marginalized the third of these secretaries of state. In 1986, the new minister, Carlos 
Solchaga, restructured the ministry's second tier in a manner that clearly established the 
hegemony of the neoliberals. See El Pais, November 9, 26, and 30, 1986, and April 21, 
1988. 
2 That tension was replaced by a new kind of rivalry within the PSOE's party leadership, 
between the populist faction of Alfonso Guerra and the so-called renovadores who were 
placed in control of economic policy. Though the conflict led to Boyer's resignation in 
1985, Gonzalez left economic policy firmly under the control of the neoliberals. 
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confluence of factors. Two aspects of the economic context in which 
the ·So~ialists took office supported"the central bank's position. One of 
these was the demonstration effect that the French policy experiment 
with redistributive Keynesianism in 1981-82 had ori the new Socialist 
leadership. The back-stepping in French Socialist policy in late 1982 
seemed to illustrate the impossibility of national Keynesianism in a 
context in which governments in the other major world economies 
were imposing monetary and fiscal austerity; a perception that was 
bolstered by an increase in speculative pressure against the peseta and a 
fall in foreign reserves i_n the weeks after the PSOE electoral victory.3 
These circumstances appeared to offer strong arguments in favor of a 
central bank-chartered. policy stance that would send the right signals 
in international curiency markets. As the new prime minister, Felipe 
Gonzalez, explained ih announcing the government's austerity pro-
gram, he saw "no room for maneuver. "4 Gonzalez's choice of economic 
team may also have been influenced by a domestic development: the 
intensification of a crisis in the banking sector in late 1982, just as the 
Socialists were taking office. Like the French demonstration effect, the 
spector of a financial crisis offered an incentive for Gonzalez to bolster 
the authority .of the central bank. 
These contextual factors gave the central bank a significant voice 
with the Socialist leadership. But they cannot account for the degree to 
which that institutiort's opinions were to dominate economic policy 
over the following dec~de without the longer-running developments in 
the policymaking elite described in earlier chapters. One reflection of 
those developments was the consistency with which Spanish econo-
mists0yvho had displaced all other professionals within the bureau-
cracy Mer the p'rewous decade-believed that the central bank's view 
reflected virtually unquestionable expertise. 5 Another was the fact that 
many of the PSOE's own top economic experts, such as Miguel Boyer, 
either had been trained in the Bank of Spain's Research Service or were 
closely associated with Rojo's network. The 1philosophy that was to 
guide Socialist economic policy in the 1980s-what came to be known 
as "supply-side socialism" -can thus be traced directly to the changing 
diagnoses put forth in the Bank of Spain's annual reports in the years 
leading up to the Socialists' victory and to a series of articles by Rojo 
3 New York Times, January 4, 1983. 
4 El Pais, December 2, 1982. 
5 This opinion was expressed virtually without exception by the officials I interviewed 
when I asked them to explain the bank's ascendance after the transition period. 
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and others that stressed the supply-side nature of Spain's economic 
crisis and argued tha~ adjustment required a reduction in real wages to 
compensate for th_e wage growth that had taken place durin_g the 
transition. 6 
The position of the reformers in the PSOE was also aided by the 
programmatic moderation that the party had undergone in the years 
leading up to its electoral victory. 7 This moderation was accompanied 
by a conspicuous rapprochement between the party leadership and the 
Big Seven, who after the transition had become the main providers of 
electoral financing. 8 In its 1982 electoral program, the party had 
dropped its earlier commitment to nationalization of the banking sec-
tor in favor of a less radical program of financial reform that centered 
on easing the financial plight of Spanish industry by reorganizing the 
official credit organizations (EOCs) and by keeping banks that had to 
be rescued with public funds in public hands, so that the state could 
exert competitive downward pressure on credit rates. The new pro-
gram also referred to the need to reach agreements with the large 
banks, "to restore the banks' role as great investors and promoters in 
the industrial sector. "9 
Negotiated Deficit Financing: 1983-1987 
The prominent position afforded to the reformers in the first Socialist 
cabinet ensured that the central bank's policy preferences would be 
given the highest priority under the PSOE's rule. Inspired by the view 
that macroeconomic policy could do little to address rising unemploy-
6 See Anton Comesaiia and Jose Macia Serrano Sanz, "Problemas escogidos y olvid~dos 
de la politica econ6mica espaiiola," in Diez ensayos sabre economia espanola (Madrid: 
Eudema Universidad, 1993), pp. 23-25. 
7 Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Donald 
Share, Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The Spanish Socialist Workers Party in the 1980s 
(New York: Greenwood, 1989), esp. chap. 5. 
8 The state subsidized political parties in relation to the vote they received. The banks 
provided credits to the parties in advance and in this sense gambled on the electoral 
outcome. Data on the credits extended by specific banks to different parties ace offered in 
Jesus Rivases, Los banqueros def PSOE (Barcelona: B-Grupo Zeta, 1988), pp. 30-40. 
Rivases cites one banker who explains that "there ace two types of electoral credits: those 
provided in the hope of being recovered, and those that ace given without such expecta-
tion." See also the opinion on Gonzalez of the AEB official quoted in the New York Times, 
January 4, 1983 . 
9 PSOE, Programa 1982 (Madrid, 1982) p. 15, and Mercado Financiero, September 
1982. 
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ment w-ithout a decline in real wages, the new government preemptively 
d6valued the peseta immediately after taking office ahd embarked on 
an unprecedented austerity program designed to repress inflation. The 
refor~ers' new clout also meant that the alternative approach to finan-
cial reform that had been outlined in the party's economic program was 
dismissed outright. Instead, the process of financial reform under the 
PSOE continued to be guided by the central bank's policy agenda, just 
as it had been under the centrist government and before the political 
transition. Having alr~ady managed to limit the influence of other state 
actors over the financial system, the reformers now focused on finding 
a way to finance a budget deficit that had gone from 1 percent of GDP 
in 1977 to 5.6 percent in 1982 without compromising the central 
bank's ability to set•m<;>netary policy.1° 
The problem of orthodox deficit financing faced by the Spanish au-
thorities derived from the absence of a market in short-term public debt 
in which the Treasury could finance its shortfalls. The creation of a 
money market that would render day-to-day control over monetary 
policy subject to routine central bank operations had been one of the 
principal objectives of the reformers from the start, but it had been 
effectively blocked by the bankers, who did not want the authorities to 
compete with them in capturing short-term savings by issuing short-
term securities directly to the public. 11 With the growth of the deficit, 
however, the issue had acquired much greater importance. Because of 
the absence of a short-term debt market, the central bank was obliged 
to monetize the Treasury's shortfall and then to offset this monetization 
by issuing its (?Wn certificates of monetary regulation (CRMs) to the 
banks. f.rom 1977 to 1982 more than 94 percent of the deficit was first 
. ~ ,' ,_, " ~~ ... ·, 
10 The deficit's growth was due to a rise in social transfer payments (including unem-
ployment benefits), subsidies to public enterprises, and interest on the public debt. After 
1982, however, the last of these factors came to account for 62% of the growth in public 
expenditures. See Julio Alcaide, "El gasto publico en la democracia espaiiola: Los 
hechos," Pape/es de Economia Espanola," no: 37_ 1988, f: 12. By _the late 1980s, ~he 
budget deficit thus became "a self-feeding def1c1t dnven by the fmanc1al costs of forgomg 
deficits": J. M. Gonzalez Paramo, "El deficit del estado en 1986 y su financiaci6n," 
Economistas (Colegio de Madrid), no. 23, 1987 See also Rafael Repullo, "Deficit, deuda 
publica e inflaci6n: Aspectos te6ricos y aplicaci6n al caso espaiiol," Boletin Econ6mico 
(Banco de Espana), December 1986. 
11 Under the existing arrangement, the central bank extracted liquidity through its 
certificates of monetary regulation (CRMs) and injected it through short-term credits to 
the banks but did not have a handle on the aggregate "liquid assets in the hands of the 
public," or ALP, which was becoming increasingly important for monetary policy 
objectives. 
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monetized, then offset in this way. But, as the deficit grew, the central 
bank's ability to offs.et the monetization was compromised because the 
auctions for its certificates were restricted by law to commercial and 
savings banks. In the early 1980s the banks' oligopsony
0 
in public debt 
became a serious impediment to monetary control. A sharp rise in the 
budget deficit in 1981 forced the Bank of Spain to raise the return on its 
CRMs to more than 20 percent. In the absence of an instrument of 
short-term public debt, the tremendous cost of this financing had to be 
monetized, and could be neutralized only by further increases in the 
already exorbitant return to the banks. Monetization was therefore 
unavoidable in the medium run. 
This dilemma led the governor of the Bank of Spain, Jose Ramon 
Alvarez Rendueles, to push aggressively for the creation of a short-term 
public debt instrument in the last year of UCD government. Protracted 
negotiations to get the bankers to subscribe the new debt at a rate 
below that which they received on the CRMs failed, and the govern-
ment held the first public auction of so-called pagares del tesoro (PTs) 
in early 1982. A high bidding minimum, however, continued to make 
the auctions accessible mostly to the banks, which boycotted them until 
they had forced the Treasury to raise the return on the PTs to the rate 
they were receiving on the central bank's CRMs. 12 
The reformers' new position of strength after the Socialist victory led 
to a new attempt to redress this persistent conundrum. The solution, 
however, was obliquely enshrined in another reform of the compulsory 
coefficients carried out in 1983. The centerpiece of this reform was the 
creation of a new compulsory ratio that obliged the banks to invest up 
to 12 percent of their deposits in PTs. At the same time the old com-
pulsory investment ratio (by now restricted almost exclusively t}J· ex-
port credit) was further reduced, and the central bank's obligation to 
finance the Treasury's shortfalls was abolished. 13 What had once been 
12 "La reforma de un fracaso," Mercado Financiero, October 1982. The coexistence of 
two parallel public debt instruments (the central bank's CRMs and the Treasury's PTs) 
produced an inverted interest rates curve in which "the most prestigious issuer in the 
market [the Treasury] was forced to offer much higher rates of return than many private 
issuers of securities." Raimundo Ortega, "Tendencias recientes y problemas inmediatos 
de la politica de deuda publica," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 32, 1987 pp. 130-
32. 
13 Raimundo Poveda, "Las financiaciones privilegiadas de las entidades de dep6sito," 
Pape/es de Economia Espanola, Suplementos sobre el sistema financiero, no. 11, 1985; 
Carmen Arasa Medina, "La politica monetaria espaiiola: Del plan de estabilizaci6n a la 
decada de los 80," Situaci6n (Banco de Bilbao), no. 4, 1985. 
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an instrument of privileged financing to favored industrial sectors was 
th.us astutely transformed into an -instrument of ort9odox deficit fi-
nancing. This maneuver allowed the Bank of Spain to abolish its own 
debt instruments (the CRMs), ~nding the duality of public debt instru-
ments that had hindered monetary policy.14 
The creation of the new coefficient appeared to represent a flagrantly 
interventionist way to solve the deficit financing problem. This was 
the position publicly taken by the head of the AEB, who criticized the 
new measure as an "extension of the state's empire over the financial 
system." Even some of the public officials responsible for its imple-
mentation lamented the new coefficient as a necessary evil because of 
the Treasury's inability, to raise funding more directly from savers.15 
Yet what was publicly d('.scribed as a setback in the reform process 
shrouded a new accommodation between the central bankers and their 
clients in the financial sector. 
The reform of the coefficients was drafted in the Bank of Spain and in 
close consultation with the banks. It was commonly referred to by 
public officials as a "negotiated" solution to the problem of deficit 
financing. 16 Thus, for example, in order to facilitate the conversion of 
CRMs held QY the banks into PTs, the banks received a negotiated 
above-market return, rather than the rate set at auction, on the debt 
that they acquired in compliance with the new coefficient. 17 As was the 
case with the original compulsory investment ratio, the new coefficient 
must also be understood in light of its alternative, in this case a more 
aggressive effort on the· part of the state to raise financing directly from 
savers without reliance on the banks to act as intermediaries. The high 
popularity that the PTs attained among investors early on suggests that 
market'-\3oi:iditioni;,would have allowed the authorities to act more 
assertively in this regard, as in fact they did in the early 1990s. 
14 Ortega, "Tendencias recientes," pp. 132-33. 
15 See ibid.; Rafael Alvarez Blanco, "Endeudamiento de! sector publico en Espaiia," 
Pape/es de Economia Espanola, nos. 32 and 33, 1987 Th,e technical literature on public 
debt policy for this period clearly reveals that the inadequate reform of the public debt 
market raised the return that the Treasury had to pay on its debt, thus putting upward 
pressure on other interest rates as well. 
16 El Pais, June 2, 1984, and personal interviews with public officials, Madrid, Spring 
1991. See also Ortega, "Tendencias recientes"; Jose Maria Garcia Alonso, "La evoluci6n 
de! sistema financiero espaiiol," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 18, 1984. 
17 The privileged tax treatment that the banks received in this transformation seems to 
have been the immediate cause of the resignation of the Secretary of State for Finance in 
1984. See El Pais, May 19, 1984. 
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In addition, there is ample evidence that in the economic climate of 
the early 1980s the ;new compulsory ratio constituted a nonbinding 
constraint on the banks. By 1981, the aggravated economic crisis had 
led to a dramatic ~ollapse in the demand for credit by Spanish fi;ms at 
the credit rate levels that the banks continued to set by way of gentle-
men's agreement in the context of their monthly meetings. This left the 
banks with liquidity excesses in 1982 and 1983 that forced them to buy 
increasing amounts of PTs even before the coefficient had come into 
effect. from 1981 to 1985, the banks' ability to maintain their 
oligopolistic rates and profit margins came to depend heavily on the 
return that they received on their public debt investments. In fact, for 
1984-86 the banks held far more PTs then the new coefficient re-
quired. The PTs clearly played a compensatory role in the banking 
system, as reflected in the growing weight of public securities as op-
posed to private assets in the banks' balance sheets. 18 The counterpart 
to this trend was a significant decline in the supply of investment credit 
by the banks, which in the four months after the initial agreement on 
the new coefficient decreased by 300 billion pesetas. 19 
The coefficient solution to the deficit financing problem thus created 
an interlude in the reform process that allowed the banks to maintain 
their high credit rates at a critical point in the economic cycle by offer-
ing them a high-paying, risk-free alternative for their investments. Fur-
ther proof of this accommodation is offered by the banks' operating 
costs, which had moderately declined between 1981 and 1984, but 
began to rise again in 1985 (see Table 7). As late as 1988, the OECD 
noted that despite the cost inefficiency of the Spanish banks, "their net 
earnings margins are in fact the highest in the EEC [ with the exception 
of Denmark] . [ and] despite the regulation of interest rates on Pc!ft' of 
their assets, the same is true of interest margins, suggesting that these 
18 Carlos Contreras, "Deuda piiblica, desintermediaci6n, e inovaci6n financiera en 
Espana," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 33, 1987 The banks held an average of 
51 % of the total PTs issued by the Treasury for this period, 10% above the 41 % that the 
coefficient obliged them to. Their dependence on the PTs was also laid bare when they 
tried again to boycott the Treasury's auctions after the government decided not to 
continue granting them an above auction return on PTs once the original ones had 
matured in 1985. The banks' inability to place their funds in the depressed credit market 
forced them to return to the auctions, and even during the boycott they continued to hold 
PTs well above the required percentage . El Pais, November 12, 1984, and September 8, 
1985; Financial Times, April 3, 1985. 
19 The Big Seven and their subsidiaries reduced their credit by 450 billion pesetas, while 
the foreign and smaller banks increased theirs by 82 and 50 billion, respectively. 
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controls have not had a serious effect on profitability and that their cost 
has largely been borne by bank clients. "20 
It is highly unlikely that the banks could have ;naintained their 
oligopolistic credit rates or their high profit margins through the period 
of the Socialist austerity plan otherwise than by flight into government 
debt. If the new coefficient constituted a nonbinding constraint, how-
ever, the question remains why it had to be made a legally compulsory 
requirement. Here the apparently contradictory character of the 1983 
reform reveals the mo{e subtle aspects of reciprocal consent. The new 
compulsory ratio can be said to have made life easier for both the 
authorities and the bankers in a number of ways. For the reformers, the 
"negotiated" ~as opposed to market-path ensured a noninflationary 
source of deficit finan~ing whose cost could be predicted and con-
trolled. 21 This solution, moreover, could be arranged within the in-
creasingly tightly knit policy community of private and central bankers 
and Ministry of Finance officials. The new coefficient was in this sense 
fundamentally different from the original investment ratio in that it did 
not increase the discretionary power of other actors in the state over the 
financial system or create vested interests outside of the financial com-
munity. It therefore did not conflict with the reformers' underlying 
objective of bolstering the central bank's influence over economic 
policy. 
The transformation of the compulsory ratios can also be said to have 
made life easier for the . reformers by making it easier for their main 
partners, the banks. While the authorities secured financing for the 
state through t~e new coefficient, they also eschewed a more aggressive 
attempt to raise state financing directly from savers. In this regard, the 
new coaficitint w;s 'analogous to the original investment ratio, which 
had been the counterpart of the state's willingness not to enable the 
official credit institutions to compete with the private banks in captur-
ing deposits. The imposition of a compulsory ratio thus allowed the 
reformers to limit the competitive impact that orthodox deficit £inane-
20 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain (Paris, 1988). 
21 One study estimates that the state saved as much as 1 % of GDP in financial costs 
thanks to financing provided through the PT and Reserve Requirement ratios in 1988. 
Rafael Repullo, "El coste presupuestario de reducir los coeficientes bancarios: Una 
primera aproximaci6n," Hacienda Publica Espanola, nos. 110-111, 1988. However, 
because this coefficient-based financing served as an alternative to a more aggressive 
development of the public debt market, the real savings to the state may have been 
negative. 
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ing had on the financial sector. The appearance of heavy-handedness 
roward the banks th,µt this solution entailed masked its most significant 
consequence: the .. ci:irtailment of the disintermediation effect that is 
commonly associated with the growth of public debt markets, :nd the 
consequent preservation of the banks' position as intermediaries in the 
Spanish financial market. 
The new coefficient thus gave official sanction to a situation in which 
the banks were able to maintain their oligopolistic credit rates by shift-
ing a farge part of their resources into public debt at a point in the 
economic cycle when the fall in demand for credit by firms would 
otherwise have forced them to reduce their margins. Because the banks' 
balance sheet performance in the mid-1980s became highly sensitive to 
the return that they received on their public debt holdings, the existence 
of the state-imposed coefficient also made it easier for the authorities to 
make this an important criterion in the Treasury's public debt pol-
icies. 22 Foreign bankers, for example, complained in 1984 that the 
rates at which the Treasury issued its debt were too high to be ac-
counted for by market conditions, suggesting that they were being 
biased upward by the government's awareness of the impact on the 
domestic banks. 23 High Treasury rates, in turn, obfuscated the extent 
to which the overall level of interest rates, in particular the high cost of 
investment credit, was attributable to the banking sector's high cost 
and profit margins. 24 The compulsory nature of the coefficient may 
thus have served to mask both a direct and indirect process of subsidiz-
ation of the banks by the Treasury during this period. Thus if the 
creation of a new compulsory ratio at a time when the central bank had 
been strengthened seems puzzling, it was in fact highly compatible with 
the evolving relationship of reciprocal consent between the reformers 
and the Big Seven. · 
In addition to the accommodation in deficit financing, the banks' 
ability to maintain their oligopolistic behavior in the credit market 
through the years of the Socialist austerity program was sustained in a 
22 Antonio Torrero, Estudios sobre el sistema financiero (Madrid : Espasa Calpe, 1989), 
pp. 89-90. 
23 El Pais, August 19 and September 13, 1984. 
24 One board member of one of the large banks expressed the opinion that this was a 
critical criterion in the Treasury's policies. Interview, Madrid 1991. This is also implied by 
Raimundo Ortega, head of the Treasury in the mid-1980s, in "La financiaci6n del deficit 
publico y su incidencia sobre el sistema financiero," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 
23, 1985. 
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number of other ways. Like the plan to reorganize the EOCs outlined in 
thf PSOE 1?82 electoral platform, a promise to use tqe savings banks 
as a source of privileged industrial financing-a measure that would 
have clashed with the Bank o(Spain's agenda-wa1indefinitely post-
poned once the government took office. So, for a number of years, was 
capital market reform. Competition was further hindered by the gov-
ernment's treatment of foreign banks. Increased liquidity in the inter-
bank market in 1985 allowed the foreign bank& to offer lower credit 
rates that year and to increase their share of the credit market to 11 
percent. But the attempt was rapidly undermined by the big domestic 
banks, which, through their control over the domestic interbank mar-
ket, cut off the foreigners' main source of funds. Far from encouraging 
such competitive pryssures to lower the cost of corporate finance, and 
despite the severity of the industrial recession, the Bank of Spain placed 
a moratorium on foreign bank entry in 1984, arguing that the Spanish 
financial market had reached its point of saturation by foreign banks (a 
point that was arbitrarily defined as 14 percent of the credit market). 
One high-ranking central bank official bluntly informed the repre-
sentatives of four Japanese banks that it was a question of "having 
foreign banks .interested in Spain come to resolve problems and not just 
to create them." 25 By the end of the year, and after the Big Seven's 
maneuvers to reduce foreign bank fun9ing, the latter's share of invest-
ment credit had receded again to 10 percent.26 
The Role of the Banking Crisis 
The ~purse o{ regulatory reform under the first Socialist term thus 
allowed ~he bank; to maintain their oligopolistic interest margins at a 
critical point in the economic cycle, while averting the negative effect 
that deficit financing might have had on the Big Seven's position in the 
financial system. The upshot was the perpetuation of extraordinary 
financial costs for Spanish industry in the midst'of a prolonged recession 
and a calibration in the process of public debt market reform that had 
serious consequences for Spanish economic policy through the 1980s. 
When pressed to explain this regulatory pattern, public officials in-
volved in the reform process almost invariably attributed it to the un-
25 El Pais, November 27 1985. 
26 Financial Times, May 23, 1991. 
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folding of a crisis in the banking sector in the mid-1980s. The crisis, the 
most significant in t;he Spanish banking sector since the late nineteenth 
century, did acquire · very serious proportions just as the Socialis,ts took 
office. Yet it is questionable that it made the kind of protection afforded 
to the large banks in their day-to-day business necessary. What is evi-
dent, however, is that the crisis advanced the relationship between pri-
vate and central bankers under the new Socialist government. 
The Socialists' entry into office at the end of 1982 coincided with the 
forced· rescue of Banca Catalana, an industrial bank group created in 
the 1960s by Jordi Pujol (by now the leader of the Catalan regional 
government) and the first major bank that was taken over by the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund (which had been set up at the onset of the 
industrial bank crisis in 1978). Just three months later, the new govern-
ment, in a largely unexpected move, summarily expropriated RUMASA, 
an industrial holding company also created during the 1960s that had 
come to control twenty industrial banks, in response to the central 
bank's discovery of a state of insolvency at the holding. RUMASA, which 
was to become the center of a heated political controversy during the 
PSOE's first term, 27 was highly unusual in two respects: it was the only 
newcomer ever to challenge the Big Seven (in part through its purchases 
of failing industrial banks and savings trusts in the late 1970s), and its 
banks belonged to its industrial concerns and had clearly been put at 
their service.2 8 With 4 percent of the banking system's deposits, their 
potential failure also represented the first real threat to the sector's 
stability, a fact implicitly acknowledged by the Spanish Association of 
Private Bankers (AEB), which did little more than express "strong 
concern" at the government's choice of methods. 29 
During the next two years, virtually all of the remaining industrial 
27 The expropriation measure was challenged in court, but the Constitutional Court 
eventually ruled in the government's favor, and RUMASA's founder and head executive, Jose 
Maria Ruiz Mateos, was convicted of fraud. 
28 The RUMASA banks had been used to provide unbacked borrowing to the holding's 
nonfinancial companies to cover a mounting negative worth. An Arthur Anderson audit 
eventually revealed a $1.67 billion shortfall at the expropriated holding. 
29 Financial Times, April 13, 1984. There was a widespread perception in the media that 
"some [bankers] were happy with the Rumasa expropriation," as "Ruiz Mateos, with his 
banks and unorthodox practices had become a bothersome competitor who any moment 
might buy a package of stock in one of the big banks and demand his admission to the 
'club of Seven'": Rivases, Banqueros de/ PSOE, p. 35. The Financial Times, May 27, 
1983, reported that the chairman of Banco Santander "sent a note to congratulate Boyer 
on his performance" following the expropriation. 
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banks l;l.ad to be rescued by the Deposit Guarantee Fund, and by the 
time the crisis ended it had involved 51 of the 102 btnks existing in 
" Spain in 1977 The crisis also affected the Big Seve1;, some of which 
suffered significant losses as a result of the failure of their industrial 
subsidiaries, and at least one of them (the Hispano-Americano) was 
forced to suspend its annual dividend payment in 1984. 30 However, 
although the dimensions of the crisis in the banking sector should not 
be understated, it is unclear that it required the kind of continued 
suppression of compe~ition in the market for corporate finance that 
was maintained during the Socialists' first term. As the head of the AEB 
would later write, the episode never really threatened the stability of the 
system because it consisted of a series of discrete individual bank crises 
and did not extend to the sector as a whole. It is therefore questionable 
that the sector's stability would have been jeopardized by a measured 
increase in competition in the credit market from either the foreign 
banks or a reorganized public banking sector. The persistence of gross 
and net earning margins that remained well above the OECD average 
for the whole period suggests that the sector's profitability was quite 
independent of the problems faced by individual banks with failing 
subsidiaries (which were in any event being resolved through the mas-
sive socialization of losses). There seems to have been greater room for 
competition in the credit market than the automatic link so often 
drawn between the crisis and the government's approach to financial 
reform suggests. . 
Indeed, the new government's response to the banking crisis closely 
fit the pattern of accommodation in other areas of financial regulation. 
Despity,the PSOE's electoral promise to keep rescued banks in public 
hands;'Boyet ancfhis team hastened to privatize both the Banca Cata-
lana and the RUMASA banks. 31 The Big Seven's tender for Banca 
Catalana was quickly accepted, and the holding's banks ended up in the 
hands of the Vizcaya. 32 The RUMASA holdings were disposed of at a 
"negotiation table" attended by the Minister 9f Finance, the president 
30 The problems of the Hispano-Americano stemmed from its attempt to rescue the 
Banco Urquijo, an industrial bank with which it had strong ties. The government offered 
the Hispano assistance to absorb the Urquijo, rather than have it go the normal route of 
the FGD. 
31 The head of the AEB reported just days after the measure that Gonzalez had assured 
him that the RUMASA banks would be reprivatized. Financial Times, March 1, 1983. 
32 La Caixa, a major Catalan savings bank, presented a tender for Banca Catalana, but 
it was refused in favor of one presented by the Big Seven. 
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of the AEB, and the presidents of the two largest banks; their new 
ownership was appertioned among the Big Seven in strict compliance 
with the cartel's internal ranking, along with a small p;rrticipation by 
five medium-sized banks. 33 Foreign banks were excluded from the 
consortium of buyers, despite their expressions of interest.3 4 From the 
beginning, the government thus forwent any leverage afforded it by the 
crisis to influence conditions in the credit market. The upshot was a 
new round of concentration that allowed the Big Seven to boost their 
share of the sector's resources at the time this share was being chal-
lenged by the domestic savings banks. The cost to the banks ultimately 
was little more than symbolic. 35 
The banking crisis, in fact, seemed to encourage the pattern of ac-
commodation observed so early on under the Socialists, by bolstering 
the sense of cohesiveness in the financial policy community that now 
included the PSOE's economic team. It clearly made it easier for public 
officials to engage in policy measures that protected the banks, because 
the threat of instability in the sector constituted such a compelling 
argument that it was hardly ever questioned. It also brought the Big 
Seven into immediate and close negotiations with the reformers in the 
new government, emphasizing the element of mutual dependence be-
33 In what an editorial in El Pais (April 1, 1984) termed the "merry-go-round of the 
RUMASA debt," the government agreed to issue 440 billion pesetas in public debt, which 
the Big Seven subscribed in direct proportion to their deposits and for which they received 
a return of 9.5%. With the collected 440 billion, the state then extended an interest-free 
loan to the RUMASA banks to cover the unrecoverable debts contracted by the holding's 
other companies. The RUMASA banks then deposited that money with the acquiring banks 
at an interest of 13.5%. Through this accounting maneuver, the Big Seven acquired the 
RUMASA banks at a symbolic real cost that amounted to the difference between the 9.5% 
received from the state and the 13.5% paid on the RUMASA deposits, 121 billioQ ~ver 
twelve years, compared to the cost to the state of 550 billion pesetas. See El Pais, March 4, 
May 5, July 10, and July 13, 1984. RUMASA's nonfinancial holdings, by contrast, were 
auctioned off to the highest bidder. 
34 El Pais, April 1, 1984. It was only later in the decade that sales of some of the smaller 
failed banks to foreigners were approved. In all cases, it involved banks that were in such 
bad shape that the domestic banks had refused to take them over. Credit Lyonnais in 1991 
purchased one smaller bank from Banco Santander for what was estimated at "an 
astronomical 19.5 times [the banks] historical earnings." The going price for a Spanish 
bank m the early 1990s was estimated to be at least twice its book value. See Banker, April 
1992. 
35 According to one estimate, the crisis cost the private banks 365 billion pesetas, for 
which price the Big Seven were able to increase their share of deposits from 70% to 82%. 
The cost to the public sector, by contrast, was of 1.215 trillion (an amount almost equal to 
the public deficit at the time). Alvaro Cuervo, La crisis bancaria en Espana, 1977-1985: 
Causas, sistemas de tratamiento y coste (Barcelona: Ariel, 1988), pp. 190-91. 
SUCIA11ST VICTOR ND'REGUG'ffUH'rA--C-C-O~MODATION 151 
tween the bankers and the authorities and more clearly establishing the 
ceptraf ban,~ as a trusted "friend of the banking sector." This new sense 
of affinity now went well beyol}~ the Bank of Spain to include the high-
ranking Ministry of Finance officials who were direc\ly involved in the 
resolution of the crisis, as indicated by the growing number of finance 
officials who went on to high-ranking jobs in the banking sector during 
the PSOE's tenure. 36 The most notable was Miguel Boyer, who after his 
resignation in 1985 became head of the semipublic Banco Exterior, and 
was the first president of that institution invited to participate in the Big 
Seven's monthly luncheons. 
The upshot of the crisis was thus a reinforced sense of identification 
between public official!i and the banking sector, or, in the words of one 
central bank officia.1, a "peculiar sensitivity" on the part of officials 
toward the sector. 37 This identification outlasted the crisis years and set 
the stage for an "<llmost single-minded preoccupation among Spanish 
officials with the banking sector's ability to face up to foreign competi-
tion in the late 1980s. 
EC Membership and New Priorities 
The course of financial reform in Spain discussed so far was driven by 
the agenda of a network of reformers whose principal aim was to 
bolster the position of the central bank in Spanish policymaking and 
who sought to establish a compact of reciprocal consent with the pri-
vate banks as a means to that end. The ensuing pattern of accommoda-
tions maint\lined during the Socialists' first term, shifted the burden of 
,,. 
adjustment -frmti""tbe banking sector to other sectors of the Spanish 
economy, aggravating and deepening a recession that sent unemploy-
ment skyrocketing to over 21 percent in 1985. The end to this dire 
economic scenario came only with Spain's admission to the EC in June 
1985. 
' EC membership altered the dynamics of Spanish financial reform in 
two important yet somewhat contradictory ways. The first was the 
prospect of European financial integration, which introduced an ex-
36 Among others, the first two heads of the Treasury, two director generals of financial 
policy, and the Secretary of State for the Economy who oversaw the reform of the stock 
market all went on to high-level jobs in the banking sector. 
37 Quoted in Financial Times, May 29, 1990. 
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ogenous motivation into the reform agenda and forced the government 
to act in area!t that had long been neglected (most prominent among 
them capital market ~eform). After a decade of limiting t!ie ~omgetitive 
impact of credit deregulation and disintermediation on the banking 
sector, the authorities were now forced to worry about preparing the 
national banking sector for external competition. The manner in which 
these issues were addressed was nonetheless strongly conditioned by 
the relationship between the reformers and the banks that had come 
into being during the previous years. 
The second way in which EC membership affected the dynamic of 
reform was through the tremendous impact it had on the level of eco-
nomic activity. In the three years after its entry into the Community, the 
Spanish economy went from a deep and prolonged recession to a four-
year boom that was driven by massive inflows of foreign capital. This 
turnaround in the domestic economic context ended the nonconstrain-
ing character of the compulsory Treasury ratio introduced in 1983 and 
was followed first by its reduction in 1987 and eventually by its aboli-
tion. Yet foreign investment also became a palliative for the long-
running problems of the Spanish industrial sector, and thus facilitated 
the further dissociation of financial reform from the problems of other 
sectors in the minds of Spanish policymakers. 
The result in the late 1980s was a sharp contrast in the policy stances 
adopted by the Socialist government toward finance and industry. 
While manufacturing firms were sold off to foreigners at an unprece-
dented rate (the proportion of firms in foreign hands rose from 17.0 
percent to 31.5 percent between 1985 and 1990), Bank of Spain and 
Ministry of Finance officials became almost single-mindedly concerned 
with safeguarding the national character of the banking sector .. This 
concern produced a distinctive brand of financial nationalism at the 
end of the 1980s, manifested first in a failed attempt to restructure the 
sector from above and later in a policy of supporting the banks' ca-
pacity to fend off foreign takeovers, even at the expense of forgoing 
improvements in the efficiency of the financial sector. 
The Belated Bang of the Spanish Stock Market 
Perhaps the single most important manifestation of the biased course 
of financial reform pursued in Spain through the first half of the 1980s 
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was the long postponement of capital market reform. As long as the 
reform effdrt was motivated solely by the central binkers' domestic 
policy agenda, the political logic of strengthening tb.eir principal part-
ners, the Big Seven, had advised against any radical alteration of the 
status quo in the stock market. 
The existing institutional structure of the Spanish stock market in the 
mid-1980s centered on the agentes de cambio y bolsa, publicly licensed 
agents who held a monopoly on trading that allowed them to charge a 
fixed commission of 0.25 percent on every transaction. Since the 
agentes acted only on behalf of their clients, there were no market 
makers in this system. The actors that commanded the market were the 
banks, which not only were its main issuers and investors but also 
placed the vast ma~oi;ity of the agentes' orders. Their indirect domi-
nance contribut~d to a very low level of transparency. As lenders, the 
banks received privileged information that, with no legal restrictions 
on insider trading, they were able to turn to their advantage as share-
holders. "Outsider" trading was seen to be "largely confined to small 
private investors." 38 This situation not only entailed profits for the 
banks but also allowed them to control the fate of their own stock. As 
one business journal explained, it was "an open secret that most of [ the 
banks] place employees on the exchange floors, who go from agente to 
agente before the trading round checking on the orders they have. 
Armed with this preview, the banks could then opt to intervene" by 
buying and selling stock to ease liquidity or by "turning their stock over 
from one subsidiary to another, although the latter is expressly against 
Bank of Spain regulations." 39 
The, ~Id institu.t~onal framework thus offered some obvious guaran-
tees f~~ the hank;' control over the financial market. For the rest of the 
economy, the main consequence of this institutional control was the 
stock market's narrowness and manipulability, which made it an unvia-
ble source of long-term financing for industry. In 1987 only three hun-
dred companies were listed on the four sto'ck exchanges ( of which 
Madrid accounted for 80 percent) and their total value of shares was 
just over half that in Italy. Seventy percent of the total capitalization of 
the exchanges, moreover, was accounted for by the banks and a small 
number of utilities. Industry accounted for barely 30 percent, setting 
38 Economist, August 22, 1987 p. 76. 
39 Euromoney, June 1988, special suppl., p. 11. The agentes traded each share only once 
a day in a ten-minute voice auction. 
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the Spanish stock market apart not just from those of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, but alst> from. those of France and Italy. Despite the extreme 
inadequacies of the existing setup, no significant reform measures had 
been implemented for almost a decade after the report on capital mar-
ket reform that had been commissioned in 1977 and published in 1978. 
EC membership became the catalyst for such reform. Foreign inves-
tors, who turned Madrid into the hottest stock market in Europe after 
1986 (dri~en largely by the extraordinary undervaluation of Spanish 
industrial stocks, which had experienced a 90 percent decline in real 
share prices between 1974 and 1983), demanded better market ser-
vices, offering significant profits to anyone who could deliver them.40 
These profit opportunities created an interest in capital market reform 
from some of the banks who stood to benefit and from the government 
which was eager to support foreign investment. At the same time, the 
prospect of a single European market in financial services introduced 
by the Single European Act of 1986 turned capital market reform into a 
sine qua non if Spain was to avoid falling behind other European 
countries in the rush to attract securities investors and if the banks were 
to be accustomed to operate in a more sophisticated marketplace. 
These factors finally led the government to pass a major stock market 
reform law in 1988. Yet change continued to be shaped by the search 
for accommodation. Although stock market reform was portrayed as a 
standoff between the government and the agentes, the more important 
line of cleavage turned out to be that between the agentes and their old 
clients, the banks. Despite the benefits that the old institutional setup 
had afforded them, the bankers swiftly caught on to the fact that if they 
were to profit from the boom in foreign investment, they would have to 
offer a wider range of stock market services. The agentes, for their paft, 
were aware that if they lost their monopoly, they would be incapable of 
competing with the firms set up by the banks. Thus the final draft of the 
reform law of 1988 was endorsed by the AEB but opposed by the heads 
of all four bourses, who argued that it would lead to a further "bankar-
ization" of the markets. 41 Once the banks had become willing partners 
40 Trading by foreigners multiplied fivefold, and share prices rose by 144% in 1986. 
Foreign investment also continued to account for approximately 28 % of the trading in the 
market in 1987 and 1988. 
~
1 The head of the Madrid Bolsa complained publicly that the agentes had had no input 
m the formulat10n of the reform. See El Pais, July 11, 1987 
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in the government's reform effort, however, the agents could do little to 
influence the course of reform. 
• . • t 
These factors were reflected in the law of July 1988. Along with 
major ·technical changes (the introduction of an electronic continuous 
trading system linking all four regional exchanges), the law introduced 
three major institutional changes: (1) an end to the agentes' privileges 
and the establishment of stock exchange firms;42 (2) the establishment 
of a new regulatory commission charged with defining and imposing 
the rules of the market; and (3) the outlawing of insider trading. The 
banks were singularly ·positioned to attain a dominant position in this 
modernized market, hav'ing anticipated the changes by creating dealer-
ship firms of their own. :rhey also drew advantage from two other legal 
specif~cations: a reqpirement of 750 million pesetas in capital for the 
establishment of market-making firms (an amount that virtually re-
stricted the creation of this type of firm to the banks, since non-EC 
firms were excluded from participating until after 1992); and a decree 
that prevented firms that did not have the backing of a bank from 
gaining a banking license, thus limiting their operations to the regional 
level. 43 These measures allowed the Big Seven to establish a dominant 
position in th_e reformed stock market before its opening to foreign 
competitors. In addition, the Bank of Spain was given a major voice in 
the new regulatory commission of the capital market (though it would 
not be long before the governor of the Bank of Spain, Mariano Rubio, 
would fall victim to the commission's investigative powers and be 
found guilty of insider trading in 1994). 
The belated reform did achieve a categorical transformation of the 
Spanish stock ·market once it came into effect in 1989. Yet it also 
entailec.l',;some significant limitations. Discriminatory tax treatment of 
mutual funds delayed the single most important source of new capital 
that could boost the market's role for almost two years. When the law 
was changed in 1991, it led to an almost immediate quadrupling of 
mutual fund savings to 7 75 percent of GDP. By then, however, the 
market had essentially been cornered by the 1banks. All eight of the 
largest funds, accounting for 59 percent of the total, were sponsored by 
the banks and only 5 percent of the money was being invested in the 
42 The new law allowed for both single-capacity brokerage firms and broker/dealer (i.e., 
market-making) firms. 
43 El Pais, October 10, 1988, p. N22; Banker, April 1988, pp. 72-74. 
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stock market, with the rest going mainly into public debt. 44 Though 
this investment patterp. may to some extent have reflected the slow-
down in economic ~.ctivity in 1992, it also concurred with the banks' 
traditional ambivalence toward the markets, because "bringing firms to 
the Bolsa meant providing information, and probably losing power. "45 
As with other areas of financial reform, capital market reform was thus 
calibrated to allow the banks to gain a head start, a pattern that limited 
the role that the stock market would play as a source of long-term 
finance well into the 199Os. 
It is also worth returning briefly to the development of the Spanish 
public debt market. The late 198Os witnessed some significant changes 
in this area. The most important ones were the creation of a book entry 
system for public debt at the Bank of Spain and eventually (and with 
significant delay) the creation of a new long-term debt instrument (so-
called letras) for the Treasury. The period also witnessed an increas-
ingly explicit conflict between the monetary policy objectives of the 
central bank and the public debt policy objectives of the Treasury. The 
conflict occurred because the Treasury's principal debt financing in-
struments (the short-term PTs) were included in the very wide monetary 
aggregate that the central bank began to target in 1987 ("liquid assets 
in the hands of the public," or ALP). As two observers explained at the 
time, 
when the Treasury places downward pressure on the interest rate on 
Treasury bills, it increases the incentive for the banks to pass on their 
holdings of PTs to the public, and to take the role of commission takers 
rather than rentiers [of public debt]. This complicates the control of 
liquidity because the public debt is converted into a source of liquidity,. 
and in addition loses effectiveness as an instrument of open market 
operations. But when a premium is placed on the interest rate paid by 
the Treasury, monetary control is recovered as the incentive for the 
44 Financial Times, June 24, 1992. 
45 Jose Manuel Garcia Hermoso and Sebastian Ubirria Zubizarreta, "Reforma y trans-
formaci6n del mercado de valores," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 44, 1990, p. 138. 
When the central bank imposed draconian credit restrictions in an attempt to control 
speculative capital inflows in 1989, the banks had been far more willing to promote the 
commercial paper market (which they were able to control more thoroughly and in which 
the cost of financing was much higher) than to take companies on to the equity market, 
which would have allowed them to raise cheaper financing. See Financial Times, May 29, 
1990; OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, p. 28. 
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ba~s to pass on their public debt holdings to the public is reduced, 
•and open market operations can be limited to the pordolios of finan-
cial institutions; of course, this raises the cost of de~icit financing.46 
Despite the reforms of the late 198Os, this conflict between the 
central bank's efforts to gain a handle on liquidity and the Treasury's 
efforts to reduce the high cost of financing its debt persisted through 
the 198Os.47 Indeed, it seemed to be exacerbated by the Treasury's 
decision to promote its new long-term debt instrument (which was not 
included in the ALP) more aggressively on international markets, in an 
effort to alter the shoq:-term structure of its debt. 48 Seeking to take 
advantage of massi':'e demand by foreign investors for its international 
"matador" issues in 1991, the Treasury cut its rates progressively as far 
as the markets allowed, even though the Bank of Spain refused to bring 
its own interest rates in line. Yet, the discrepancy in the two interest 
rates led to a fall in the interbank money rate and put downward 
pressure on the peseta in international currency markets, a develop-
ment that went against the Bank of Spain's policy objectives.49 
Eventually _ the Treasury stepped back from its more aggressive 
stance, officially because it had been forced to raise rates by a lack of 
demand in the markets. This explanation, however, is contradicted by 
the fact that the Treasury repeatedly faced more orders than it could fill 
during its weekly auctions in 1991 because, as one official explained, it 
was offering returns above the market-clearing level to support the 
central bank's interest rates. 50 This lack of autonomy in the Treasury's 
operation ip.anifests the persistent contradictions incurred by the re-
former~ in-esch'ewiog a more aggressive attempt to develop the public 
debt market to shield the banks' position as intermediaries in the finan-
cial system. It also reflects the predominant weight of the central bank's 
policy objectives in Spanish economic policymaking, even when this 
' 46 Carlos Cuervo-Arango and Jose A. Trujillo, La politica monetaria y la evoluci6n 
reciente de los flujos financieros," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 32, 1987 pp. 7-8. 
47 El Pais, March 5 and 19, May 24, June 2, and June 16, 1991; Financial Times, June 
19, 1991. 
48 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, pp. 37-38. 
4 9 El Pais (Internacional), March 4, 1991; El Pais, March 19, 1991; Financial Times, 
June 19, 1991. 
50 Interview, Madrid, Summer 1991. See also El Pais, March 15, March 19, May 24, 
and October 4, 1991. 
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pressure raised the cost of financing the public debt and thereby in-
creased the public defkit. 
From Financial Liberalization to Financial Nationalism 
By the .end of the PSOE's first term in office in the mid-1980s, the 
effort to bolster the central bank's position in Spanish economic policy-
making launched in the early 1970s by a small number of academic 
economists had given way to a broader policy community of private 
bankers and public officials who identified strongly with the fate of the 
domestic banking sector. EC membership would rattle this community 
not just by forcing the pace of capital market reform but also by intro-
ducing the prospect of a single European financial market after 1992. 
The 1992 horizon generated an almost single-minded preoccupation 
among Bank of Spain and Ministry of Finance officials with preparing 
their domestic policy partners for the challenge ahead. Overtaken by 
events at the European level, the shift within the policymaking elite that 
had started in 1969 and driven the anti-interventionist reform agenda 
thus produced a distinctly nationalistic stance toward the financial 
sector at the end of the decade. This development was all the more 
striking because it contrasted sharply with the stance toward other 
sectors of the economy, in which foreign capital was not just offered an 
open door, but indeed became the centerpiece of the government's 
economic strategy. 
The differential treatment of the banking sector was already patent in 
Spain's 1985 treaty of accession to the EC. Membership in the Com-
munity was an indisputable political imperative for any post-Franco 
government in Spain and led the Socialists to accept what many foreign 
observers regarded as a punishing treaty for domestic industry and 
agriculture. 51 By contrast, Spanish negotiators stood firm on behalf of 
the banking sector, negotiating a seven-year interim period in which the 
authorities could invoke an "economic necessity" clause to limit discre-
tionally the entry of foreign banks while maintaining the existing lim-
51 Economist, March 1, 1986. The treaty required an immediate and significant reduc-
tion in Spanish tariffs on industrial goods while phasing in equal treatment for Spanish 
agriculture only over ten years. 
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itations on foreign banks already in Spain until the end of 1992. 52 
Foreign banks thus continued to be limited in praqice to wholesale 
b~nking, th~ most competitive! _and therefore most unprofitable, sector 
of the market, for the remainder of the 1980s. 53 No other sector in 
Spain could claim such advantageous treatment in the late 1980s, with 
the exception of energy (a sector in which the banks and the state 
continued to be the largest stakeholders). 54 
The contrast in the accession treaty, however, was only the first ele-
ment in an increasingly paternalistic stance by the government toward 
the financial sector ih the late 1980s. It was followed by the central 
bank's effort to limit the incursion of foreign capital into the sharehold-
ing of the Big Seven through a gentlemen's agreement whereby the 
banks agreed not to sell troubled subsidiaries to foreigners at a time 
when foreign bank~ were willing to pay substantial premiums to gain a 
retail network.Sf Only in the early 1990s, when the Big Seven began to 
seek out share swaps with other EC banks as a way to establish interna-
tional alliances and fend off hostile takeovers, did the Bank of Spain give 
its assent to significant bank stock purchases by foreigners. 56 
Most notable, however, was the Bank of Spain's attempt in the late 
1980s to direct a series of mergers among the Big Seven, with a view to 
restructuring . the sector for the European market. Despite their oligo-
polistic hold on the domestic financial system (and in fact because of it), 
the Big Seven were small by international standards, the largest among 
them, Banesto, ranking only seventy-third by assets in the world in 
1986.57 The central bank's effort is commonly associated with the 
52 Ban\<s of .other EC countries were limited to three branches for ~he first four years 
after aettssion, an!:! ·thereafter were allowed to open only two add1t1onal branches per 
year until 1993. The limit on the amount of deposits that foreign banks could raise in 
Spain was maintained at 40% for two years and thereafter increased by 10% per year to 
reach 100% in 1993. See Rafael Termes, "Consequencias de la adhesion sobre nuestro 
sistema financiero," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 25, 1985, and Luis A. Lerena, 
"La banca espaiiola en el proceso de integraci6n en la CEE: Dirigismo frente al mercado," 
Situaci6n (Banco de Bilbao), no. 4, 1985. f 
53 Euromoney, July 1986, p. 102. 
54 For an analysis of the politics of Spanish energy policy in the transition, see Thomas 
D. Lancaster, Policy Stability and Democratic Change: Energy in Spain's Transition 
(University Park: Penn State Press, 1989). 
55 Economist, August 22, 1987 
56 The exception to the rule was the 1983 share swap agreement that had given 
Commerzbank of Germany a 10% stake in Banco Hispano-Americano. 
57 American Banker, July 31, 1987; "Spanish Banks: Best of the Bunch," Economist, 
April 6, 1991. 
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1987 "Revell report," which had been commissioned by the govern-
ment and drew two b~sic conclusions: that the number of banks that 
made up the core of the Spanish financial system was too great for 
the size of the Spanish economy, and that there had come to be a 
growing divergence among the Big Seven between those banks that had 
acquired more dynamic and aggressive managements and those whose 
management practices had changed little. 58 The four smaller banks in 
the cartel (Bilbao, Vizcaya, Santander, and Popular), the report sug-
gested, were more efficiently managed than the three largest banks 
(Central, Banesto, and Hispano-Americano). The ideal strategy for the 
sector thus would be to pair the more dynamic banks with the more 
traditional ones. 
Yet such a strategy was not likely to be initiated by the banks them-
selves. Indeed, the mergers being recommended were "of a sort rarely, if 
ever, seen before," as they paired "small relatively efficient banks with 
large and relatively inefficient banks." Most mergers, the report noted, 
involve "a dominant partner, which is almost invariably the larger of 
the two banks. When the dominant partner happens to be less efficient 
than the bank it is absorbing and to be less well managed, the result is 
rather more likely to perpetuate the existing inefficiencies than to create 
a wind of change in the new bank." Hence "the situation in Spain [ did] 
not favour the merger solution to achieve greater efficiency in the bank-
ing system unless the authorities [were] prepared to take the bull by the 
horns and to impose the more efficient management on the less efficient 
in any mergers irrespective of the size of the banks concerned." 59 
The Revell report was released just before the Banco de Bilbao made 
a hostile bid (the first ever among the Big Seven) to take over Banesto in 
late 1987 The Bank of Spain not only gave its backing to the bid but is 
widely believed to have instigated it. The outcome, however, high-
lighted the limits of the central bank's ability to interfere directly in the 
internal business of the banks. The Banco de Bilbao's bid was thwarted 
by a ruling of the Madrid stock exchange (at the time still the corporate 
representative of the agentes), which, in a last-ditch effort to gain sup-
port in its efforts to influence capital market reform, ruled that the 
58 Jack Revell, Mergers and the Role of Large Banks, Research Monograph in Banking 
and Finance, no. 2. Institute of European Finance (University College of North Wales, 
Bangor), 1987 chap. 8. See also William Chislett, "From Minnows to Big Fish?" Banker, 
April 1988, p. 67, and Euromoney, July 1986. 
59 Revell, Mergers, p. 280. 
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Banco de Bilbao's shareholders had to approve the share issue that the 
b~nk was <?ffering to Banesto's stockholders, thus ~iving Banesto's 
board time to defeat the bid.60 After the fiasco, the central bank is 
believed to have backed off from promoting a similar bid by Banco de 
Vizcaya toward Banco Central. Although the incident was followed by 
two mergers among the Big Seven, they were far from the ones that the 
central bank had envisioned, pairing the two more dynamic banks, 
Bilbao and Vizcaya, and two of the so-called mammoths, Hispano-
Americano and Central. 61 Both mergers, in the opinion of most ob-
servers, were intended to guard against future hostile bids and to take 
advantage of the government's tax forgiveness on the huge capital gains 
revaluations that the Jl!ergers made possible. 62 
The hostile bid by the Bilbao severely shook the modus operandi 
among the Big Sev~n :and had strong reverberations on the financial 
policy community in Madrid. Press accounts began to speak of a 
cleavage between the BBV (Bilbao-Vizcaya), identified by some ob-
servers as the government's "bank of choice," and Banesto, the rene-
gade of the 1987 failed takeover bid. Thereafter Banesto received less 
than amicable treatment from the Bank of Spain on several occasions 
before it was taken over by the central bank when an audit showed 
massive ove~aluation of assets in late 1993. It was sold to the Banco 
Santander five months later.63 The monthly luncheons attended by the 
heads of the large banks, however, continued after the events of 1987 
They came to an end only in 1990, after the Banco de Santander began 
to offer interest on current accounts in response to a similar move by 
foreign banks, setting off an unprecedented deposit war among the 
,. 
60 Ecim'omiit, Del:e}DQer 19, 1987 
61 A merger between Central and Banesto, the third of the so-called mammoths, fell 
apart in 1989. 
62 Alvaro Cuervo, "La evoluci6n de! sistema financiero espaiiol," Pape/es de Economia 
Espanola, no. 43, 1990, p. 187 and Euromoney, July 1989, p. 54. 
63 
"cEs el BBV el 'grosse Bank' de! PSOE?" Espana Econ6mica, January 1990. The 
"black hole" discovered in Banesto's assets exceeded $4 ,,billion. The Santander beat its 
two contenders, BBV and Argentaria, with a bid of $2.5 billion, establishing itself as the 
largest bank in Spain. Banesto's problems were attributed to the aggressive industrial 
dealings and unorthodox accounting operations of its management, headed by Mario 
Conde, a self-made entrepreneur and outsider who had come to the rescue of the bank's 
board during the Bilbao's 1987 hostile bid and who was eventually convicted for fraud. 
See "Who Busted Banesto?" Institutional Investor, February 27, 1994. In spite of the 
much-publicized animosity of the central bank toward Conde, Banesto was granted a tax 
break of $180 million on the asset revaluation that Conde devised by consolidating its 
industrial shares into a large holding company. See Financial Times, April 24, 1990. 
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banks that seemed to bring an end to the days when foreign competi-
tion could be largely igµored. 64 Nevertheless, by late 1990 the banks 
had managed to curtail the deposit war. Moreover, the competition 
over deposits did not spill over into the credit market, as seen in the 
very modest decline in the banks' financial margins in the early 1990s 
( see table 7 in chapter 1). 
Despite the internecine conflict set off by the central bank's attempt 
to restructure the sector, the basic character of the financial policy 
community in Madrid survived the EC challenge well into the 1990s. 
One manifestation of the degree of intimacy in this community was the 
role taken by the central bank in 1990 in a succession crisis at the BBV, 
whose newly merged board could not agree on a new president until the 
governor of the Bank of Spain stepped in to make the choice. As the 
Financial Times noted, "the bottom line [was] not that the BBV did 
exactly as the governor ordered. It is that the bank did so because it had 
asked [the governor] to arbitrate in the first place, and had undertaken 
to abide by his ruling. "65 Another illustration was the central bank's 
handling of the Banesto fiasco in 1994. According to several accounts, 
the new central bank governor, Angel Rojo, called in the heads of two 
of the private banks (BBV and Santander) on the eve of the takeover to 
arrange a rescue that would leave Banesto's assets and branch network 
in the hands of what by this time were the remaining Big Four private 
domestic banks. Although other EC banks were eventually allowed to 
bid for Banesto after the illegality of restricting the auction only to 
Spanish banks was brought to the government's attention, the difficulty 
posed by the size and intricacies of Banesto's problems, as well as the 
speed with which the selloff was scheduled, made it far too risky for 
anyone without the inside access granted to the BBV and the Santander 
to participate. 
Indeed, the one source of tension between the central bank and its 
clients at the end of the 1980s was the bank's zeal to prevent a foreign 
takeover of one of the large banks. This determination also lay behind 
its promotion of mergers because, as the Revell report noted, "the real 
advantage of size" was not efficiency but its ability to "protect a bank 
from being taken over." 66 In the early 1990s, the authorities thus re-
acted with considerable alarm to the decision by some of the large 
64 Financial Times, February 26 and May 29, 1990. 
65 Financial Times, May 29, 1990, p. v. 
66 Revell, Mergers, p. 275. 
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banks. to reap extraordinary profit~ by selling off troublesome subsidi-
aties to foreigners and to accept incursions by foreigntcapital into their 
boards. 67 This discrepancy between the viewpoints of the private banks 
and ~he central bank and the latter's almost single-minded concern to 
preserve the national character of the banki~g sector may be~t be un-
derstood as an attempt to maintain the cohesiveness of the policy com-
munity that the reformers had worked so hard to establish. 
The nationalistic stance toward the financial sector, ironically, also 
led the Socialist gov.ernment to do in 1991 what it had previously 
avoided: to transform. the EOCs into a commercial banking entity. 
After the central bank's frustrated attempt to orchestrate mergers in the 
sector, the government' in early 1991 merged the EOCs wit~ the Post~! 
Savings Bank and 'th~ Banco Exterior (the only commercial ban~ ,m 
which the government held a controlling share) into the Corporac1on 
Bancaria de Esp~fi.a (CBE), which, in terms .of total resources, became 
the largest financial institution in Spain. However, contrary _to ~he 
PSOE's 1982 electoral program, which had cast such a reorgamzat10n 
as a way to exert competitive pressure in the credit ~ar~et and_ to 
improve credit conditions for industry, the principal mot1vat1on behmd 
the CBE's creation was the authorities' desire to compel further mergers 
among the private banks that would shield them fro":1 foreign take-
overs. 68 The gamble proved at least partially successful; 1t was fol~owed 
just a few weeks later by the surprise announceme~t of the creat10n of 
the Banco Central Hispano (BCH), whose combmed resources sur-
passed that of the new public holding. The government enthusiastically 
furnished the _BCH with a tax break similar to the one extended to the 
BBV, ~rspite tl;~. fact that the wisdom o~ the merge\~£ the two mam-
moths· was strongty questioned by bankmg experts. 
67 Sales of bank stock and share swaps had placed 15. 79% of the big banks' stock in the 
hands of foreign investors by early 1991, although, with th~ ex~eption of Cornmerzban_k's 
10% participation in Banco Hispano-Americano, no fo1f1gn investor had a controlling 
!~ar~his objective was made explicit by both the ministe~ of finance, Carlos Sokhaga, 
and the head of Banco Exterior, Francisco Luzon, who designed the merg~r and went on 
to become its first president. ABC, May 5, 1991; El Pais, March 3, 1991; F1nanc1al Times, 
May 23, 1991. The Revell report also suggested the creat!on of a large public bank as a 
way to force the private banks into mergers, and the creation of the CBE was appare_n~ly 
carried out based on the blueprint of a second report cornm1ss1oned from the British 
academic. El Pais, May 5, 1991. . . . . 
69 The BCH experienced very significant difficulties, which led its profits to fall far 
below the sector average for several years after its inception. 
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0~ the other hand, and despite official assertions that the new public 
holdmg company also would be used to offer better credit terms to 
industry, the CBE displayed limited zeal in this area. The public hold-
i~g's capacity to do so was curtailed by the fact that the original institu-
tions were not truly merged, but simply placed under a common in-
stitutional structure until 1993, when the government moved to 
pri:atize ~he holding, turning it into a commercial bank, called Argen-
taria? ~hi~h w~s responsible to its shareholders and hence obliged to 
maximize profits within the existing market structure, rather than seek 
to change it. 70 In theory, the activities of the conglomerate might have 
been coordinated through the Ministry of Finance before its privatiza-
tion. In practice, the same desire that led to the CBE's creation-to 
strengthen the domestic banks-also led the government to forgo a 
more aggressive use of the CBE in the credit market. 71 Before the 
Socialists' electoral defeat in 1996, Argentaria had thus become the 
fifth member of a now-reconstituted Big Five group of Spanish com-
mercial banks. 72 
. Rather than seek to augment competition in the market for corporate 
fmance, the strategy the Spanish authorities adopted on the eve of 1992 
w~s thus t_o support the banks' ability to exploit the existing degree of 
ol~gopoly m the credit market so that they could enter the single market 
with the greatest possible amount of capitalization (an attribute critical 
to preventing takeovers), while prodding them to merge and modernize 
~heir management. 73 This approach was encouraged by the realization 
m th~ e~ly 199_0s that the banks' staying power and their ability to 
margmahze foreign competitors in the domestic market rested precisely 
on what also made them less cost-efficient: their inordinate branch 
70 The government _sold 48% of Argentaria's shares in 1993 and another 25% right 
before the 1996 elect10n. 
71 Argentaria was the third bank to bid on Banesto in 1994, although it was not deemed 
;~ be favored by the central bank. See Financial Times, April 23, 1994. 
. lllus~ratmg the continuhy in the banking sector's modus operandi, Argentaria was 
mvolved m ~ha~ the F1nanc1al Times (May 23, 1995) described as a "neat share-out of the 
telecommumcatmns sector," along with BBV and La Caixa, the Barcelona-based savings 
bank that also had become a member of the club of big banks in the early 1990s. By 1995, 
Argentar1a, BBV, and La Caixa were set to replace the state's shareholdings in the public 
telecom operator,_ Telefonica, and Santander-Banesto and Banco Central Hispano were 
~anted the sole hcmse to set up a second mobile telephone network. 
After 1992? Spam would be one of the slowest of the twelve signatories to the Second 
B~nki~g D1rect1ve of 1988 _{along with Germany) to implement the single banking market 
directtv: See Gary C. Ztmmerman, "Implementing the Single Banking Directive in 
Europe, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, no. 3, 1995. 
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networks, which created a formidable cost barrier to entry into the 
highly profitable retail market. 74 · As late as the early 1990s, foreign 
banks that had entered the ~panish market at the beginning of the 
1980s were still far less profitable thari Spanish banks, even after some 
of them had managed to acquire small retail networks. 75 With the 
exception of Manufacturers Hanover, moreover, less cost-efficient Eu-
ropean banks fared better than the American banks, whose competitive 
advantage rested precisely in their cost efficiency, and several of which 
(including Chemical and Chase) eventually withdrew from Spain.76 
The government's stance of benign neglect was reflected at the end of 
the decade in the behavior of the large banks, whose efforts focused far 
more heavily on shifting their lending to the least cost-sensitive bor-
rowers (household~ and construction) than on cutting costs so that they 
could offer better credit terms to business. Although the prospect of the 
single market clearly placed pressure on the system, that pressure came 
far more heavily from the threat of hostile takeovers by foreign interests 
seeking a piece of the sector's high profit margins than from market 
competition (though competition for deposits outweighed competition 
in lending). In addition, the banks in the late 1980~ began again to 
expand their . industrial holdings after two decades of steady divest-
ment. This strategy was exemplified by Banesto, whose new manage-
ment, after foiling the Bilbao's hostile bid in 1987, consolidated its 
industrial stocks into a holding company to revalue the bank's book 
worth and then went on to sell shares in its "Corporaci6n Industrial" to 
raise profits. Most of the other banks followed Banesto's lead. Thus in 
1990 and 1991, "extraordinary items" accounted for more than a third 
of the pret_ax earnings of the large banks, and surpassed 50 percent of 
... 
profits " at ,Bane'sro..and 60 percent at Santander. 77 
The banks' return to and subsequent sell-off of industry in the early 
74 
"Defending el Dorado," Euromoney, July 1989. 
75 Even a bank such as Barclay's, which with over two hundred branches had the largest 
network of any foreign bank in Spain, was hard-pressedA:o compete with a bank such as 
Banco Popular, the smallest of the large Spanish banks, which had over 1,600 branches. 
The Spanish banks, moreover, proved very adept at imitating and overtaking the market 
innovations brought by the foreign banks, as in the syndicated loan market. See Eu-
romoney, July 1986; European Banker, June 1995, October 1996. 
76 El Pais, March 11, 1991; Financial Times, May 23, 1991. Other American banks that 
retreated from Spain included First National of Chicago, First Interstate, and Continental 
Bank Corp. By 1993, all fifteen of the largest foreign banks operating in Spain were 
European banks. See Banker, April 1992; Euromoney, April 19, 1993. 
77 Cinco Dias, May 8, 1991; March 20, 1992. 
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1990s was consistent with their highly procyclical investment behavior 
of the past. A nuru.ber of observers have argued that it also constituted a 
strategy to increase th~ir capitalization in order to fend off possible 
hostile bids on the ev-e of the single market. 78 Whatever the dominant 
motivation, the strategy allowed the banks to maintain their high 
profits despite their still very high costs. In 1990, Banco Popular ranked 
as the world's most profitable bank (a place it maintained for over three 
years), and even Hispano's 0.9 percent profit margin, the "lowest post-
tax return ~n assets [ever] reported" by one of the large Spanish banks, 
was "roughly three times the average of Britain's clearers. "79 And 
Spanish banks as a group continued to lead European banks in prof-
itability in 1991, 1992, and 1993, remaining remarkably unaffected by 
a new recession that was sharply cutting bank profits elsewhere and 
producing another wave of record bankruptcies among nonfinancial 
firms at home. 80 
78 See Jordi Blanch, Antoni Garrido, and Esteve Sanroma, "Las relaciones banca-
industria y su incidencia sobre la eficiencia bancaria," Economia Industrial, no. 272, 
1990, p. 93; Carlos ChuJia, "Las participaciones del sistema bancario en las empresas no 
financieras," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 44, 1990, p. 79. 
79 Economist, April 6, 1991, p. 79. 
80 See Banker, September 1992; Financial Times, Nov. 4, 1992; European Banker, 
January 1994. 
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From Meso To Macro. 
The Rise and Fal I of the Peseta 
T he persistent protection afforded to the domestic banking sec-tor in Spain from the beginning of this century through various regulatory overhauls was not a simple function of the 
sector's economic clout. It was made necessary by the objectives of 
contending state elites who sought to advance particular political 
agendas and institutional outcomes through a strategic partnership 
with the banks. In the 1980s, with the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 
(PSOE) in office, domestic financial flows were therefore liberalized in 
a marmer that minimized competition in the supply of corporate fi-
. ,' ' 4~ 
nance ·aria preserv~d the position of the banks as intermediaries in the 
economy. These outcomes in the regulatory arena were reflected in the 
character of economic policy under the PSOE, in particular in the differ-
ing stances that the government took toward finance and industry as it 
sought to integrate Spain into the single European market, and as 
developments at the European level began to overtake the domestically 
crafted process of regulatory reform. 
The upshot of the accommodation between the domestic banking 
sector and the central bank reformers was that the oligopolistic struc-
ture of the Spanish financial system was extended through the 1980s 
and in some respects (as in the calibration of stock and public debt 
market reform) 'into the 1990s. Economic policy, meanwhile, came to 
167 
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center increasingly on the maintenance of a high interest-rate differen-
tial_ vis-a-vis the rest of.Europe and an appreciating currency, through 
~h1ch the government could maintain the necessary foreign capital 
mflows to compensate for the failures of domestic reform. Like finan-
cial reform itself, this strategy reflected the preferences of the central 
bank. Yet in a hampered domestic financial market, the strong-cur-
rency course had highly contradictory consequences. The additive 
effect on i!1terest rates of the central bank-led financial reform process 
and policy strategy, compounded in a seemingly counterintuitive way 
by developments in the European Monetary System (EMS), produced a 
strong bias in favor of speculative capital inflows and against invest-
ment in productive capacity or technological innovation. By the early 
1990s, the Spanish economy thus began to exhibit "Dutch disease" 
characteristics and was riding on a bubble that would inevitably burst 
with the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
1992-93. 
Economic Performance and New Policy Dilemmas 
The year 1990 was a watershed for the Spanish economy. After four 
years of euphoria, and with the onset of a new world recession, busi-
ness profits declined by 30 percent, the sharpest fall since the PSOE had 
taken office. The decline continued in the next two years and was 
accompanied by virtual stagnation in the rate of productivity growth 
and a rapid worsening of the current account deficit that Spain had 
be_gun to carry since joining the EC. Equally important, though it r!!-
ce1ved less attention, was a shift in the way this deficit was financed. 
The share of long-term direct foreign capital declined sharply and was 
replaced by short-term capital inflows and foreign debt.1 Various 
reports on the Spanish economy noted the worrisomely low pace of 
technological innovation in industry, the sharp loss of competitive-
ness suffered over the preceding years, and the almost complete halt 
in the modernization process that Spanish firms had begun in the 
1 Net long-term capital fell by well over $2 billion during the first four months of 1990. 
S~e Analistas Financieros, "La financiacion del deficit corriente espaiiol: Que ha cam-
biado en los flujos de capital a lo largo de 1990?" Cuadernos de Informaci6n (FIES) June 
1990; Informe Mensual (La Caixa), January 1992, pp. 69-73. ' 
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mid-1970s. 2 Inflation, on the other hand, remained stubbornly above 
· tht EC aveq1ge despite draconian monetary measures tand a new turn 
toward austerity in 1989 Une~ployment, which had remained above 
16 petcent during the boom years, began to rise again dramatically, 
surpassing 24 percent in early 1993. By then the Spanish economy was 
once again, as in the early 1980s, immoderately hard hit by a downturn 
in the world economy. 
In addition to these signs of underlying economic weakness, the 
Spanish economy was characterized in the late 1980s by growing ten-
sion between internal "and external macroeconomic balance. This ten-
sion was captured in a paradox. Although Spain's current account 
worsened almost contipuously after it joined the EC in 1986, going 
from a surplus of $3,.9 billion in that year to a deficit of $10.9 billion in 
1989 and of over $16 billion in 1990 and 1991, the peseta appreciated 
sharply both in nominal and in real terms over the same period. 3 This 
appreciation, which ended only with the onset of the 1992-93 crisis in 
the ERM, was driven by massive inflows of capital (over $30 billion in 
1991) which served to finance the current account deficit but had a 
strong inflationary impact on the Spanish economy. It therefore pre-
sented Spanish authorities with a new policy dilemma as their objective 
of fighting inflation suddenly appeared to conflict with their commit-
ment to capital liberalization. 
The peseta's enduring appreciation in the face of a sharply deteriorat-
ing current account was made possible by the rapidly changing context 
of the EMS at the end .of the 1980s and by the effect of Spain's high real 
interest rates in that context. After the partial lifting of external capital 
controls th~t came with EC membership in 1986, Spain experienced 
... 
very large infloWs -JJf long-term direct investment that sought to take 
advantage of the undervaluation of Spanish industrial stocks and the 
relatively skilled and cheap labor force. Yet there also was a substantial 
amount of portfolio investment, about half of which is estimated to 
have responded principally to Spain's high differential in short-term 
interest rates and therefore to have been highly speculative and vol-
2 El Pais, November 12, 1990; Juan Antonio Maroto, "La situacion empresarial en 
Espana (1982-1989)," Cuadernos de Informaci6n Econ6mica (FIES), nos. 44-45, 1990. 
3 In real (unit labor cost) terms, the peseta is estimated to have appreciated between 25 
and 30% from 1987 through 1991. See Philippe Bacchetta, "Por que es necesaria una 
devaluacion de la peseta," Cuadernos de Informaci6n (FIES), July 1991; OECD, Econom-
ic Surveys: Spain (Paris, 1991), p. 9. 
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atile. 4 Because this speculative element in capital inflows also came to 
be driven incre.:isingly by the rising value of the Spanish currency, it 
acquired a self-reinforcing character. It forced the central bank to en-
gage in a progressive tightening of domestic credit and hiking of inter-
est rates to compensate for the inflow of external liquidity. Yet these 
measures encouraged further short-term capital inflows and placed 
further upward pressure on the peseta. By late 1988, this circle had 
become vicious enough to prompt the government to impose a draco-
nian credit squeeze and, in 1989, unprecedented restrictions on capital 
inflows, which included a 30 percent deposit on borrowing raised by 
Spanish firms abroad and a 25 percent withholding tax on foreign 
purchases of Spanish public debt. 5 
The dynamic created by high interest rates, however, was compli-
cated by the government's decision to join the ERM in June 1989. ERM 
membership, advanced by the Bank of Spain as a way to discipline 
wages and add credibility to the government's anti-inflation stance, was 
also expected to force a greater balance between interest rate hikes and 
fiscal policy, to ease the strong upward pressure on the peseta. 6 The 
very success of the EMS in increasing the peseta's credibility in inter-
national markets, however, intensified the speculative element in capital 
inflows. The decision to enter at a relatively high rate of 65 pesetas 
to the deutsche mark and with a 6 percent fluctuation band (as opposed 
to the standard 2.25 percent) produced an immediate and massive 
influx of short-term capital that pushed the peseta up against its upper 
band limit. From virtually the moment it entered the ERM and for 
almost three years thereafter, the peseta thus became the "strong-
est" currency in the system, pushing steadily up against its upper 
ceiling, despite an inflation rate that was 2 points above the ERM 
4 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991, p. 24; Jaime de Pinies, "Vulnerabilidad 
externa y la autopista," in La politica espanola en el contexto internacional hoy previsible 
para los anos 90 (Madrid: C1rculo de Empresarios, 1990), pp. 355-56; El Pais, March 24 
and October 6, 1991. 
5 Guillermo de la Dehesa, "Las inc6gnitas macroecon6rnicas de 1991," Anuario de El 
Pais, 1991. The increase in foreign borrowing by Spanish firms was spearheaded and 
intermediated by the domestic banks in response to the government's credit squeeze. See 
also El Pais, May 29, 1992. 
6 Financial Times, June 7, 1989; OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991. For an 
explanation of the decision to join the ERM in 1989, see Jose Luis Malo de Molina and 
Jose Perez, "La politica monetaria espaiiola en la transici6n hacia la union monetaria 
europea," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 43, 1990. 
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avera&e and the continuing sharp deterioration of the Spanish current 
7 , 
a,count. • 
The peseta's nominal appresi .ation became a source of shar~ tension 
between the Spanish central bank and its ERM partners, fuelmg spec-
ulative pressures that ultimately contributed to the systei:n's crisi~ and 
eventual crash in 1992-93. The ERM's bilateral parity grid-designed 
to protect the independence of the Bundesbank within the system-in 
practice forced weak-currency countries (those w~ose currency ap-
proached the lower limit of their bilateral band agamst any other cur-
rency) to adjust before strong-currency countries (those whose cur-
rency approached the upper limit of their bilateral band~ had to do S~- 8 
Spanish interest rates therefore soon began to act as a direct const~ai~t 
on policy in countries such as France, the Netherlands, a~~ later Bnt~m 
(which joined the ERM in 1990), putting them in the position of havi~g 
to raise interest rates (or not being able to cut them) to keep their 
currencies in line with the peseta. 9 
This effect of the ERM's rules of adjustment was aggravated by 
developments at the time of the peseta's entry. The lifting of capital 
controls in the late 1980s by countries such as France and Italy, coupled 
with the 19.87 Basel-Nyborg Agreement, which committed govern-
ments to maintain their currencies' parities within the system without 
recourse to devaluation, produced a dramatic rise in short-term capital 
flows into currencies that offered positive interest rate differentials 
with little regard for economic fundamentals (such as inflation rates or 
public deficit levels)." Economists referred to this phenomenon as_ a 
"new EMS " characterized by high capital mobility, the apparent dis-
appeapnc; of a risk premium on currencies with .W:~rri~~me_ funda-
mentafs; and the-fhenomenon of "undeserved credibility, . which was 
reflected in the remarkable performance of the peseta and m the some-
what shorter-lived appreciation of the Italian lira at the end of the 
7 It became the second strongest currency after the Apf ii 1992 entry _into the system of 
the Portuguese escudo, whose value in the system was a close funct10~ of that of the 
peseta. See "Tres aiios de la peseta en el SME," Informe Mensual !La Ca,xa),_June _1992. 
s The ERM's asymmetric adjustment rules centering on th~ _bilateral parity gnd ai::e 
discussed in John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty: The Po/1t1cs of Central Banking m 
Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 191-201. 
9 See Financial Times, October 24, 1989, and May 7 1991; El Sol, February 17 1991; 
El Pais, March 24, April 30, and May 17, 1991; Investment Daily, March 18, 1991; 
Independent, June 17, 1991; Times, December 20, 1991. 
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198Os.10 In this context, attempts by the Bank of Spain to stem the 
appreciation of ~he peseta through intervention in currency markets in 
support of the deqtsche mark and dollar proved powerless when 
stacked against a 6. 7 percent positive interest rate differedtiai between 
the peseta and the deutsche mark. 11 Just three months after the peseta's 
entry, the Bundesbank thus began to call openly and adamantly for a 
devaluation of the peseta; a development met with dismay by Bank of 
Spain officials who argued that it was impossible to devalue "against 
the markets."12 
Spanish interest rates contributed to the growing instability in the 
ERM, but membership in the system also perpetuated the vicious circle 
in Spanish policy. The surge in short-term capital inflows after the 
peseta's entry came just as the central bank was attempting to stave off 
credit growth. To counter this trend, Spanish authorities raised interest 
rates further and imposed a 10 percent ceiling on credit growth, revers-
ing the reformers' decade-long drive to shift monetary policy away 
from credit controls and into the money market. Such measures were 
symptomatic of a growing intractability in the government's fight 
against inflation. As the Financial Times put it at the time, "Spain's 
monetary policy options [had] probably been exhausted by EMS mem-
bership, the existing high rates, and credit restrictions. Every time the 
Bank of Spain [had] to intervene to soften the currency by placing 
pesetas in the [currency] market, it damage[d] progress made on con-
trolling the supply of money and delay[ed] any fall in interest rates. "13 
Having joined the ERM at a high parity rate with the intention of 
placing a damper on inflation, Spanish authorities thus came to face an 
unexpected policy dilemma. The peseta's strength appeared to conflict 
with the government's commitment to keep it within the 6 percept 
10 Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa, "The New EMS," in Paul De Grauwe and 
Lucas Papademos, eds., The European Monetary System in the 1990s (London: Long-
man, 1990); and Patrick Artus and Henri Bourguinat, "The Stability of the EMS," in 
Afred Steinherr, ed., Thirty Years of European Monetary Integration: From the Werner 
Plan to EMU (New York: Longman, 1994). 
11 The day after the peseta's entry into the system, the Bank of Spain began to intervene 
heavily in favor of the deutsche mark and dollar in an attempt to brake the peseta's 
advance. See New York Times, June 20, 1989; Financial Times, June 20 and October 31 
1989. ' 
12 Financial Times, October 24, 1989. 
13 Financial Times, June 20, 1990. Contrary to the experience of other member coun-
tries, EMS membership thus did not have an observable effect on inflation in Spain. See 
Ana Revenga, Credibility and Inflation Persistence in the EMS, Bank of Spain Working 
Paper no. 9321 (Madrid, 1993). 
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ERM band. Yet it was believed that to redress this situation by allowing 
c\ cut.in interest rates would be to ·compromise the cctntral bank's anti-
inflation stance at home. For ,!.relatively high-inflation country such as 
Spain, ERM membership thus suddenly appeared to conflict with 
domestic price stability. 
The Spanish authorities' dilemma reflected the ERM's growing sus-
ceptibility to what economists refer to as the Mundell-Flemming condi-
tion, according to which monetary policy autonomy is not possible in 
the context of both fixed exchange rates and free capital flows. 14 Yet 
this condition is generally expected to imply that in a fixed exchange 
rate zone with high capital mobility, a country with higher than average 
inflation will need to .raise its interest rates to maintain its exchange 
rate. The perversitr of the Spanish case lay in the fact that it had an 
appreciating currency despite somewhat higher-than-average domestic 
inflation and despite a rapidly deteriorating current account balance. 
The unexpected consequence of the peseta's participation in the ERM 
from 1989 to 1992 thus reflected the biases that high interest rates had 
created in the Spanish economy even before it had entered the system. 
As one foreign observer put it, despite the fact that the real interest 
rate differential between Spain and Germany narrowed to just 3 points 
after 1990 (thanks principally to the rise in German rates), Spain's 
"structural problems [made] high Spanish interest rates a far more 
dependable bet" for foreign investors than those of other European 
countries. "15 
High IN~rest Rates and Spanish Economic Policy 
. ' ~ .. 
Th~· ~'aradoxic~f experience of the Spanish peseta in the EMS was 
linked directly to the high real interest rate differential that Spanish 
financial assets offered vis-a-vis those of other ERM member states. 
Economists generally interpret this differential as the unintended con-
sequence of two other problems: a lack of fisclil restraint and inflation. 
Spain's macroeconomic policy mix in the late 198Os and early 199Os 
was characterized by the combination of a tight monetary policy stance 
14 See Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies 
in a World of Global Finance," International Organization, no. 45, 1991. 
15 Financial Times, March 15, 1991. The lifting of some of the controls led purchases of 
Spanish public debt by foreigners to quadruple in just one month when the 25% with-
holding tax was lifted in early 1991. 
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and a laxer fiscal policy stance. The prevalent interpretation of this 
policy mix is that mon~tary policy was forced to compensate for a lack 
of fiscal restraint iq_ the government's fight against infl3:tion.16 )'he 
persistence of inflation (which rose from a low of 4.8 percent in 1988 to 
6.8 percent in 1989 and leveled off at 5.9 percent in 1991) despite very 
high interest rates is commonly attributed to wage growth, which, 
given the phenomenal level of unemployment in Spain, is in turn at-
tributed to certain features of Spanish labor laws and industrial rela-
tions practices. Most often cited are the prevalence of centralized bar-
gaining at the sectoral level, the practice of backward-looking wage 
indexation, and the comparatively high level of dismissal costs for 
workers with non-time-limited contracts. 17 Spain's high real interest 
rate differential is thus understood as a risk premium imposed by cur-
rency markets on the peseta, because of the perceived inflation-prone-
ness of the Spanish economy. 
To be sure, all of these factors played a role in determining the level of 
Spanish interest rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. If fiscal policy 
had been tighter, the Treasury's financial costs and the crowding-out 
effect on credit rates would both have been lower. If wages had grown 
less, inflation might not have increased again after 1988, and the loss of 
competitiveness experienced by Spanish firms as a result of the over-
valuation of the peseta would have been mitigated. If the cost of firing 
workers with open-ended contracts had been lower, unemployment 
might have placed greater downw;;ird pressure on wages, and busi-
nesses might have deemed the creation of new long-term jobs more 
profitable at the margin. 
The prevalent interpretation of high interest rates in Spain, however, 
entails some serious inconsistencies. The level of the Spanish pub\ic 
deficit before the 1992 currency crisis (averaging 3.6 percent from 
1987 to 1991) and the level of the public debt (at 47 percent in 1991, 
well below the European average) do not seem to explain the high cost 
of financing the public debt. The notion that Spain's real short-term 
interest rate differential vis-a-vis Germany simply reflected a risk pre-
16 See, for example, Jose Luis Raymond and Jose Palet, "Factores determinantes de los 
tipos reales de interes en Espaiia," Pape/es de Economia Espanola, no. 43, 1990. 
17 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991, pp. 66-68; Juan Dolado and S. Bentolila, 
"Labour Flexibility and Wages: Lesson.s from Spain," Economic Policy, no. 18, 1994; 
Olivier Blanchard et al., Spanish Unemployment: Is There a Solution? (London: CEPR, 
1995), Annex 4. 
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Table 17 Cost components of inflation, 1981-1990 
1981-1983 1984-1986 1987-1988 1989 1990 
GDP deflator 12.5% 10.0% 5.7% - 7.0% 7.3% 
Unit labor costs• 6.0 2.9 1.9 2.1 3.2 
Unit profitsb 5.4 5.7 3.6 4.0 4.0 
Indirect tax rate 1.1 1.6 0.2 0.9 0.3 
apercentage change at annual rate. 
bPercentage point contribution toGDP deflator at annual rate. 
Source: Adapted from DECO, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1990-91, p. 59. 
mium on the peseta related to public debt and inflation also seems to be 
contradicted by the fact that up until 1991, this differential was higher 
than the one sustame~ by the Italian lira, despite Italy's far higher 
public deficits and debt, far lower level of foreign reserves, and very 
similar inflation 1performance. The exclusive focus on labor market 
variables in explanations of Spain's inflation-proneness also is prob-
lematic. Despite the apparent rigidity of wages in the face of Spain's 
extremely high unemployment rate, unit labor costs until 1989 grew far 
below the rate of growth in unit profits. They thus had a moderating 
effect on the rate of inflation (see the cost components of inflation in 
Table 17). Even between 1989 and 1991, when wage growth acceler-
ated after the breakdown of social concertation between the govern-
ment and the unions, the real wage per person in Spain still grew well 
below the European average (1.8 percent as opposed to 5.2 percent), 
and the rise in unit labor costs during this period was due largely to the 
sharp drop in p~oductivity rather than to the growth of wages. 18 As late 
as 1991., the OECD noted that "international comparisons of gross 
wage le\fets" ·and ·f&e record of wage moderation were among Spain's 
principal points of attraction for foreign investors. 19 
Labor market-centered explanations also fail to recognize the extent 
of change that took place in this area during the 1980s. Although 
Spanish labor law offered workers with permanent contracts a very 
high level of protection against dismissal, measures taken by the Social-
ist government early on significantly altered the terms of employment 
and labor-cost determination. With the legalization of temporary em-
18 Agustin Garcia Laso, "La dinamica salarial de los aiios ochenta : De la politica de 
rentas al 'pacto de competitividad, "Informaci6n Comercial Espanola, no. 705, 1992, p. 
194-97; OECD, Econo,;,ic Surveys, Spain, 1992, p. 59. 
19 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991, pp. 62-65. 
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ployment contracts in 1984, businesses could hire new workers and 
shed them in reipons~ to market conditions with virtually no dismissal 
costs. By the early J9 .90s, more than 30 percent of workers in ~pain 
were employed under temporary contracts (the EC average was 9 per-
cent), and Spain had one of the highest labor turnover rates in the 
OECo.20 Some economists argue that this flexibility in employment 
did not translate into real wage flexibility, because the unions' wage 
demands were determined by permanent workers, who did not face the 
threat of-dismissal in a downturn. Yet empirical tests of this hypothesis 
suggest that the purported "insider effect" on wages was very small. It 
therefore hardly offers a sufficient explanation of the stickiness of infla-
tion in Spain. 
The most important fact that tends to be overlooked in accounts of 
Spain's economic problems, however, is that the inflation-proneness of 
the Spanish economy at the end of the 1980s had a very strong sectoral 
component. As one report pointed out, "unlike developments in the 
rest of the OECD, the rate of inflation in services (excluding rents) 
exceeded that of manufactures by 7 percentage points" in the second 
half of the 1980s, and it was this "abnormally large cumulative rise in 
the price of nontradeables relative to tradeables" that was the principal 
cause of inflation in Spain.21 Thus, while the inflation rate of Spanish 
tradeables (food and manufactures) edged toward the EMS average, the 
inflation differential in services increased. The divergent trend in sec-
toral inflation rates reflects the exceptionally rapid growth of the ser-
vices sector in relation to the tradeables sector (where unit labor costs 
grew very modestly even after 1988). Yet this structural transformation 
of the Spanish economy was exacerbated rather than mitigated by high 
interest rates and a strong currency, because both of these factors fn-
couraged resources to flow into precisely those sectors that were better 
able to pass on their costs to consumers (i.e., nontradeables) and away 
from those sectors that were forced to compete with cheap imports 
(i.e., tradeables). As the 1992 OECD report acknowledged, the govern-
ment's policies thus were producing a "shift of resources from the 
sectors exposed to foreign competition to the sheltered sectors," and 
the renewed acceleration of inflation after 1988 was overwhelmingly 
due to this shift.22 
20 See the section on labor market reform in OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1994. 
21 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, pp. 62, 65. 
22 Ibid., pp. 21, 28. 
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Ind~ed, if in the late 1970s the Spanish economy had displayed the 
foatures of an overdraft economy a·s a result of decade\ of cheap credit, 
by the early 1990s it had acquired m;my of the fe,.atures of a Dutch 
disease economy: poor export performance, rapid growth of the less 
competitive sectors of the economy, and the combination of an over-
valued currency, high interest rates, and inflation. 23 The persistence of 
inflation was perhaps the most striking of these factors, given the gov-
ernment's commitment to fight it. Yet, as the OECD analysis suggests, 
inflation was rooted jn a shift of investment from competitive to less 
competitive sectors, which was being spurred by high interest rates and 
the overvaluation of the peseta. High interest rates and an overvalued 
currency thus undermined not only the competitiveness and productiv -
ity growth of Spanish. firms but also the one objective that Spanish 
policymakers were focusing on: disinflation. 
These observations raise the question of just how Spanish policy-
makers ended up facing this conundrum. Standard economic accounts 
tend to overlook two factors behind this outcome. The first is the 
strategic role that interest rates acquired in Spanish economic policy at 
the end of the 1980s. The second is the way in which the government's 
policy strategy was both encouraged and hampered by the nature of the 
domestic financial market. 
Although the high level of Spanish interest rates is commonly inter-
preted as an unintended outcome of other policy failures, the interest 
rate differential between Spain and other EC countries served an impor-
tant strategic purpose in Spanish policy during the late 1980s. The 
appreciable eff~ct of partisan politics on public spending (as reflected in 
the ren<,~ed_ exR~nsion of social transfers after the Socialists' narrow 
victor{iri' T989) a·n'd the ability of the unions to raise their members' 
23 The source of overvaluation in a Dutch disease economy is a sector that is experienc-
ing explosive growth, thereby producing large inflows of foreign capital. The overvalua-
tion of the currency and the inflation caused by capital jnflows create a bias against 
investment in other tradable sectors and are thus associated with deindustrialization. 
Typically, the term has been used for economies in which a natural energy source has 
played this role (as with the discovery of natural gas in Holland or the windfall profits for 
oil-producing countries after the OPEC price shocks). In the Spanish case, however, what 
played this role was the sale of national assets to foreigners, both industrial and real 
estate, and the inflow of speculative capital to take advantage of high Spanish interest 
rates. See Candido Muiioz Cidad, "Un ajuste febril," El Pais, March 27 1991. For a 
general discussion of the Dutch disease concept, see W. M. Corden, "Booming Sector and 
Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation," Oxford Economic Papers 36 
(1984). 
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wages in the face of massive unemployment after 1988 cemented the 
perception among the ]?SOE's economic policy elite that high interest 
rates were the only w.ay to wage battle against inflation. This conclu-
sion was strongly influenced by the particular economic outlook, or 
"optic," that had become so dominant under the first Socialist admin-
istration. One critic summarized this outlook as follows: 
The European challenge has to be met. Nationalistic economic posi-
tions make no sense in the face of relentless European integration. 
Spain must prepare for that integration by aligning itself with the 
central or hard core (more and more, that is to say, with Germany), 
and since the essential characteristic of that core is a low level of 
inflation, this must be the overriding priority. 
Given these basic ideas, and taking into account the existing current 
account deficit, it is necessary to count on high interest rates to encour-
age capital inflows that can compensate [for that deficit], and to bol-
ster the peseta's value in order to cheapen imports. The scheme 
thus requires higher interest rates than [those of other EC] countries.24 
This argument, equating adjustment with eliminating the inflation 
differential between Spain and the ERM's low-inflation (and low-
growth) core countries, justified the strong currency course pursued in 
the late 1980s. It was premised on the notion that the nominal ex-
change rate could be used to enforce desired changes in economic 
fundamentals. High interest rates were the sine qua non of such a 
strategy, not just because they underpinned the strong currency but also 
because they were needed to attract sufficient foreign capital inflows to 
finance the resultant trade and current account deficits. In this sense, 
the level of interest rates that the government's tight monetary policy 
stance created in the Spanish economy in the late 1980s must be seen 
not just as an unintended outcome but also as entailing a policy choice. 
The government rejected the option of easing monetary policy in a 
manner commensurate with the very significant reduction in the public 
deficit achieved between 1986 and 1988. Had it pursued this option, it 
might have had to accept a more gradual disinflation between 1986 and 
1988 (when inflation was cut from 8.8 to 4.8 percent). Yet it might also 
have averted the speculative appreciation of the peseta, and the intense 
24 Antonio Torrero, "El poder de las ideas," El Pais, December 19, 1990. 
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shift of resources toward sheltered activities that reactivated inflation 
in• 1989. Such a choice, however, would have implied forgoing the 
., advan!ages vis-a-vis domestic actors (in_particular the unions) that the 
government associated with the strong peseta. Spanish policymakers' 
unshakable belief in these advantages is revealed in the notion that a 
strong currency, even if overvalued, would boost competitiveness by 
countering the ability of domestic producers to rely on a weak currency, 
and by facilitating "the productive re-equipment of the Spanish econ-
omy" through cheap imports. It is also reflected in the Bank of Spain's 
insistence that it was "not uncomfortable" with the peseta's apprecia-
tion in the face of a deteriorating current account, even as this apprecia-
tion was clearly undermining Spanish monetary policy.25 
The strategic policy choice behind the high interest rate/strong-
currency outcome also is reflected in two other aspects of Spanish 
economic policy~ the late 1980s and early 1990s: (1) the government's 
decision to forgo the collaboration of the unions in its fight against 
inflation; and (2) its increasingly untenable position on the issue of 
Spanish participation in European Monetary Union (EMU) after the 
ERM crisis of 1992-93. 
The government's strong-peseta policy course had dour implications 
for Spanish unions. The appreciation of the peseta after 1986 rapidly 
eroded the international competitiveness of Spanish firms. The reliance 
on high interest rates to attract sufficient capital inflows to finance a 
growing account deficit thus required wages to compensate not just for 
the higher financial costs carried by Spanish firms but also for the 
lowered profitability that this loss of competitiveness entailed. As 
critics argued, the. government's strategy turned wage mo~eration into 
the ''ceii.'traP' and ·apparently only "variable in the performance of the 
[economic] system." 26 With unemployment failing to decline below the 
16 percent mark despite an average growth rate of almost 5 percent 
between 1986 and 1990, one of the consequences of this stance was the 
' 25 See the views on Spain's ERM entry by the deputy finance minister, Pedro Perez, in 
Financial Times, June 20, 1990; Daniel Manzano, at FEDEA/Fundes-Club Conference, 
Madrid, June 13, Cuadernos de Informaci6n (FIES), July 1991; Financial Times, June 13, 
1990. 
26 Jesus Albarracin and Pedro Montes, "La 6.nica politica posible?" Espana Econ6mica, 
January 1991, p. 25. The point was continuously emphasized by government officials, 
who tended to cast competitiveness as a simple function of wage moderation. See, for 
example, El Pais (Internacional), June 4 and December 31, 1990, and May 16, 1991; and 
El Independiente, October 24, 1991. 
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agreed to just such a limit in the 1988 public sector wage round, only to 
see actual inflation rise. to almost double the assumption, rejected the 
proposal. 29 That same year, the government also refused to allqcate any 
part of a windfall surplus from taxation and social security contribu-
tions to social spending, despite the fact that the proportion of unem-
ployed receiving benefits continued to fall far below its 1984 commit-
ment. It chose instead to allocate the surplus to lowering the public 
deficit to 2.7 percent in 1989 (a level well below the EC average). The 
result was ·a complete rupture between the PSOE and the UGT and the 
latter's alliance with the CC.OO., which culminated in the general 
strike of December 1988. 30 
The government decided in essence to "ignore the unions and take 
the risk" despite the fact that until 1989 (and hence until the break) 
wages had continued to have a clear moderating influence on infla-
tion.31 Contrary to the authorities' expectations, however, the unions 
would manage to extract greater wage concessions from employers 
after the collapse of the concertation process in 1988. This seems to 
have been an important element in the government's decision to enter 
the EMS a year ahead of schedule in 1989-and to do so at an ex-
change rate that signaled its willingness to live with an overvalued 
currency. 
The pressure exerted on Spain by its ERM partners and its growing 
inability to impose wage restraint through interest rate hikes eventually 
spurred the government to attempt to revive concertation in the early 
1990s. In early 1990 the IMF began to call on Spanish authorities to 
seek an incomes policy agreement with the unions that would tie real 
wage growth to productivity growth. The government moved on the 
recommendation a year later, when the Bundesbank again raised the 
possibility of a two-speed EMU and officials began to worry that if 
Spanish interest rates were not cut and the peseta not moved to the 
standard 2.25 percent ERM band, Germany and France might try to 
keep Spain out of the first phase of such a union. In 1991, shortly after 
the Bank of Spain had cut interest rates 20 points in response to a 
request from the Bank of England (which was seeking to cut its base 
rate), the government proposed a "competitiveness pact" along the 
29 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1991, p. 67 
30 Richard Gillespie, "The Break-up of the 'Socialist Family': Party-Union Relations in 
Spain, 1982-1989," West European Politics, January 1990, p. 53. 
31 OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, pp. 58-59. 
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lines set out by the IMF. 32 By then, however, trust ha.cl been seriously 
eroded, and the unions refused to resolve the external and internal 
contradictions of the government's strong-peseta strategy by agreeing 
to limit their wage demands. 
The government's reliance on the overvalued currency to enforce 
adjustment was also highlighted in its response to the 1992-93 crisis in 
the ERM. Intent on having Spain included in a fast-track Europe, the 
government drew up a "convergence" plan of fiscal and monetary 
measures in early 1992 meant to allow Spain to meet all of the require-
ments set out in the Ma~stricht Treaty. Included were across-the-board 
cuts in unemployment benefits and a doubling of the work time re-
quired to qualify for benefits, which were imposed by decree and vir-
tually without consultation with the unions. 33 Although the plan 
strongly overestirpated the rate of capital formation in Spain and was 
thrown off track by the subsequent crisis in the ERM, Spanish officials 
continued to "treat convergence towards economic and monetary 
union as an article of faith" in 1993. A Financial Times article on the 
Spanish response to the currency crisis noted that, "as usually occurs 
among those embracing a dogma," the government was "quite un-
aware of the disbelief among others." Having "fixed its sights on con-
verging with the rich Community economies," it had "worked out how 
to reach its target in clqsed doors meetings of motivated policy makers 
and relentlessly set out on its course although it [might] scorch the earth 
it treads on." 34 
If the government's response seemed entirely out of touch with real-
ity to foreign observers, it represented a desperate attempt to rescue a 
policy ~~rs~_it l\aq .pursued since the mid-1980s. To pay off econom-
ically and politically, that policy course (including the standoff with the 
unions) required continued capital inflows. These, however, had come 
to depend increasingly on the credibility of an overvalued peseta, which 
in turn was now closely tied to the prospect of European currency 
union and to Spanish participation in it. The' point was poignantly 
illustrated when foreign purchases of Spanish public debt dropped 
32 Financial Times, March 15 and June 19, 1991; El Independiente, October 24, 1991. 
Such fears also led the government to depart momentarily from its staunch pro-EMU 
stance in late 1990, when it proposed a one-year delay in the movement toward monetary 
union, only to be rebuffed by its EC partners. See El Pais (Internacional), September 10 
and 24, 1990. 
3 3 Financial Times, April 13, 1992. 
34 Torn Burns, "Markets Distrust Dogma," Financial Times, April 2, 1993. 
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sharply in response to the Danish "no to Maastricht" vote in June 
1992. It was fully driven home by the ERM currency crisis two months 
later, when, despite its long-held position as the highest valued currency 
in the system, th~ peseta became the subject of a massive speculative 
attack that forced the government to devalue and to impose sharp 
interest rate hikes and spending cuts just as domestic demand was 
contracting. Remaining in the system, and not following the British and 
Italian governments out, was viewed as critical to maintaining the for-
eign capital lifeline. The government therefore threw its weight behind 
an ever more doubtful project of early monetary union, continuing to 
portray Spanish participation as a simple function of mustering the 
necessary "tenacity." 35 Such commitment might have seduced foreign 
investors as long as the European project was not challenged, but it 
now began to be perceived as sheer "dogmatism" by the markets, 
forcing two further peseta devaluations on the government before the 
ERM's effective suspension in August 1993. 36 
The excesses of the Spanish policy course were captured in the dra-
matic consequences of the ERM crisis for the Spanish economy. The 
government did manage to keep the peseta in the EMS, but only 
through severe adjustment measures that cut public consumption to 
1.6 percent of GDP in 1993 (the lowest level since 1969) and pushed 
the unemployment rate up from 18 percent at the end of the second 
quarter of 1992 to over 24 percent by the first quarter of 1994. The 
string of forced devaluations and subsequent depreciation of the peseta 
(by as much as 30 percent in nominal terms by 1995), on the other 
hand, did allow a radical transformation of the Spanish balance of 
payments, reducing the current account deficit from over 3 percent of 
GDP in 1992 to less than 1 percent in 1993, one of the fastest external 
adjustments ever experienced by an OECD country. Inflation, so per-
sistent in the days of the strong peseta, also declined substantially to 4.6 
percent in 1993. Despite the government's refusal to take advantage of 
the opportunity to restore competitiveness afforded to the British and 
Italian economies by their exit from the ERM, the system's crisis thus 
offered some relief to an economy that had been made to endure a 
policy strategy that sought "the achievement of the final results [ of the 
35 Felipe Gonzalez, quoted in Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1992. 
36 Financial Times, April 2, 1993. Once the future of the EMU was questioned, foreign 
speculators no longer believed that the government could in the long run avoid deval-
uation. 
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core EMS] countries, i.e., low i!}flation and strong curren_cy, through 
• the use of the financial lever, placing the whole burcfen of adiustment on 
tht; productive apparatus. ".37 Mor~. than three reai:s of severe ove~-
valuation nonetheless left a lasting mark, and by the time of the PSOE s 
electoral defeat in 1996, unemployment still hovered around 23 
percent. 
Back to the Financial System 
The costs that the· government's strategy imposed on the economy 
and its self-defeating effect on the fight against inflation bring us bac_k 
to the question why it was so insistently followed. One answer may he 
in the choices imposed on Spanish authorities by the EU's move toward 
monetary union. Given the oft-noted deflationary bias of the_ ERM, 
which Spain would have to join to participate in EMU,38 the idea of 
promoting the reequipment of industry by che_a~e~ing imports through 
a strong currency rather than seeking to mimmize th~ loss of com-
petitiveness of Spanish exporters might be seen ~s _a rational respon_se. 
Because the ERM was more effective at constrammg monetary policy 
than fiscai"policy, countries willing to endure a significant overvalu~-
tion of their currencies resulting fr9m an unbalanced macroeconomic 
policy mix could maintain higher growth in the late 19~0s than coun-
tries seeking to fit both their fiscal and monetary policy to German 
interest rates.39 The notion that a high nominal exchange rate could be 
used to enforce convergence toward the economic fundamentals of core 
EMS countries also was not unique to Spain. Italian authorities relied 
hea.vily, on such .~ premise at the end of the 1980s, when they sharply 
tightened monetary policy to address Italy's extremely large budget 
deficits. 
The ERM may indeed have warped the incentives for policymakers 
in the late 1980s. At the very least, it faile? to discourage the l_ack of 
balance in the Spanish policy course. However, the costs of allowmg the 
37 Torrero, "Poder de las ideas." 
38 On the ERM's deflationary bias, see Stefano Vona, "Real Exchange Rates and Trade 
Imbalances in the EMS," in Piero Ferri, ed., Prospects for the European Monetary System 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). f 
39 Such a conclusion can be read from Vona's analysis of growth and balance o 
payments developments in the ERM (ibid.), particularly from the c~ntr~sts he draws 
between the experience of Italy and that of France, where fiscal consohdatton was taken 
much farther in the late 1980s. 
186 BANKING ON PRIVILEGE 
Spanish economy in essence to "live off other people's money while 
paying the highest int'erest rates in Europe for the privilege" 4 0 were 
staggering, and seern to belie the notion that the government~s reliance 
on high interest rates simply reflected a coolheaded dose of supply-side 
socialism. 41 With the exception of Italy in the late 1980s, no other 
government in the ERM relied so stubbornly and unilaterally on the 
exchange rate lever in its fight against inflation. France's policy of 
"competitive disinflation," which also is sometimes referred to as the 
franc fort policy, involved a far more balanced policy mix. It was 
guided by the criterion of keeping interest rates high enough to main-
tain the franc within the lower end of its ERM band until the actual 
disinflation process allowed it to move gradually to the center of its 
band in the late 1980s. 42 And in the case of Italy, where public deficits 
surpassed 10 percent of GDP in the late 1980s and appeared virtually 
intractable, the decision to lean on the nominal exchange rate as a last-
ditch effort seems more understandable than in the Spanish case, where 
the overall public deficit had been cut from 7 percent in 1985 to 3.1 
percent in 1987 and where the public debt was still one of the lowest in 
Europe. 
Another explanation lies in the character of the Spanish policymak-
ing community and in the extraordinary sway that the central bank's 
views had gained in policymaking circles by the mid-1980s. These 
factors account for the obsessive tendency to view inflation as a simple 
function of wage growth even when the empirical record clearly 
showed that the sources of inflation were of a different nature. They 
also help explain the extent to which any course that might have 
lowered the value of the peseta came to be seen as a capitulation to the · 
unions. The strong currency strategy also conformed with the central 
bank reformers' long-held objective of altering the institutional bases of 
4° Financial Times, March 15, 1991. 
41 New York Times, February 13, 1989. This interpretation of the Socialists' policies 
also is challenged by the paltry character of other supply-side policies. Thus, although the 
Socialists increased R&D expenditures in the public sectors, these expenditures continued 
to average only 0.7% of GNP from 1985 to 1990, compared to a 2% average in the EC. 
Expenditures on vocational training in relation to GDP remained less than half the OECD 
average, despite the relevance of such policies in the context of Spain's extraordinary 
unemployment levels. See El Pais (Internacional), November 12, 1990; OECD, Economic 
Surveys: Spain, 1992, p. 70. 
42 Vona's analysis suggests that whereas Italy and Denmark tolerated a significant real 
appreciation of their currencies, disinflation in France was based on internal cost cutting 
rather than on the use of the exchange rate. See "Real Exchange Rates," pp. 70-75. 
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. Spanish policymaking. Thus, even if reliance on the ~xchange rate lever 
was ultimately counterproductive in, the fight against inflation, it had 
the virtue of preserving the influence of the central bank over national 
economic policy. 
The central bank's ability to define the thinking behind Spanish pol-
icy played an important role in the late 1980s. Yet the course of Spanish 
policy also responded to the particular constraints and incentives that 
derived from the structure of the domestic financial market. The man-
ner in which financial liberalization had been pursued had persistently 
limited competition in the supply of corporate finance and therefore 
placed extraordinary financial costs on Spanish firms. Even before the 
rapid appreciation qf the peseta at the end of the 1980s, the Spanish 
economy thus was subject to a bias against investment in productive 
capacity in cohipetitive sectors and in favor of a reallocation of re-
sources toward sectors and activities that could better absorb such 
costs. This bias is reflected in the high return that firms were able to 
attain from their financial investments (see Table 3 in chapter 1), and in 
the nature of foreign investment. After Spain's entry into the EC in 
1986, foreign capital had first flown predominantly into manufactures, 
as foreign investors sought to take advantage of lower wages and the 
extreme undervaluation of Spanish industrial stocks. Yet a large share 
of foreign money was quickly rerouted toward the financial services 
sector, which became the main beneficiary of foreign capital inflows 
after 1987 
The strong currency strategy pursued by the Socialist government 
sougp,t to •turn this preexisting high interest rate bias in the economy 
into~~ instrument that would allow it to curb wages and fight inflation 
while simultaneously attracting the necessary foreign capital inflows to 
finance the resulting current account deficit. Yet in such an economy 
interest rate measures could have only a limited impact on inflation (as 
they encouraged the resource allocation that made the economy 
inflation-prone). This limitation was ultimately reflected in the govern-
ment's resort to credit ceilings and controls on capital inflows starting 
in 1988. Because the central bank reformers in charge of economic 
policy were unwilling to impose a more radical transformation of the 
domestic financial market, Spanish policy in the late 1980s thus be-
came caught up in an attempt to suppress the inflationary consequences 
of this underlying bias through a policy strategy that could do nothing 
but exacerbate the inflation-proneness of the Spanish economy. 
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The hampered structure of the Spanish financial market also con-
tributed to the h1gh inlerest rate policy course in other ways. One was 
the persistent malle~bility of the Spanish public debt market, whose 
development had been retarded in the mid-1980s by the search for 
"negotiated solutions" that preserved the banks' position as intermedi-
aries in the economy. The banks' control over the public debt market 
raised the cost of financing the public deficit. It was also responsible for 
the conflict between central bank and Treasury interest rates that 
marred Spanish policy in the early 1990s. The Treasury's attempt to 
lower its costs through foreign issues of long-term public debt, which 
was obstructed by the central bank in 1991, received a further setback 
when the ERM currency crisis sharply eroded the interest of foreign 
investors in Spanish securities. Just the first devaluation of the peseta in 
September 1992, moreover, instantly added over 300 billion pesetas to 
the cost of the public debt. 43 The compromises made between public 
officials and the banks on developing the public debt market in the 
1980s thus continued to contribute to the cost of deficit financing in the 
early 1990s. 
However, the most evident way in which the financial sector con-
tributed to the excesses of the Spanish policy course in the late 1980s 
was through its direct role in promoting the sectoral shift of resources 
that made the Spanish economy so inflation-prone. Not having been 
forced to cut their costs during the recession years, the banks at the end 
of the 1980s maintained their oligopolistic interest margins by mas-
sively shifting credit to those sectors and activities that were least sensi-
tive to high interest rates and most likely to pass on their costs to 
consumers. The galloping pace at which the banks were extending 
credit to sheltered sectors, speculative ventures, and consumers 1n 1988 
and early 1989 allowed demand for services during this period to grow 
twice as fast as overall consumer demand. 44 This development was 
what lay behind the re-acceleration of inflation that prompted the 
government to risk the collapse of the social concertation process and 
the complete alienation of the unions. 
One can of course still argue that if the deficit had been cut further in 
the 1980s, or if wage growth had not picked up after 1988, Spain 
43 Analistas Financieros, "La financiaci6n del deficit corriente," El Pais, September 22, 
1992. 
44 OECD, Economic Survey: Spain, 1992, p. 63; Financial Times, February 24, 1989. 
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would have had lower interest rates and lower in{lation in the early 
'1990s. A.fl these explanations, however, neglect how the failure to re-
form the domestic financiarinarket drove the inttactable inflationary 
process in Spain and overdetermined the views and choices of Spanish 
policymakers through the end of the 1980s. 
Conclusion· The Politics of 
Financial Liberalization 
T he trend toward market-oriented reform in formerly interven-tionist states is commonly interpreted as the result of systemic market forces that force societies to alter their regulatory in-
stitutions in a manner that allows them to allocate resources more 
efficiently. Such a market-driven view relegates political and historical 
factors to a second order, and leads us to expect that, other things being 
equal, reform is likely to support the competitiveness of national econ-
omies. The Spanish experience challenges these assumptions by sug-
gesting that the political dynamic behind liberalization may be quite 
independent of the dictates of competitive market forces, and that this 
dynamic can produce a reform process that fails to support an econ-
omy's competitiveness. 
The protracted and biased course of financial liberalization in Spain 
is the direct consequence of the domestic historical dynamic that 
brought such reform about. The way liberalization was carried out and 
its consequences for the Spanish economy were the result of strategic 
choices on the part of anti-interventionist reformers whose first priority 
was to alter the institutional structure of Spanish economic policymak-
ing to give greater influence and leverage to the central bank. These 
outcomes reflect a pattern of accommodation between state elites and 
the private banking sector that can be traced back to the beginning of 
190 
CONCLUSION 191 
the twentieth century, and that w:as just as pervasive in the neoliberal 
reform drive of the 197Os and 198Os as it was in the creation of an 
interventionist regulatory framework under the franco regime. The 
prolonged privileging of the banking sector in Spain, however, was not 
just a secondary domestic effect in an independently driven process of 
change. It was the consequence of the same developments in the Span-
ish state that brought about the early turn to market-oriented reform. 
Much of my analysis relies on the contrast between the Spanish 
experience and that of France, the country on which the interventionist 
framework of financial regulation introduced in Spain in the early 
196Os was modeled. The adoption of the French regulatory model in 
Spain, I have suggested, was not just a matter of institutional mimicry. 
It reflected import'anf urtderlying similarities in the politics of postwar 
economic polic1 between the two countries. The similarities, however, 
stop precisely at the point at which the market-driven view leads us 
to expect greater convergence: when governments move to abandon 
interventionism in favor of a market-based system of capital alloca-
tion. What insights can we draw from this contrast between the Span-
ish and French experiences about the politics of domestic financial lib-
eralization? ·· 
The French-Spanish Contrast and the Politics of Regulatory Reform 
The story of Spanish financial reform highlights the primary role of 
state elites rather than economic actors in bringing about the regulatory 
shift 3.way from interventionism. With the exception of foreign banks, 
no doirtestic sectoral actors exerted any significant pressure in favor of 
liberalization when it was initiated, and the interests of foreign banks 
were all but relegated to insignificance for well over a decade after the 
reform process was initiated. The Spanish case also highlights the pri-
macy of monetary policy considerations OVfr other economic objec-
tives in bringing about the shift away from interventionism, as do 
analyses of the French experience by other authors. 1 Yet in France the 
1 Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Re-
form (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jacques Melitz, "Financial Deregulation in 
France," European Economic Review 34 (1990); Stephen S. Cohen, James Galbraith, and 
John Zysman, "Rehabbing the Labyrinth: The Financial System and Industrial Policy in 
France," in Cohen and Peter A. Gourevitch, eds., France in the Troubled World Economy 
(London: Butterworth, 1982). 
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course of reform conformed broadly to the objective of supporting the 
adjustment of French producers to new international conditions by 
accompanying credit - deregulation with substantial financial- market 
reform. Although French governments resisted abandoning the princi-
ple of discretionary credit regulation that allowed them to provide 
financing at low interest rates to favored users until the rnid-1980s 
' once they decided to do so, credit deregulation was accompanied by an 
assertive and simultaneous effort to boost the role of the capital market 
as a source of long-term investment finance. Indeed, preliminary steps 
that would bolster the capacity of the capital market to play such a role 
were undertaken in France well before the regulatory turnabout of the 
1980s. The Spanish reform effort, by contrast, failed to support the 
ability of Spanish producers to adjust to international competition in 
very important ways, replacing one set of economic problems (an over-
draft economy in which producers relied heavily on institutional credit) 
by another (a Dutch-disease economy in which resources were re-
directed away from productive investment in tradeables and toward 
investment and consumption in sheltered sectors). 
These differences in the actual course of reform were accompanied 
by some more subtle but nonetheless telling differences in how the 
regulatory shift away from interventionism was ideologically packaged 
and conceptualized in the two countries. Though the arguments for 
credit deregulation were based largely on the efficiency of capital al-
location in both countries, the French reform effort was intended to 
emulate the German (or, as popularized by Michel Albert, the Rhen-
nish) model of organized capitalism, which centered on the institution 
of universal banking. 2 In practice, reform in France produced a far 
greater shift toward reliance on the capital markets, .and in this sense 
seems to have approached the Anglo-Saxon model more than the Ger-
man. 3 But the choice of Germany as an ideological referent is nonethe-
less significant because it illustrates the consideration given to the prob-
lem of industrial finance in a process that was driven primarily by 
monetary policy considerations. As Philip Cerny puts it, reform in 
France was ultimately based on "the convergence of two logics," a 
financial policy and an industrial policy logic.4 It was clearly influenced 
2 Loriaux, France after Hegemony, pp. 206, 227, 237 
3 Melitz, "Financial Deregulation in France." 
4 Philip Cerny, "The 'Little Big Bang' in Paris: Financial Market Deregulation in 
France," European of Political Research 17 (1989): 182. 
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also by a strong awareness that being able to keep up in Europe (specifi-
cally with 'Germany) required that attention be giv:n on a structural 
(financial market) level to the- investment requirements of French pro-
ducers, even as French governments chose to subject macroeconomic 
policy to German direction. 
The reform effort in Spain, by contrast, was conceptualized far more 
strictly as a domestic political battle against the enemy within, as CO!Jl-
bating the historical scourge of government interventionism in Spain. 
Once the French model (so closely associated with authoritarianism in 
Spain) had been discatded, no other European referent took its place. 
Spanish reformers appeared convinced instead that they could achieve 
convergence with Europe only by approaching the solutions spelled out 
in monetarist and neo.classical eco"nomic theory and generally identified 
with the Uniteq States. As in the French case, however, the external 
referent, while connoting something important about the politics of 
reform, served more as an ideological tool than as a guide to action. 
The issue of industrial finance was virtually exorcised from the prob-
lem of financial reform in Spain. The advantage of a market-based 
financial system was taken as a matter of faith, even though the struc-
ture of that market went unreformed for well over a decade after credit 
deregulation was initiated. Only in the late 1980s, when developments 
at the European level overtook the Spanish reform process and created 
a new set of concerns for state elites, was reform of the capital market 
(so central to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate finance) finally 
addressed. By then, however, Spanish policymakers had become so 
focused on the challenge that lay ahead for the domestic private banks 
that ~en this reform effort was calibrated and directed largely at boost-
ing th~ ~r~fits and' staying power of the banks, rather than nonfinancial 
firms, in a single European market. 
What these contrasts and paradoxes illustrate is the extent to which 
reforms that are commonly seen as driven and determined by competi-
tive market pressures respond to historical 1developments within the 
state. The critical difference in the two reform processes lies in the 
character of the state actors who controlled it, and in the way financial 
reform fitted into their broader set of objectives. In Spain, financial 
reform was promoted and controlled by a network of reformers an-
chored in the central bank, and it became a vehicle for furthering that 
institution's influence over policy. In France, central bank economists 
also did much of the intellectual groundwork and participated in the 
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drafting of proposals for regulatory reform. But the process was con-
trolled and coordinated _ by the Treasury, a part of the state bureaucracy 
that had been "the .. economic apex in a centralized state" for four 
d~cades _and that combined responsibility for both monetary and indus-
tnal ?ohcy. 5 The Bank of France remained in a subordinate position at 
the time of the reforms, and the Treasury continued to set the overall 
direction of monetary policy when France focused on disinflation in the 
mid-1980s. 6 The French central bank, moreover, did not become the 
object of a contending network of policymakers who defined them-
selves in opposition to other parts of the state. It was embedded in an 
overarching network of high-ranking civil servants that centered on the 
Treasury_ ~nd served to integrate the industrial and financial policy 
commumties. The career path of high-ranking Bank of France officials 
thus typically went from the Treasury to the central bank. Other parts 
of the financial policy community, notably the large commercial banks 
we:e also run by _civil servants designated by the Treasury or belongin~ 
to i~s bureaucratic corps. 7 This pattern contrasts strongly with that of 
S_pam~ where the opposite path, from the central bank into top posi-
t10ns m the executive, became so emblematic during the 1980s, and 
where the men in charge of designing the reform effort had come to see 
t?eir mission as that of elevating monetary policy and financial regula-
t10n to a plane apart from other policy concerns. 
To be sure, these differences in the identities and objectives of state 
reformers worked themselves out in interaction with other structural 
aspects of the domestic political economy. The imbalance within the 
5 
John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics 
of ln1ustrzal Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 114. See also Andrew 
Shonf1eld, ~odern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public · and Private ( Oxford: 
Oxford Umvers1ty Press, 1965), pp. 129-30; Stephen S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist 
Planning: The Frenc~ Model (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), chap. 4; and 
Jam~s K. Galbraith, Monetary Policy in France," Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics · 
(Sprmg 1_992): 399-400. There are varying positions on just how dominant the Treasury's 
pos1t10n is. Some observers argue that French policymaking is more pluralistic than I have 
suggested. In genernl, however, they question the extent of the Treasury's dominance 
rather than its pos1t10n as first among equals. See Jack Hayward The State and the 
Mp ark~t Economy (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp. 22-25; Cerny, :. 'Little Big Bang' in 
ar1s. 
6 
John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western 
E~rope (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 131-41. The Bank of France at-
t~m~d formal statutory autonomy in 1994 in preparation for European Monetary Uni-
f1cat10n (EMU). 
7 Ibid., p. 109; Banker, May 1995. 
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Spani~h policymaking elite and the extent to which financial reform 
came to canter on compromises between the centool bank and the 
private banks were exacerbated by the weak position of Spanish indus-
try vis-a-vis the financial sector. • 
By the mid-1970s, the great majority of large private industrial firms 
were under the control of either the banks or foreign capital. Because 
foreign-controlled firms had greater access to external financing, the 
position of industry as an independent political pressure group was 
weak when it came to an issue, such as financial regulation, were its 
interests conflicted ~ith that of the banks. 8 The influence of public 
industry, on the other ·hand, was curtailed by ·the fact that the sector 
was saddled with so many firms in decline as a result of the socializa-
tion of losses that took place in the 1970s. In France, by contrast, the 
public sector included a significant number of industrial champions 
that were still l:egarded as indispensable to the country's economic 
success. It also encompassed the large commercial banks, which had 
been effectively nationalized since 1945. 
These structural factors may have contributed to the divergence of 
the Spanish and French reform processes, but they are not sufficient to 
explain that •<livergence. French industry included more international 
heavyweights in the 1980s than did Spanish industry. Yet these firms 
were the ones least in need of domestic financial restructuring, because 
they had access to i:nternational markets. If the reform process ad-
dressed the needs of industrial firms to a far greater extent in France 
than in Spain, it was not because of organized sectoral pressure on the 
state. It was rather because reform in France was advanced by a net-
work pf stat~ elites that integrated, rather than separated, the financial 
and ihdustrial'pbiicymaking communities. To be sure, public owner-
ship of the financial sector facilitated reform in France, because French 
policymakers, unlike their Spanish counterparts, did not have to con-
tend with a private cartel. Yet I have shown that post-Franco govern-
ments in Spain had several tools at their disppsal to exert leverage over 
the private banks (including the legal regime governing the operations 
of foreign banks and the official credit institutions), but that they chose 
consistently not to pursue these options. The Socialist government also 
chose to forgo the opportunity afforded to it by the banking crisis of the 
8 This situation is reflected in the fact that the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) was 
granted disproportionate voting power in the Spanish employers' organization (CEOE). 
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early 1980s, which left a substantial portion of the banking sector's 
deposits and the-infras,tructure of those industrial banks rescued with 
public funds in its h~nds. 
These observations bespeak the importance of the identities and mo-
tivations of state elites in explaining the course of reform in the two 
countries. Yet it might be argued that the differences I am describing 
simply represent residual variation in a process of market-induced con-
vergence of regulatory institutions. There is little doubt that the inter-
national e'conomic context changed significantly for the French and 
Spanish economies sometime in the late 1960s as a result of the adop-
tion of an overtly expansionist monetary policy stance in the United 
States, new competition in product markets, the growth of offshore 
financial markets, and eventually the supply shocks of the 1970s. Such 
changes created specific policy challenges for governments that had 
been able to pursue relatively expansionary policies since the 1950s. 
There was now less balance-of-payments leeway for monetary expan-
sion, so that governments had to pay greater attention to restricting the 
overall level of liquidity as opposed to directing liquidity flows, or in 
effect rationing credit selectively rather than selectively expanding it. 
These changes in the international context, however, are often em-
phasized in a way that obscures the endogenous political limits of the 
strategy of defusing social conflict and maintaining the profitability of 
firms through cheap credit policies in the late 1960s in both France and 
Spain. More important, although the changing economic context lim-
ited the room for expansionary monetary policies, raising the political 
costs of a regulatory framework that now forced governments to allo-
cate openly the costs of adjustment to external shocks, it did not deter-
mine any particular course of reform. The shift away from interven.-
tionism is best understood as involving two separate kinds of objectives 
and motivations. The basic one, which is responsible for the cross-
national trend away from interventionism, constitutes an essentially 
negative choice on the part of political or elected authorities to extricate 
the state's authority from allocating the costs of adjustment by getting 
rid of selective credit regulation. Whether or not such credit deregula-
tion is accompanied by adequate "market reform," however, is a func-
tion of the motivations of reformers within the state bureaucracy and 
of the character of the domestic policymaking community. 
Unpacking the cross-national trend away from interventionism in 
this way also explains the different timing of the decisions by political 
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authorities to abandon selective regulation in France and Spain. In both 
cases the move occurred when elected authorities 6ecame convinced 
that ~usterity was unavoidabte· but per.ceived that it~ntailed substantial 
political risks, so that proposals for market-ori~nte1 reform suddenly 
offered an important political advantage. In Spam this moment came at 
the height of the political transition, when the Suarez government had 
to face up to the simultaneous tasks of thwarting a mounting balance-
of-payments crisis while inaugurating a democr~tic ~olitical process. In 
France, it came only after 1983, when Frarn;01s Mitterrand w~s con-
vinced that there was· no alternative to austerity and to keepmg the 
franc in the ERM. By differentiating the decision to abandon interven-
tionism from other facets of reform, . we also can better account for the 
difference in the extent to which liberalization was accompanied by 
market reform ~n the two countries. In Spain, a network of refor~ers 
anchored in the central bank, for whom reform represented a vehicle 
for increasing the bank's influence over policy, rejected any asserti~e 
attempt to use the resources at the state's disposal to increase con:ipeti-
tion in the credit market. Reform was guided instead by a senes of 
compromises between these reformers and the private b~nk~ that were 
intended to .secure the central. bank's principal reform ob1ectives and to 
preempt any attempt by other political actors to usurp its leadership in 
the reform process. Jn France, by contrast, where the reform process 
was coordinated by the Treasury and coincided with a differe~t, less 
divisive, configuration in the domestic policymakin~ commu~ity, the 
monetary policy decision to abandon selective credit regulat10n was 
accompanied by much more aggressive market reform. . 
Tht :historical displacement of an industry-oriented policy outlook m 
the Spa.ni~h poli~ymaking community and the more balanced perspec-
tive on adjustment that persisted in France are critical to ~n. understand-
ing of the course of reform in the two countries. It also is importa~t to 
note however that developments within the state were not determmed 
solel~ by ide;logy. The relative success of market-oriented reform in 
France was facilitated in important ways by the fact that the state 
ultimately had control over the banking sector. Public ~wnership_ m_ade 
it easier for public officials to abolish regulatory practices that limited 
competition in the credit market. It also allowed the state to use the 
banks as a compensatory mechanism to aid industry ~fter th~ 19~7 
stock market crash and the 1992 ERM crisis. Indeed, this relationship 
persisted in the early 1990s, even after the privatization of two of the 
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three !arge commercial banks (Societe General and BNP), and may have 
contributed to the state of bankruptcy discovered in 1994 at Credit 
Lyonnais. 9 Hence what may have been more important is the way state 
c_ontrol of the banking sector informed French policymakers' percep-
tions of the problem of adjustment. 
. The_nationalizations of 1945 contributed to the emergence of rela-
t1onsh1ps between the French policymaking elite, the banks and indus-
trial firm~ which ensured that the abandonment of inte;ventionism 
would not be seen as a solution in and of itself. In Spain, where a few 
lar~e c~mmercial banks emerged from the interwar period far better 
c_ap1ta~1zed than_ their French counterparts and still in private hands, 
~man~~al re~ul~t1on became the object of a different set of cleavages and 
1dent1t1es w1thm the state policymaking elite, contributing in the 1980s 
to a reform process that took place largely at the expense of Spanish 
producers. The comparison of the two cases therefore suggests that the 
comprehensiveness of financial reform in France may have been due 
largely to the way the state's control of the banking sector had shaped 
the character of the French policymaking elite. 
Finance and the Socialist Experiment i  Spain 
The analysis in this book has centered on exposing the historical 
backgrou~d an_d ~onsequences of financial reform in Spain, and on 
secular shifts w1thm the state's policymaking elite. It also, however has 
important implications for our understanding of the economic s~rat-
egies pursued by post-Franco governments, particularly by the Socialist 
government that came to office in 1982 and held an almost unchai- · 
leng:d parliamentary majority until 1993. As I have ~oted, the individ-
~als m ch~~e of economic policy under the PSOE, particularly the two 
f~nance m1msters, Miguel Boyer and Carlos Solchaga, were intimately 
lmked to the network of academic reformers at the central bank. But 
their policy preferences and views also became part of what the PSOE 
9 
The_ Socialist_ government persu~ded the commercial banks to swap shares with large 
mdustnal firms m the earl~ 1990s, man effort to encourage their involvement in industry 
and create core shareholdmgs to fend off hostile takeovers. Aher the ERM crisis the 
?overnrnent persua?ed. the large commercial banks not to pass on the full cost of the 
I~te~e.st rate hikes mst1tuted by the Bank of France to their core industrial clients, at 
s1?mf1cant cost to the banks' profits. See Institutional Investor, July 1994; Financial 
Times, October 9 and November 3, 1992, and March 2, 1993. 
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leadership came to regard as a social democratic policy strategy suited 
to the spe~ific situation of the Spanish economy int the 1980s. This 
orientation, which some obse,vers have designated as "supply-side so-
cialism," involved an almost categorkal rejection~ of countercyclical 
demand management as a solution to Spain's unemployment problem . 
It favored instead a long-term strategy of boosting competitiveness 
through macroeconomic rigor, wage moderation, and fiscal consolida-
tion to raise the level of public savings and to shift resources in the state 
budget away from ,social transfers into capital investments in in-
frastructure.10 In the view of the government's economic team, this 
combination of policies aimed at boosting profitability constituted the 
best strategy for integrating Spain into the European economy and for 
solving the problem 9f structural unemployment in the long run. 
If this strategy was· not to result in an increase in unemployment, it 
required contin\ied moderation and even a reduction in real wages. 
During the years covered by social concertation agreements, the pace of 
wage growth met this condition. Nominal wage agreements remained 
below actual inflation and unit labor costs fell continuously from 1978 
until the late 1980s. 11 Starting in 1989, however, wages accelerated, as 
the unions sought to recoup some of the concessions made during the 
previous years. The government's decision in the late 1980s to allow 
concertation to end was motivated by the perception of insufficient 
union cooperation in the fight against inflation and by the belief that an 
adequate reduction in real wages might be better achieved if the unions 
were forced to negotiate without the benefit of a social pact. The failure 
of this expectation is commonly attributed to the institutional features 
of the -Spanish labor market, which are believed to exacerbate the 
insid~~-cnifsid~·\:tmflict among workers by encouraging a predatory 
pursuit of benefits for union members at the expense of higher un-
employment.12 
This prevailing focus on labor market institutions is consistent with 
the comparative literature on social demop:racy, which stresses the 
"strategic capacity" of unions to engage in a solidaristic wage stance as 
10 See Carles Boix, "Political Parties, Growth, and Equality," unpublished manuscript, 
1995, pt. 2. 
11 Juan Dolado and S. Bentolila, "Labour Flexibility and Wages: Lessons from Spain," 
Economic Policy, no. 18, 1994; Blanchard et al., Spanish Unemployment, Annex 4; 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 1992, pp. 66-70. 
12 Olivier Blanchard et al., Spanish Unemployment: Is There a Solution? (London: 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995), pp. 56-57 
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the key to successful disinflation based on social concertation.13 Some 
organizational -:haraqteristics of the Spanish unions (such as ideological 
division and low mtmbership) were indeed not conducive to this.kind 
of "strategic capability." Other aspects, however, such as the primacy 
of bargaining at the sectoral level and the fact that Spanish labor law 
amplified the unions' influence in the wage-setting process (so that they 
could in fact predict the effect their demands would have on the econ-
omy), also can foster solidaristic wage restraint. Moreover, while as-
pects of-Spanish labor law inherited from the Franco regime, such as 
the high level of dismissal costs, militated against a solidaristic wage 
stance, the UGT was willing to go alol}g with substantial alterations of 
this legal framework during the Socialists' first term and moderate its 
wage demands to support the government's policies. The divorce be-
tween the government and the UGT at the end of 1988 was thus not so 
much over the distribution of costs as over the distribution of profits, as 
the union leadership felt it was time to reap the rewards of its earlier 
collaboration.14 
The analysis offered in the preceding chapters suggests that the gov-
ernment's conflict with the unions and the failure of incomes policy in 
Spain were determined significantly not by labor market features but by 
the state's compromised approach to reforming the structure of the 
financial market. The very significant contribution of wage moderation 
to the fight against inflation up until 1989 was undermined by the shift 
of resources into consumption and sheltered sectors that took place 
during the 1980s. This dynamic of the credit market, exacerbated by 
large inflows of short-term capital responding to Spain's high interest 
rates and to its appreciating currency, also lay behind the government's 
failure to reach the inflation targets to which the unions had agreeclto 
peg wages in the public sector in 1988. The fact that inflation was 
overshot again, by more than 3 points, in 1989, despite the draconian 
credit squeeze and capital controls imposed in that year, further eroded 
the government's credibility with the unions, undermining its attempts 
to revive concertation in the early 1990s. 
13 Fritz Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), pp. 176-78, 187-92. 
14 J~se Maria Maravall, "Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe," 
m Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in 
New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 119-20. 
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Th~ dynamic of the Spanish financial market thus persistently and 
n:peatedly undermined the government's ability to ddiver on its part of 
the deal in its attempt at social democracy. Voluntary wage restraint 
requires a belief in a "'social memory ·; for all nece;sary contributions 
and sacrifices, so that participants [are] relieved of the need to seek 
immediate compensation." 15 The persistence of inflation and unem-
ployment in spite of the UGT's cooperation eliminated any chance that 
labor could hold on to such a belief. In this context, the government's 
shows of socialist toµgh love became indistinguishable from a hostile 
and conservative mon~tarism, and its determlnation to use an over-
valued currency to keep pressure on the unions was bound to backfire. 
15 Scharpf, Crisis and ,Choice,. p. 178. 
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